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Case No. 20150840-SC
INTHE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Peli tioner,
V.

MANUEL ANTONIO LUJAN,

Defendant/Respondent.

Brief of Petitioner
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court
of Appeals in State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199 (Addendum A). The Supreme
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-3-102(5) (West 2009).

INTRODUCTION
Kendall Oney couldn't sleep and was sitting in the driver's seat of his
car at 3:30 in the morning when Defendant opened the door and squatted
down, putting his exposed face mere inches away from Oney's face.
Defendant looked directly at Oney and said, "Why you following me?" The
dome light and the dashboard lights illuminated the pair as they looked at
each other. After several seconds, Defendant stood and reached toward
what Oney believed to be a weapon tucked in his waistband. Oney slowly

stood, putting the two once again face-to-face for several more seconds in
an area lit by two street lights, a porch light, a flood light, and the car's
headlights. Oney spoke calmly and watched Defendant while at the same
time moving slowly around both Defendant and the car before bolting for
his house.

Defendant then stole Oney' s car.

Oney immediately called

police with a description of Defendant: a Hispanic male, about 5'10", 180
pounds, with long hair, and wearing a black leather jacket and a black
beanie.
Within 20 minutes of Oney' s early 1norning call, officers had:
followed a leak from Oney' s driveway to the stolen car parked next to a
walkway that led to an ele1nentary school; established a containment area
and a visible police presence; followed a canine from the car near the school;
discovered Defendant curled up inside a component of the school's exterior
air conditioning unit; and obtained Oney' s positive identification of
Defendant. Defendant matched the description Oney gave police, including
height, weight, build, coloring, ethnicity, and clothing. He had a "scraggly"
salt and pepper goatee that had not been 1nentioned, and he had no hair
sticking out from under his beanie. When asked why he was there at the
school, Defendant stated, "[S]omebody is following me." Oney thereafter

-2-

w.

identified Defendant as one of two familiar individuals at a lineup, then
positively identified him at the preliminary hearing and at trial.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This Court granted certiorari review on the following issues:
1. "Whether the majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals erred
in reversing the district court's denial of Respondent's motion to suppress

eyewitness identification testimony."
2. "Whether the majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals erred
in holding the State was required to demonstrate that any error in
admission of the eyewitness identification was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, and whether it erred in concluding the admission of that
testimony was not harmless."

Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews decisions of the
court of appeals for correctness. RalwfiJ v. Steadman, 2012 UT 70, ,I7, 289
P.3d 534.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provision is reproduced in Addendum

B:

Utah Const. art. I § 12.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary off acts.

Defendant's encounter with the victim - "Why you following me?"
Forty-year-old Kendall Oney was an amateur astronomer, familiar
with late-night and early-morning stargazing and used to getting up in the
very early morning. R357:15-18. So when he found him.self unable to sleep
around 3:30 a.m. on November 25, 2012, he got out of bed. R357:15-18, 65.
The night was overcast, so he decided to use the time to get his car ready for
its annual inspection. R357:16-18, 22, 65.
As he sat in the driver's seat in his driveway checking the starter,
gauges, and lights, he came face-to-face with Defendant, who opened the
driver's door and squatted next to the seat looking directly at Oney.
R357:16-18, 29, 34-35, 74-77. His face was about ten inches from Oney's face,
was not obscured by any covering, and was lit by the car's ''[f]airly bright"
interior lighting, which included both the dome and dashboard lights.
R357:17-18, 26, 35, 77. As Oney stared at Defendant's face, Defendant asked,
"Why you following me? Why you following me?" R357:18, 35, 77.
Oney initially thought Defendant might want a drink or a ride.
R357:18. But after about ten seconds, Defendant stood up, opened his jacket
and reached for the handle of something tucked into his waistband.
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G

R357:18, 35-36, 39, 77.

The movement left Oney looking directly at

Defendant's torso and hands, and upwards at his face.

R357:37-38, 78.

Oney's surprise turned to fear, and he decided to get back to the house.
R357:18-19, 35, 41, 78, 81. He stood up, putting himself face-to-face with an
equally-tall Defendant and so close that the men were "almost touching."
R357:37-38, 49-50, 101. At the same time, Oney started talking calmly to
Defendant, asking what was going on and if he was all right. R357:18-19,
35. For about five seconds, Oney moved slowly around Defendant and the
car as he talked, paying special attention to Defendant's face and hands and
never losing sight of him. R357:36-38, 40-41, 82. Defendant moved with
Oney, ultimately moving into the car's headlights. R357:36, 41, 51.
Oney saw Defendant as he stood up because of illumination from
multiple sources:
•

the car's headlights (R357:27);

e

the porch light by the back door of the house about twenty feet away
(R357:29, 67-68; State's Exh. 19);

0

a

a street light at the front of Oney' s house about thirty yards away
(R357:32-35; State's Exh. 9, 18);
a street light in the front yard of the house behind Oney' s car about
thirty-five feet away (R357:33, 69-72; State's Exh. 17);
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•

a flood light on the house next door to the driveway about forty feet
away, which shown on Defendant from behind (R357:30-34; State's
Exh. 16); and

• the reflection of the sh·eet lights and other lighting off the clouds
(R357:18, 26).
The trees were bare, allowing the multiple lighting sources to leave the area
"fairly well illuminated."

R357:22-23, 26.

In fact, the circumstances

provided "pretty bright" lighting, allowing Oney to see Defendant and to
judge his movements. R357:19, 22, 25-26.
After about five seconds of maneuvering, Oney turned and ran for his
house. R357:19, 40-41. He immediately turned on the flood lights on the
back of his house, woke up his brother, and stepped back outside in time to
watch Defendant squeal away in his car to the end of the driveway before
turning north and speeding away. R357:19, 29-30, 42-43, 67-69, 90-91; State's
Exh. 13, 14.

Defendant's capture by police- "[S]omebody is following me."
Oney called the police and gave a description of the car thief- a
Hispanic male, about 5'10", 180 pounds, with long hair, and wearing a black
leather jacket and a black beanie.

R357:42-44, 50, 83-87, 91; R359:10-12.

Officer Shawn Bias responded frmn nearby within a 1ninute of getting the
dispatch. R357:110, 117. While talking with Oney, Bias noticed a trail of
liquid on the ground leading from where the car had been parked to the end
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of the driveway, then turning north the way Oney's car had gone. R357:45,
119-20. The officer immediately left to follow the trail, which led directly to

Oney's abandoned car a few blocks away.

R357:46-48, 119-20, 125-32;

R359:13; State's Exh. 1. It was stopped at a curb a few blocks from Oney's

house in front of a fenced concrete pathway leading to the schoolyard of an
elementary school. R357:120-21; State's Exh. 21, 23, 24.
Because no more than ten minutes had passed since Oney's call to
police, Bias believed that the suspect could still be nearby. R357:122-23.
The location and the officer's years of experience led him to believe that the
suspect may have seen the police, abandoned the car, and hid. R357:124.
,:·::-.

Vi1J

Consequently, the officer called for a K-9 unit to help locate the suspect and
for additional officers to set up a containment barrier to prevent his escape.
R357:122-23.

Officer Swazo and his dog arrived shortly after, and the dog wasted
no time picking up a scent and leading the officers "very strongly" from
Oney' s car to the nearby pathway, then down the pathway and across the
schoolyard toward the school. R357:125-29, 143-44; R359:17. Officer Swazo
handled the dog while Officer Bias followed behind him with his flashlight
on and gun drawn.

R357:128-29.

Officer Bias was 1nere feet into the

schoolyard when he heard a noise coming from the direction the dog was
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tracking. R357:129, 145; R359:17. It sounded to him like a person jumping a
chain link fence. Id.
Several portable classrooms-each an individual building-were
clustered next to the school building on the path the dog was tracking.
R357:128-30, 147; State's Exh. 27 (showing where classrooms stood before

being removed). While Officer Suazo stopped the dog to do a routine safety
sweep around the classrooms to ensure no one was hiding there who might
ambush them, Officer Bias continued toward the school to follow the noise
he had heard, constantly looking around to ensure no one approached them
from the school. R357:129, 132-33; R359:17, 26-27. Near the building just
beyond the classrooms, he tracked a rustling noise to the heating/ air
conditioning unit that was against the school wall and surrounded by a 9foot high chain link fence.
Addendum C).

R357:129; R359:17; State's Exhs. 27 & 28 (in

He did not yell for help because he did not want to

broadcast his location before he was ready. R357:130. Instead, believing
someone or something was inside the heating unit,_ he neared the unit,
identified himself, and ordered the person to come out.

R357:130, 148;

R359:17. Getting no response, he moved to within three feet of the unit and

found Defendant "curled into a ball" inside the heating unit. R357:129-30,
132-33, 148-49. Bias repeated his command numerous times, as did the
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other uniformed officers who joined him, but Defendant simply made eye
contact without complying with the orders. R357:130-33, 149; R359:28-29.
The only way in or out was a padlocked gate, suggesting Defendant had
scaled the fence. R357:130, 134. No other basis was found for the noise Bias
heard and no other people were found. Officers used a bolt cutter on the
lock, and Defendant eventually came out. R357:130; R359:18. When the
officer asked Defendant why he was hiding, Defendant said, "somebody is
following me." R359:8. He claimed that he had called 911 to get police to
help him.
Bias concluded that Defendant matched the description of the car
thief "very well" - h~ appeared to be Hispanic and was wearing a black
beanie and a black jacket. R357:136-37, 141-42; R359:18. 1

The first identification
Within five minutes of Officer Bias's visit, another officer drove Oney
to identify the abandoned car, then to the schoolyard where Oney positively
identified Defendant as the man who stole his car. R357:45-47, 49-51, 91-93,
135-36.

At the "showup" -held within thirty minutes of the crime-

Defendant was the only non-officer present, was in handcuffs, and was

1

A quick search of Defendant revealed no weapons, but a knife was
found on him during booking. R359:25-26, 29, 46, 94.
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illuminated with police spotlights. R357:49, 93-94; R359:22. However, Oney
identified him based on his looks, not the setting. R357:49-50, 94-95, 106-07.
Oney testified that Defendant was wearing the black jacket when Oney
identified him at the showup. R357:49-50.
B.

Summary of proceedings.
The second, third, and fourth identifications

The State charged Defendant with first-degree-felony aggravated
robbery. Rl-3.

At a lineup four months after Defendant's arrest, Oney

selected Defendant (#6) and one of the other men (#8). R357:51-54, 60-62, 9597; State's Exh. 43 & Def's Exh. 1 (in Addendum C). At trial, he explained

that he recognized Defendant's eyes, thought his goatee looked familiar,
and knew that he was the robber, but that one of the other men "looked
familiar," prompting the dual identification. R357:62-64. Oney thereafter
positively identified Defendant at both the preliminary hearing and the
trial. R357:20.
The trial court's ruling

Before trial, the judge ad1nitted expert testilnony from Dr. David
Dodd, PhD., concerning the unreliability of eyewitness identification
testimony. R89-108, 111-18, 142-44; R221; R356:passim. At the same time,
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the judge denied Defendant's pre-trial motion to suppress all of Oney' s
identifications of Defendant. R54-55, 60-88; R356:75-76. The judge ruled:
THE COURT: Based upon what I've heard today, as well
as the fact that as I think about five to 7 minutes in this contest
- five to 7 [DEF CNSL] Seconds.
THE COURT: --seconds, excuse n1e, in this context, it
appears sufficiently enough under a dome light and otherwise
darkened area where it's - it's pre-lit to have at least the State in
this particular case ... provided sufficiently reliable evidence to
suggest that - that identification should not be suppressed and
for the other factors that [the prosecutor] has articulated all of
which seem to be frankly compelling associated with the
identification. [sic] The Court finds that that test associated
with sufficiently reliable evidence to support the identification
has been met by the State. And the victim in this particular
case will be entitled to testify about what it is he identified on
that evening.
R356:75-76. The factors articulated by the prosecutor included:
e

Oney and the suspect were face-to-face within a foot of each other for
5 to 7 seconds;

•

the car's dome light and dashboard lit Defendant's face the entire
time;

e

Oney kept his eyes on Defendant at all thnes until Oney reached the
front of the car where he turned and bolted for the house;

e

Oney's inability to sleep could have resulted from something other
than fatigue;

a

the car had a fluid leak which led an officer to the abandoned car with
its door open;
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•

a K9 sniffed the car's area and led his handler up the nearby sidewalk
path through the schoolyard to the air conditioning unit outside the
school;

•

an officer heard a fence rattle, fallowed the noise to the enclosed air
conditioning unit, and, using a flashlight, saw an individual inside
meeting Oney' s general description of the robber, including the
ethnicity, general height and weight, black beanie, and black jacket;

•

the suspect' s first words to Oney were "Are you following me" or
"why are you following me," and Defendant's first words to officers
when found were "I'm being followed";

• at 4:00 a.m. on a winter morning, Defendant was found within a
couple of miles of Oney's home and near the abandoned stolen car;
~

Defendant met the suspect' s general description;

• it is not reasonably likely that many individuals fitting the suspect' s
general description would be in the area at that time of day;
• Oney identified Defendant at the school within thirty minutes of the
robbery; and
e

Dodd explained that even though certain details about an
identification could be wrong, it does not necessarily mean that the
identification itself is wrong.

R356:70-75. 2

2

Al though the judge did not make express findings of fact regarding
the reliability of the identifications, he adopted as "compelling" the
prosecutor's articulation of the factors set forth in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d
774 (Utah 1991). R356:75-76. Accordingly, this Court should assume that
the judge found the facts in accord with the prosecutor's argument. See id.
at 787-88 (where "factual issues are presented to and must be resolved by
the trial court but no findings of fact appear in the record, we 'assume that
the trier of facts found them in accord with its decision."') (quoting Mower v.
McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 6,245 P.2d 224,226 (1952)).
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The prosecutor also reminded the court that an expert would guide
the jury on weighing each factor. R356:70. Finally, the trial court insh ucted
4

the jury about factors that may affect an identification's accuracy. R308-11.
The defense

In an effort to undermine the reliability of Oney's eyewitness
identification at trial, the defense focused on the differences between Oney' s
initial description of the robber and Defendant's appearance when he was
arrested. Oney initially described the robber as having "long hair" sticking
out the bottom of his beanie "maybe an inch," but Defendant had short,
almost shaved, hair. R357:85-86; State's Exh. 43. Oney made no mention of
facial hair in his initial report and said at the preliminary hearing that he
saw no facial hair, but testified at trial that he remembered a goatee and that
the goatee was part of the reason he focused on Defendant at the lineup;
Defendant sported an untrimmed goatee when arrested. R357:63-64, 87-89,
136-37, 149-50; R359:11-12, 18-19. Officer Bias described it as "long scraggly
facial hair." Where Oney consistently maintained that the robber wore a
black leather jacket during the robbery and at the arrest site, no jacket was
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inventoried when Defendant was booked, and none was produced at trial. 3
R357:43, 83-84, 106-07, 118; R359:52-53, 58, 69.
A jury convicted Defendant as charged.

R286.

Defendant was

sentenced and timely appealed to this Court, which transferred the case to
the court of appeals. R335-38, 340-41, 348-52.

The court of appeals' ruling
In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a
new trial.

See generally State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199. The majority

identified the five factors articulated in the 1991 case of State v. Ramirez,
conducted a simple balancing of some of those factors, and concluded that if
u

Ramirez was an extre1nely close call, we are confident that here" the

testimony was "legally insufficient" to be deemed reliable. Id. at ,r,r12-15;

see State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782-84 (Utah 1991). It based its ruling on
(1) the "troublesome" suggestiveness of the showup combined with the
racial difference between Defendant and the eyewitness; (2) differences in
Oney' s description of the robber the night of the robbery and at h"ial,
especially regarding the length of the robber's hair and the existence of
facial hair; and (3) Oney' s failure to identify only Defendant at the lineup.
3

At least two police officers also remembered Defendant wearing a
black jacket when he was arrested early on a winter morning, suggesting
that the jacket was later misplaced. R357:141-42; R359:46-47.
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Id. at ,I,I14-15. The majority ruled the evidence inadmissible, held that the
error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, vacated the conviction,
and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at if 19.
Judge Pearce took the polar opposite position in his dissent, finding it
impossible to "squint at Ramirez's holding in a way that permits [one] to see
how the identification testimony offered in this case is less reliable than the
testimony the Ramirez court deemed admissible."
dissenting).

Id. at ,r21 (Pearce, J.,

Judge Pearce reviewed each Ramirez factor, first under

Ramirez's facts and then under the facts at hand; he acknowledged the same
"concerns" noted by the majority. Id. at if if22-30. But, unlike the majority,
he determined that, in "almost all respects, the showup involving
Defendant in this case was substantially less troublesome than that the

Ramirez court approved." Id. at ,I21.
Review of the first three factors led Judge Pearce to find that this case
fared better then Ramirez on each factor.
dissenting).

Id. at ilif24-26 (Pearce, J.,

Only the fourth factor-whether Oney's identification was

made spontaneously and remained consistent-caused Judge Pearce
concern. Id. at ,I,I27-29. This factor included consideration of the consistency
of Oney' s descriptions of the robber. Oney was not fully consistent in his
identification of Defendant at the lineup where he identified both
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Defendant and another man as the robber, was inconsistent in his
description of Defendant's facial hair, and was wrong in claiming
Defendant had long hair. Id. at ~f29. It was these inconsistencies, the judge
explained, that "present the only way in which this matter could be
considered a better candidate for reversal than Ramirez." Id. Ultimately,
however, there were a "myriad" of other ways in which the testimony
admitted in Ramirez was more unreliable than the testimony excluded in
this case, prompting Judge Pearce to believe that the discrepancies were
insufficient to require reversal under Ramirez. Id.
Finally, Judge Pearce acknowledged that the showup in this case was
"h·oublesome," as was the showup in Ramirez. Id. at if 31. However, where
a similar showup did not render the eyewitness testimony in Ramirez
inadmissible, Judge Pearce found no basis for a different outcome in this
case. Id.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Eyewitness identifications. This Court should clarify its state due
process 1nodel governing the admissibility of eyewitness identifications. At
the outset, the right to due process protects against the miscarriage of justice
resulting from state action. Absent police conduct causally related to the
identification, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor
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has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law. This Court should
also clarify that State v. Ramirez did not intend to eliminate the conditional
two-step approach of the federal model applied in Neil v. Biggers.
Under step one, trial courts must determine whether the police
identification procedure itself was suggestive, and if so, to what extent
(embraced in the fourth Long factor). If the procedure was not suggestive,
the evidence should be submitted to the jury without further inquiry from
the trial court. If the police identification procedure was suggestive, trial
courts proceed to step two.

In that step, trial courts must weigh the

remaining Long factors against the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure to determine whether the identification was clearly unreliable.
The identification should be suppressed as constitutionally inadmissible
only if there is a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
Short of that, the identification should be submitted to the jury for its
consideration.
The showup by which Kendall Oney first identified Defendant as the
robber was suggestive but did not produce the victim's identification of
Defendant. Instead, Oney testified that his identification of Defendant was
prompted by his recognition of the individual, not by the surroundings.
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And the witnessing conditions at the time of the crime were
imminently more reliable than in Ramirez. As a result, to the extent the
identification procedure was suggestive, it cannot be said that the
witnessing conditions were so poor that there was a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
II. Harmless Error. Should this Court rule that there was "a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification" requiring exclusion
of the identification testimony, it must determine whether the error was
harmless. The court of appeals' majority reached this issue and, for the first
time in this jurisdiction, applied the same standard used for a federal
constitutional due process error: harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The
standard should remain undecided in this jurisdiction because, even if the
federal standard applies, it was met here. Even without Oney's eyewitness
identification of Defendant at the arrest site, the lineup, the preliminary
hearing, and the trial, a thorough review of the evidence reveals sufficient
compelling evidence of Defendant's guilt to establish that admission of the
eyewitness identification testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
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ARGUMENT

I.
ONEY'S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AS THE
ROBBER WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY ADMISSIBLE
The court of appeals majority held that Kendall Oney's identification
of Defendant as the robber was constitutionally inadmissible under the state
due process standard articulated in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82
(Utah 1991).

State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ,I,Ill-15.

The dissent

concluded otherwise, opining that if the identification testimony in Ramirez
was admissible, so too is the testimony in this case. Id. at if 31.
Both the majority and the dissent urged review of the Ramirez
standard for the admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony, citing
its age, the continuing legal and scientific concerns about the reliability of
eyewitness identifications, and the outcome in this case. Id. at 110, n.1; id. at

'if 21 (Pearce, J., dissenting). This Court should clarify the state due process
standard announced in Ramirez and reverse the court of appeals.

***
For the most part, the federal constitution protects defendants from
convictions based on unreliable evidence, "not by prohibiting introduction
of the evidence, but by affording the defendant means to persuade the jury
that the evidence should be discounted as unworthy of credit." Perry v. New
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Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716, 723 (2012) (emphasis added).

For example,

constitutional safeguards to counter unreliable evidence include "the Sixth
Amendment rights to counsel, compulsory process, and confrontation plus
cross-examination of witnesses." Id. (citations omitted).
The same holds true under the Utah Constitution. Under article I,
section 12, defendants "have the right to appear and defend ... by counsel,
... to be confronted by the witnesses against" them, and "to have
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses" on their behalf.
Utah Const. art. I§ 12. And this Court has recently added to this arsenal of
weapons by requiring the admission of expert testimony on the fallibility of
eyewitness identifications in sh·anger identification cases.

See State v.

Clopten, 2009 UT 84, if 49,223 P.3d 1103 ("' Clopten I").
Typically, then, the reliability of evidence is left for the jury to test
through the crucible of trial, with all of its safeguards for determining the
truth. PernJ, 132 S.Ct. at 723. There is a rare exception-when improper
police conduct renders the evidence so unreliable that its admission can be
said to deny a defendant his due process right to a fair trial. For example,
Q

suppression is constitutionally required when a confession is prompted by
police interrogation techniques that "'are so offensive to a civilized system
of justice that they 1nust be conde1m1ed."' State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80,
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,r11, 984 P.2d 1009 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,163 (1986)).

Similarly, suppression is constitutionally required where an identification
results from a police identification procedure that is '"unnecessarily
suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification as to deny the

accused a fair trial."'

State v. Mccumber, 622 P.2d 353, 357 (Utah 1985)

(emphasis added).
A.

A def end ant's due process rights under the Utah Constitution
are not implicated absent State conduct.

At the outset, it is important to clarify that due process concerns
under the Utah Constitution do not arise absent State conduct. This Court
has never suggested that an eyewitness identification not prompted by the
police implicates state due process. Indeed, almost every case before this
Court that has addressed the state constitutional admissibility of an
eyewitness identification has involved at least an "arguably suggestive"
police identification procedure. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 777-84 (addressing
admissibility of identification following one-person showup arranged by
police); see also State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ,l,I9-11, 29-64, 44 P.3d 794
(admissibility of identification following police lineup); State v. Hoffhine,
2001 UT 4, ~,I7,13-19, 20 P.3d 265 (addressing admissibility of identification
following two-person showup arranged by police); State v. Decorso, 1999 UT
57, ,I,I7,41-47, 993 P.2d 837 (addressing admissibility of identification
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following police lineup); State v. Willett,

909 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1995)

(same); but see State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ,Jif8, 25-30, 48 P.3d 953
(concluding that police-administered

photo

array

presentation

not

suggestive).

@

This Court's due process jurisprudence in other contexts has also
centered on the concern that government action may result in the
deprivation of a defendant's due process right to fundamental fairness. For
example, the Court" has held that due process concerns may arise when
prosecutors engage in "potentially abusive practices" against a criminal
defendant. See State v. Redd, 2001 UT 113, iJ20, 37 P.3d 1160. The Court has
likewise held that due process concerns may arise when a prosecutor
destroys or loses exculpatory evidence. See State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49,
ifif39-46, 1.62 P.3d 1106.

Due process concerns do not arise absent

government action.
This Court in Ramirez likened the standard by which the admissibility
of eyewitness identification evidence is determined to the standard applied
when considering the constitutional admissibility of a confession. Ramirez,
817 P.2d at 778. Under that standard, the trial court acts as a" gatekeeper to
carefully scrutinize proffered evidence for constitutional defects."

Id.

Significantly, ""[a]bsent police conduct causally related to the confession,
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there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a
criminal defendant of due process of law."' 4 Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, il18
(quoting Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164). This Court should thus recognize, that
absent police conduct related to an identification, there is no basis for
concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of state
due process of law.
As the United States Supreme Court recently explained in discussing
the federal model, "the potential unreliability of a type of evidence does not
alone render its introduction at the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair."

Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 728. Simply put, "[t]he fallibility of eyewitness evidence
does not, without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant a due process
rule requiring a trial court to screen such evidence for reliability before
allowing the jury to assess its creditworthiness." Id. The purpose of the due
process requirement "is not to displace the adversary system as the primary
means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of
justice does not occur." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985). That
is, a miscarriage of justice that results from State conduct. See Perry, 132
S.Ct. at 726 (observing that the very purpose of the "due process check" is

4

The Court has not articulated a state due process standard for
confessions different from the federal standard.
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"to avoid depriving the jury of identification evidence that is reliable,

notwithstanding improper police conduct").
Absent some police misconduct, a defendant's right to a fair h·ial is
fully protected by the constitutional safeguards of effective counsel,
compulsory process, confrontation, cross-examination, and the requirement
that the State prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id at
728-29. Added to that, this Court has now recognized a defendant's right to
call qualified experts to educate the jury on factors that may affect the
reliability of eyewitness identifications.

See Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, if 49.

These measures, together with the rules of evidence, are more than
sufficient to protect criminal defendants frmn convictions based on
unreliable evidence. See PernJ, 132 S.Ct. at 729 (noting protection afforded
by eyewitness expert testimony recognized in Clopten I).
In su1n, like federal due process, state due process does not require a
preliminary judicial inquiry

into

the reliability of an eyewitness

identification not prompted by police conduct.

Rather, the safeguards

against conviction based on unreliable evidence rest in the trial rights of
article I, section 12, and the rules of evidence.
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B.

Ramirez did not purport to abandon the conditional two-step
approach of the federal model.
Historically, Utah courts examined the constitutional admissibility of

an eyewitness identification under the federal due process standard.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779.

See

In Ramirez, the Court adopted a somewhat

different standard under state due process. Id. at 780. But the principle
underlying both standards remained the same- a suggestive identification
procedure administered by the police might render an identification so
unreliable that its admission can be said to deny a defendant his due
process right to a fair trial.
1. The federal due process model is a conditional two-step
analysis.
Before Ramirez, this Court had "simply applied the federal analytical
model for determining the reliability, and hence the admissibility" of an
eyewitness identification.

Id. at 779.

conditional two-step analysis.

The federal model involves a

As a threshold matter, a court must

determine whether the police used an "unnecessarily suggestive"
identification procedure in obtaining the out-of-court identification. Neil v.

Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 197-99 (1972). If not, the court's due process inquiry
ends. See id. But if police do employ an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure, the court proceeds to step two- it must determine

-25-

"whether under the 'totality of the circumstances' the identification was
[sufficiently] reliable even though the confrontation procedure [employed
by police] was suggestive." Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199.
When assessing the reliability of a tainted identification under step
two of the federal model, courts must consider the

II

totality of the

circumstances" surrounding the tainted identification in light of five
reliability factors:
[1] the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the
time of the crime, [2] the witness' degree of attention, [3] the
accuracy of the witness' description of the criminal, [4] the level
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation,
and [5] the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation.

Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200; accord Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779. The "Biggers
factors" are "weighed [against] the corrupting effect of the suggestive
identification itself" to determine whether

II

there is 'a very substantial

likelihood of irreparable misidentification.'" Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S.
98, 114, 116 (1977) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384
(1968)). If so, the identification is constitutionally inadmissible. But "[s]hort
of that point, such evidence is for the jury to weigh." Id. at 116.
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2. Ramirez sought only to replace the Biggers factors with
the Long factors.
In purporting to follow Ramirez, the court of appeals applied a state
due process model not contemplated by Ramirez. Rather than applying a
conditional

two-step

analysis,

the

court

of

appeals

treated

the

suggestiveness of police identification procedures and the overall reliability
of an identification as a single inquiry which could result in suppression
under state due process. See Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ,r,rll-15.
In articulating its approach for determining the constitutional
admissibility of an identification, the court of appeals purported to do no
more than summarize the Ramirez analysis.

See id. But Ramirez did not

suggest such a fundamental departure from the federal analysis.

To be

sure, Ramirez broke "new ground under the Utah Constitution" in assessing
the constitutional admissibility of eyewitness identifications. Ramirez, 817
P.2d at 778.

But the state analytical model adopted in Ramirez only

"diverges so mew hat" from the federal model. Id.

Ramirez did not take

issue with the conditional two-step approach of the federal nlOdel. Rather,
it only faulted the federal standard used for judging the reliability of
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11

arguably suggestive eyewitness identifications" under step two of the

federal model. 5 Id. at 779-81.

Ramirez rejected the Biggers factors for step two as

II

scientifically

unsupported" for assessing the reliability of an identification. Ramirez, 817
P.2d at 780. In their place, Ramirez required an appraisal of a suggestive
identification's reliability based on the "different criteria" identified in State

v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986):
"(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during
the event; (2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the
time of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the
event, including his or her physical and mental acuity;
(4) whether the witness's identification was
made
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether
it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event
being observed and the likelihood that the witness would
perceive, remember and relate it correctly."
817 P.2d at 780-81 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). The Long factors, the
Court held, "more precisely define the focus of the relevant inquiry" into
reliability. Id. at 781.
The Ramirez court misapprehended the federal due process model in
one respect. The Court stated that the element of "suggestibility" included
in the fourth Long factor has "no comparable emphasis given to [it] by

5

Here, the court of appeals misinterpreted Ramirez to mean the
appropriate analysis under the state constitution consists of only step 2.
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Biggers." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. That is incorrect. Long's "suggestibility"
inquiry is, in fact, the focus of step one under the federal due process model
and the subject against which the Biggers factors are weighed under step
two. See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114 (" Against these factors is to be weighed
the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.").
In sum, Ramirez did not suggest that a trial court's role in screening
identification evidence "for constitutional defects" includes a general
reliability analysis absent a suggestive police identification procedure. See
817 P.2d at 778. It" depart[ed] from federal case law only to the degree th.at"
some of the Biggers criteria rendered "the federal analytical model scientifically

unsupported." Id. at 780 (emphasis added). But see Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, il25
(suggesting that suggestive police procedures and general umeliability of
evidence are independent bases for excluding eyewitness identifications).
C.

This Court should clarify its state due process analysis.

Because Ramirez did not purport to eliminate step one of the federal
analysis, this Court should clarify Ramirez to prevent further confusion
about and misapplication of the state due process analysis. This Court
should clarify that, like the federal due process model, the state due process
model involves a conditional two-step analysis incorporating the Long
factors.
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1. Step One- assessing the suggestiveness of the police
identification procedure.

First,

a

defendant seeking

the

exclusion of an

eyewib1ess

identification must establish that police used an "unnecessarily suggestive"
identification procedure, Biggers, 409 U.S. at 197-99, or, at a minimum, an
"arguably suggestive" identification procedure, Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779. 6
This step embraces the fourth Long factor addressing "suggestibility." See

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781; Long, 721 P.2d at 493 (asking whether "witness's
identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter,
or whether it was the product of suggestion"). If a defendant meets that
burden, the court may proceed to step two.

But if not, the witness's

identification should be submitted to the jury without further inquiry by the
trial court.
r-:

2. Step Two-weighing the Long factors against the
suggestiveness of the police identification procedure.

Second- if the defendant satisfies step one- the trial court should
then weigh the Long factors (except the fourth factor) against the
suggestiveness of the police identification procedure itself (as assessed
under the fourth Long factor). See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114. The question

6

Ramirez could be read to imply that rather than showing that the
identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, the defendant need
only show that it was "arguably suggestive." 817 P.2d at 779.
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here is whether under the 'totality of the circumstances' the identification
was [sufficiently] reliable even though the confrontation procedure
[employed by police] was suggestive."

Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199; accord

Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, if30 (holding that proper inquiry is whether
identification "is sufficiently reliable such that it can be presented to the jury
for their deliberation").
This Court has held that in weighing the Long factors, trial courts
must determine whether the identification "was sufficiently reliable so as
not to offend defendant's right to due process by permitting clearly
unreliable identification testimony before the jury." Id. The Court has not
expounded on the "clearly unreliable" standard. But it appears to be the
equivalent of the federal due process standard- the defendant must show
"' a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.'" Brathwaite,
432 U.S. at 116 (quoting Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384). It is a heavy burden, as
the outcome in Ramirez makes clear.

There, the Court held that the

eyewitness identification was sufficiently reliable notwithstanding the
"blatant suggestiveness" of the one-man showup and the relatively poor
witnessing conditions surrounding the crime (no one ever saw the
perpeh·ator's full face). Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784.
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In sum, an eyewitness identification should be excluded only if the
weighing under step two results in a determination that notwithstanding
the suggestive police identification procedure, the identification was clearly
unreliable, i.e., "there is 'a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification."' Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 116 (quoting Simmons, 390 U.S. at
384).

Short of that, " [c]ourts need not, nor should they, step into the

province of the jury and decide the ultimate matter of identification for the
jurors."

Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ,l30.

It certainly should not do so as a

constitutional matter. This is particularly true where the constitution and
rules of evidence equip a defendant with the tools necessary to challenge
unreliable evidence.
D. Kenneth Oney's identification of Defendant as the robber
was not constitutionally unreliable.

Like Ramirez, the showup identification of Defendant in this case was
suggestive. But unlike Ramirez, the eyewitness testified that it was not the
basis for his identification. And unlike Ramirez, the witnessing conditions
here were eminently more reliable. As the dissent noted, one has to "squint
at Ramirez's holding" to conclude otherwise. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199,

,r 21.

When the suggestiveness of the arrest-site lineup (Long's fourth factor) is
weighed against the remaining Long factors, it cannot be said that there was
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a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. This Court
should thus reverse the court of appeal's ruling to the contrary.
1. The arrest-site identification was at least arguably
suggestive.

As expla'ined, the first step in the due process inquiry is whether
Oney' s identification of Defendant at the arrest site '"was the product of
suggestion,"' Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493), and if
so, to what extent. As explained, this inquiry embraces the fourth Long
factor. The variables subject to consideration under this inquiry are usefully
divided into two categories: (a) the circumstances of the identification
procedure itself that may be suggestive (procedural factors), and (b) witness
behavior that may signal that the identification was the product of
suggestion rather than memory (witness factors). A review of these
circumstances shows that Oney's arrest-site identification was less
suggestive than in Ramirez. However, even if it was equally suggestive, the
inquiry does not end.
(a) Procedural factors of arrest-site identification.

Relevant factors in evaluating the circumstances surrounding the
identification procedure include "the length of time between observation
and identification, ... the value of lineups compared to showups, the value
of photo identifications compared to in-person identifications," and
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potentially suggestive police conduct, such as the instructions given to the
eyewitness by police, the composition of the lineup, the way in which the
lineup was carried out, and the behaviors of the person conducting the
lineup." Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, if32 n.22; accord Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783
(citing Long, 721 P.2d at 494, n.8).
A showup is often considered "inherently suggestive because it
involves the presentation of a single suspect to a witness by the police (as
opposed to a lineup, in which several individuals are presented to the
police, only one of whom is the suspect)." Brisco v. Ercole, 565 F.3d 80, 88
(2nd Cir. 2009). Such was the case in Ramirez: the witness's identification of
Ramirez "took place on the street in the 1niddle of the night. Ra1nirez, with
dark complexion and long hair, was the only person at the showup who
was not a police officer. He stood with his hands cuffed to a chain link fence
behind his back. [And the] headlights of several police cars were trained on
him." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. The showup in Ramirez was a blatantly
suggestive procedure. Id.
As in Ramirez, the identification here was 1nade soon after the
robbery-within 20 minutes-but that fact is a favorable factor. R357:106-07.
According to Defendant's expert, a short interval improves accuracy.
R358:52. The field identification was also similar. Like Ramirez, Defendant
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was presented to Oney in the early hours of the morning, was the only nonofficer present, was handcuffed, was accompanied by police officers, and
was illuminated by the headlights of police cars. R357:49-51.
(b) Witness factors.

Relevant factors in evaluating witness behavior that might indicate an
identification was the product of a suggestive procedure indude (1)
spontaneity and consistency in making the identification, (2) a weakened or
compromised mental capacity and state of mind at the time of the
identification, (3) "instances when the witness or other eyewitnesses to the
event failed to identify defendant," and (4) "instances when the witness or
other eyewitnesses gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with
defendant." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781, 783. Witness confidence is another
relevant factor that may be examined. See State v. Guzman, 2006 UT 12, if 23,
133 P.3d 363 (holding that courts may also "weigh certainty testimony" in
assessing reliability, even though not required to be considered under

Ramirez).
No one established Oney's state of mind at the time of the showup.
Oney said he was "pretty distraught" when police arrived within five
minutes of his call to 911. R357:91. He identified Defendant at the showup
approximately 20 minutes after that. R357:106-07. By that time, he had not
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only gotten an immediate response to his 911 call and explained the
situation to the officers, but he had recovered his stolen car. Such a fast and
positive development would go far in soothing any remaining anxiety.
Nothing suggested that he was emotional or distraught at the time. Further,
Oney made his identification from the safety and anonymity of the police
cruiser, eliminating any potential fear from the possibility of reprisal if the
suspect saw him. R537:93. When asked if Defendant was the robber, Oney
immediately answered "yes," noting that it was "definitely him." R357:9394, 135-36. No one suggested that he make a positive identification, and on
the way over he was simply told that they had "probably found the
suspect." R357:91-92. Oney' s quick, positive identification suggests that it
was the product of memory, not suggestion. See Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, if28
(recognizing that spontaneous identification supports finding of reliability).
Unlike Ramirez, he confirmed as much, explaining that he identified
Defendant because of his looks, not because of the setting in which the
identification took place. R357:49-50. 94-95, 106-07. And although witness
confidence is no guarantee of accuracy, Oney's certainty was a factor that
made it slightly more likely that the identification was reliable. See Guzman,
2006 UT 12, if22 (recognizing eyewitness confidence as factor favoring
reliability).

-36-

Oney consistently identified Defendant as the robber after the
showup, although with somewhat less confidence at the lineup four months
later. He picked Defendant because he remembered his eyes and thought
his goatee looked familiar. R357:63-64. However, he hesitated because he
believed the robber would not be in the lineup based on a phone call he had
received the previous day and because he thought another person in the
lineup "looked familiar." R357:60-64. Consequently, he chose both men.

Id. He later positively identified Defendant at the preliminary hearing and
at trial.

See R355:5-6; R357:20.

His partial identification may adversely

impact the reliability of his identification to some degree, but that is only
one of the relevant considerations.
Finally, the inconsistencies in Oney's descriptions of the robber-the
hair, the jacket, and the goatee-were reasonably explained.

Through

Defendant's expert, the prosecutor established that lighting and proximity
can both obscure or distort things. R358:56-57. And officers corroborated
the existence of the jacket at the arrest site.
In sum, the arrest-site identification procedure employed by police in
this case was less suggestive than the showup in Ramirez, where one of
three victims sat in a police car and positively identified Ramirez as the
masked man who robbed him earlier in the night while Ramirez was alone
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and chained to a fence at one in the morning in the headlights of police cars.
817 P.2d at 777. While the procedural factors of the arrest-site identification
paralleled those present in Ramirez, the witness factors demonstrate that
Oney' s identification was the product of memory, not suggestion. Most
significantly, unlike Ramirez, Oney expressly stated that his identification of
Defendant at the showup was based on his memory of the robber, not the
circumstances surrounding the showup.
But even if it were unnecessarily suggestive, when weighed against
the Long factors - which this Court in Ramirez found to be more scientifically
sound than the Biggers factors -it does not produce "a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at 114, 116
(citation and quotation omitted).
2. Witnessing conditions at the crime scene.

Even if the identification procedure were suggestive, an evaluation of
the Long factors against the suggestiveness of the identification procedure
(to whatever extent that was) establishes that the identification was
"sufficiently reliable so as not to offend defendant's right to due process."
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, if 30.

***
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As explained, step two requires courts to weigh the remaining Long
factors against the suggestive influence of the identification procedure.
Although Long identifies four remaining factors, they are better understood
as "witnessing conditions," with the last two factors combining to reflect a
single condition: (1) "the opportunity of the witness to view" the
perpetrator during the crime; (2) "the witness's degree of attention" to the
perpeh·ator at the time of the crime; and (3) the witness's "capacity" to
reliably identify the perpetrator given "the nature of the event being
observed" and the witness's "physical and mental acuity." Long, 721 P.2d at
493. Courts should weigh these witnessing conditions to determine "the
likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate" the event
correctly. Id.
(a) Opportunity to view robber during the robbery.

The first witnessing condition is the witness's opportunity to view the
perpetrator during the crime. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. Relevant factors
include overall visibility, such as lighting and obstructions; the distance
between the witness and the actor; the length of time the witness viewed the
actor; and whether the witness could see the actor's face, which may be
adversely affected if the actor is wearing a disguise, such as a mask, hat, or
sunglasses. Id. at 782; see also Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, if 32 n.22; Gary L. Wells,
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Amina Mernon, & Stephen D. Penrod, Eyewitness Evidence: Improving its

Probative Value, 7 Psychological Science in the Public Interest 45, 53-54 (2006)
("Wells, Mernon, & Penrod"); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth Olson, Eyewitness

Testimony, 54 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 277, 281 (2003) ("Wells & Olson") (in
Addendum D).
Although the robbery occurred at 3:30 in the morning, Oney had
ample opportunity and ability to see the robber. His initial contact with the
robber occurred at close range-from about ten inches-within the confines
of Oney's car door under the car's "[f]airly bright" interior lighting. For a
full ten seconds, Oney was face to face with the robber's undisguised face
under the dome and dashboard lights. When the two stood, Oney had the
benefit of several illumination sources in which to see the robber's
unmasked face, including the car's headlights, a nearby porch light, two
street lights, and a neighbor's flood light. Although the lights were not
directed at the robber's face, the bare trees permitted the maxhnum amount
of light from each source to reach the area, resulting in "pretty bright"
illumination. R357:18-19, 22-23, 25-29, 30-35, 67-72; State's Exhs. 9, 16-19.
Oney kept his eyes on the robber throughout the ordeal, talking calmly to
hiln.

Standing face-to-face and almost touching, Oney moved slowly
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around the robber and the car, with the robber keeping pace with him and
ultimately moving into the car's headlights.
Despite the close proximity, Oney did not initially mention
Defendant's untrimmed salt and pepper goatee until expressly asked about
facial hair at the preliminary hearing. The omission does not necessarily
demonstrate that Oney lacked sufficient opportunity to make a reliable
identification. Officer Bias admitted cutting short his initial investigation
with Oney to follow the liquid trail left by the stolen car, suggesting Oney
may not have gotten to that part of his identification and did not need to
revisit it once Defendant was arrested. Until questioned about it at the
preliminary hearing, Oney had no reason to believe he had omitted
anything from his description of the robber. Moreover, while the lighting
and proximity were sufficient to see the robber's face, they may have been
insufficient to permit Oney to see the delineation between Defendant's face
and his "scraggly" salt and pepper facial hair.

See R358:56 (expert

admission that things may be obscured by close proximity); R358:57 (expert
opinion that features may be obscured depending on the lighting).

As the

lighting was not directed at the robber's face throughout the ordeal, any
resulting shadows could effectively minimize the differences between the
robber's face and his facial hair.
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Additionally, Oney described the robber as wearing a black beanie
that fit tight to his skull, obviously preventing Oney from realizing that the
robber had a shaved head. He also believed he saw long, straight hair
sticking out of the bottom of the beanie, although Defendant had none at
the time of his arrest. Again, the mistake does not necessarily demonstrate
that Oney lacked sufficient opportunity to make a reliable identification.
Defendant's expert recognized that perception and ability to pick out
features may change based on any number of factors, including distance
and lighting.

R358;54-57.

Here, the close proximity of the men's faces

during the initial seconds of their interaction, Oney's fixation on the
robber's face, and the multidirectional lighting both at the car door and
outside, either individually or combined, could be expected to obscure some
features but not others. Defendant's expert did not rule out the possibility
that, in the right lighting, a stand-up collar on the robber's shirt or jacket
could give the impression of long, straight hair. See R358:57.
Finally, Oney's repeated assertion that the robber wore a black leather
coat strengthened his credibility. Oney consistently explained throughout
this case that the robber wore a longish black coat, beginning with his first
report to police and continuing through trial.

He also maintained that

Defendant was wearing the coat when he identified Defendant at the arrest
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site. It is true that the jacket did not make it through processing at the jail
and, hence, could not be produced at trial. But two officers who dealt with
Defendant at the arrest site also testified that he was wearing a black jacket.
Their testimony not only corroborated Oney's description but reinforces the
fact that Oney's close proximity to the robber, the indirect lighting and
Oney's focus. on the robber's face and hands provided him with ample
opportunity to accurately.view the robber.

(b) Degree of attention Oney gave to robber.
The second witnessing condition is the witness's "degree of
attention" to the perpetrator at the time of the crime. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at
781. Relevant factors include when the witness becomes aware that a crime
is being committed, the amount and type of attention that the witness gives
to the perpetrator, and the presence of distractions that may draw a
witness's attention away from the perpetrator, e.g., noises or other activity.

See id. (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 423). Distractions may include the presence
or use of a weapon, which laboratory research has shown may result in
modest impairment to identification accuracy. 7 Wells, Memon, & Penrod,

7

Although the Court in Long and Ramirez placed distractions under
the "opportunity to observe" factor, it is more appropriately analyzed here
because dish·actions do not deprive the witness of the opportunity to
observe; rather, they cmnpete for the witness's attention during that
window of opportunity.
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supra, at 53. On the other hand, the findings of field research on weapon
focus have been" somewhat conflicting." Id.
Oney's awareness of the robber was immediate, with the robber
physically placing himself in Oney's face while Oney sat in the confines of
his driver's seat. Oney's attention focused solely on Defendant from that
moment and remained there throughout the entire ordeal. The robber did
not run or attempt to hide but remained facing Oney without a disguise.
Until the robber stood, Oney gave him his full attention without
concern for either a weapon or any criminal conduct: the robber had Oney's
full attention. Although the robber reached for the handle of something
once he stood up, he did not withdraw the item and at no time did he
brandish, let alone use, a weapon.

Oney noticed the movement, which

prompted him to include the robber's hands in his visual field and to
formulate a mental escape plan. He did not look away from the robber,
however, and he remained so focused on the robber that his memory
included the robber's conversation.

No external noises or distractions

prompted Oney to divert or diminish his attention on the robber.
(c) Oney's capacity to observe the robber given the nature
of the event.

The final witnessing condition is the witness's capacity to reliably
identify the perpetrator given the nature of the event being observed and
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the witness's physical and mental acuity. Long, 721 P.2d at 493. Relevant
factors include the witness's age (research has shown that very young
children and the elderly perform worse than other adults); the witness's
physical limitations, such as uncorrected visual defects, fatigue, injury,
intoxication, or extremely low intelligence; the witness's emotional state; the
witness's personal motivations, biases, or prejudices; the distinctiveness of
the perpetrator's appearance; and the race of the witness relative to the race
of the perpetrator. See id.; see also Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, if32 n.22. Also
relevant is whether the witness's capacity to observe was impaired by stress
or fright at the time of the observation. Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, if32 n.22.
Oney' s physical abilities were not in any way impaired at the time of
the robbery. He had not been drinking, there was no evidence of fatigue,
and he was wearing his glasses at the time. R357:108-09. There was no
evidence of any other mental or physical concerns or limitation that would
adversely affect his capacity to reliably identify the robber. Neither was
there evidence of "weapon-focus effect" that tends to decrease the reliability
of eyewitness identification. See R358:26-32; Wells & Olson, at 282, supra.
There was no weapon or other express threat used in the robbery. Oney
believed the robber reached for what might have been a weapon at one
point, but no weapon was ever produced. In any event, prior to that tilne,
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Oney had no reason to suspect the robber possessed a weapon.

And

regardless of that possibility, Oney remained calm and in control through
the remainder of the encounter, quickly creating and executing an escape
plan and calmly talking to the robber until he succeeded in his escape.
Additionally,

nothing in

the

circumstances

surrounding

@

the

identification or involving Oney himself suggests that he suffered such a
heightened degree of stress that it rendered his identification suspect. See
R358:26-32. While Oney was surprised at the robber's sudden appearance,
nothing about the situation at that point suggested he suffered any undue
sh·ess frmn the 1nan's presence: he simply thought the robber might want a
drink or a ride.

R357:18. It was nowhere near the hightened stress of

Ramirez, where the witness was struck once and nearly twice with a pipe,
was continually threatened with the pipe while another robber pointed a
gun at him and issued more threats. 817 P.2d at 783. Arguably, under the
circumstances, any fear Oney harbored did not raise to even the "ordinary
fear" of a victim, which would not prevent the accurate observation and
perception of events. State v. Rivera, 954 P.2d 225, 228 (Utah App. 1998)
(victim's ordinary fear is not alone sufficient to defeat the third Ramirez
factor).
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Finally, Oney did not have the same racial background as Defendant,
which may create a slightly higher risk of misidentification. See R358:58;
Wells & Olson, at 280-81 (despite extensive examination, "no consistent
overall differences attributable to race have emerged;" we simply know
people are better able to recognize faces of their own race). On the other
hand, a witness's prior exposure to the offender's race is a factor to be
considered in assessing their ability to make an accurate identification.
R358:49.
Oney was forty years old, had lived in the same area for fourteen or
fifteen years, and had lived in the same neighborhood for two. R357:15-16,
100-01. A number of his neighbors were Hispanic, including those on either
side and across the street, giving him an easy familiarity with their features.
R357:44.

His familiarity with the characteristics of Hispanics generally

would tend to counter concerns of cross-racial bias. The court of appeals
made no mention of this fact, however. Instead, the majority of that court
determined that Oney' s close, unobscured exposure to the robber's entire
face was a barrier to an accurate identification of the robber solely because
of the concern for cross-racial bias.

Proper consideration of Oney' s

familiarity with Defendant's race along with the duration and proximity of
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the viewing in the lighted confines of the car door weigh in favor of a
reliable identification.

***
In sum, the witnessing conditions were not so poor as to create a due
process concern.

The witnessing conditions were better than those in

Ramirez, where rnost of the guiuT1an's face vvas covered vvith a scarf and the
witness was the object of an assault and threatened assault with a gun.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782-83. Indeed, the witnessing conditions were, in most
respects, much better than those in most crimes- the robber was wearing
distinctive clothing but no mask, brandished no weapon, made no threats,
and approached the victim in close proxhnity under numerous light
sources. When these witnessing conditions are weighed against the arrestsite showup, it cannot be said that there was a very substantial likelihood of
G

irreparable misidentification.

Accordingly, any reliability concerns were

properly left for the jury to decide.
Indeed, the jury had before it all the tools necessary to assess the
reliability of Oney' s identification testimony: the testimony of the defense
expert on factors affecting the reliability of identifications, a jury instruction
on point, and the argument of both counsel in closing, all of which informed
the jurors in their consideration of the identification evidence. Defendant

-48-

adduced the expert's testimony objection-free and without limitation and
argued his testimony in closing. Defendant took advantage of every
opportunity provided for testing the reliability of the evidence and
influencing the jury's consideration of it.

Thus, even though the showup

was arguably as suggestive as the one conducted in Ramirez, the
identification was subject to comprehensive scrutiny by the jury, in keeping
with the continuing development of eyewitness memory science in the
years since Ramirez.

II.
IN ANY EVENT, ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS BEYOND
A REASONABLE DOUBT
If, as the State contends, Oney' s identification was sufficiently reliable

to be presented to the jury for their deliberation, this Court's review is
ended, and the court of appeals' decision should be reversed. See Point I,

supra.

1£, however, this Court determines that under the appropriate

application of Ramirez, there was "a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification" requiring exclusion of the identification
testimony, it must determine whether the error was harmless. Brathwaite,
432 U.S. at 116 (quotation omitted).
This Court has yet to squarely decide whether the harmless error
standard applicable to a preserved state constitutional error in admission of
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eyewitness identification testimony is the erosion of confidence standard or
the stricter federal "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. The
court of appeals' majority determined that the error must be reviewed
under the same standard that applies to federal constitutional due process
errors. 2015 UT App. 199, 116 & n.2 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 24 (1967)). They did so based on this Court's recognition in Ramirez that
Utah's state constitutional due process analysis "is certainly as stringent as"
the federal analysis. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ,r16, n.2. However, this Court
went on to require that Ramirez demonstrate "a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result had the identification not been admitted." Ramirez,
817 P.2d at 788. The same standard has since been repeatedly applied. See

State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 944 (Utah App. 1997); see also State v. Clopten,
2009 UT 84, ,I39.

Ct
V4il

Because the issue of whether the burden shifts to the State to prove
that a preserved state constitutional error in admission of eyewitness
identification testimony is hannless beyond a reasonable doubt is a matter
of first impression, it should be decided by this Court. See Utah R. App. P.
46(a)(4). See also Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, if16, n.2 (explaining majority's
reasoning for applying federal prejudice standard without prior direction
by this Court).

-50-

There is, however, no reason to reach that issue in this case because
even assuming application of the federal standard, any error in admitting
Oney' s identifications was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Factors that determine whether an error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt include "the importance of the witness' testimony in the
prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or
absence of evidence collaborating or contradicting the testimony of the
witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise
permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case."

State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 425-26 (Utah 1995) (quotation omitted).
Even without Oney's identification of Defendant, the jury would still
have the benefit of his description of the robber, the bases for his
description- unchallenged by expert testimony criticizing the reliability of
his observations- and corroboration from Officer Bias that he believed
Defendant matched the description and from both Officer Bias and Officer
Deven Mayer that Defendant was wearing a black jacket when he was
found.

The prosecutor would provide the sa1ne explanations for the

discrepancies involving the hair, goatee, and black jacket. The jury would
also have the string of events that led the officers to the car and the school
yard within minutes of the robbery, the dog's immediate discernment of a
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lone scent leading down the pathway and through the school yard in the
very direction officers later found the only person in the area, as well as the
timing of the noise indicating the suspect jumped a fence just as the officer
began following the dog through the school yard.

Officer Bias would

explain how the dog led officers toward the school but was stopped short of
the school to do a safety sweep of the portable classrooms that they
necessarily passed on their way to the school. 8

Instead of waiting to

complete the sweep, Officer Bias continued in the direction the dog had
indicated, rounded a corner of the school, and found Defendant. Moreover,
despite establishing an immediate containment zone, no one but Defendant
was found anywhere in the area.
In addition, the jury would hear the circumstances surrounding
Defendant's discovery and arrest at the school, including the indications
that he was hiding in an out-of-the-way place requiring the use of a
flashlight to see him, the fact that he stared at the officers while refusing to
obey their repeated commands to come out of the unit yet clahned

8

The court of appeals' majority suggests that the dog led the officers
to the classrooms and stopped instead of leading the1n to the school. 2015
UT App 199, if18. That interpretation is not supported by the record
evidence. R357:128-29, 145-47; R359:17-18, 26-28; State's Exhs. 27 & 28. The
dog was stopped for safety reasons at outbuildings located on their path to
the school. Nothing suggests the dog initiated the stop.
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thereafter that he called police to come to his aid. Those circumstances
sh·ongly suggest that Defendant was hiding from the visible police
presence. Further, he was found in possession of a knife, corroborating
Oney's testimony that he reached for something tucked in his waistband.
And finally, they would have the condemningly similar words uttered by
the robber and by Defendant that someone was "following me."
Given this compelling evidence, any error in the admission of Oney' s
identification testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.
Respectfully submitted on April 25, 2016.
SEAN

D. REYES

Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel for Petitioner
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. ..

.

.

.

.

. .

failed to identify defendant at the lineup, victim
was Native American and identified robber as
"Spanish," and victim's original description of
robber, with whom he came into close contact
during the offense, omitted any mention of facial
hair and included a definite recollection of long
straight hair, while defendant had a goatee and
shaved head.
Cases that cite this headnote

181

Criminal Law
,,;:;:• Arrest and identification, evidence relating
to
Error in admission of victim's unreliable showup and in-court eyewitness identifications was
not haimless, in prosecution for aggravated
robbery; victim's identification of defendant was
State's strongest evidence against defendant, and
without the identifications, jurors would likely
have found very significant victim's description
of suspect, which described suspect as having
long black and white hair although defendant
had clean-shaven hair at time of his arrest, and
evidence that a trained police dog following
suspect's scent pulled officers toward portable
classrooms at elementary school where officers
found victim's abandoned car, while the officers
who arrested defendant veered off from K9
unit and found defendant curled up in an air
conditioning unit in a different part of the school.

Cases that cite this headnote

16)

.

Criminal Law
,,>,~ Identity of Accused
For
purposes
of five-factor
analysis
for determining reliability of eyewitness
identification, the factor concerning the nature
of the event and the likelihood that the
witness would perceive, remember, and relate it
co1Tectly, includes considering whether the event
was an ordinary one in the mind of the witness
and whether the race of the actor was the same
as the witness.

Cases that cite this headnote
Cases that cite this headnote
[9)

171

Criminal Law
~;,;:;. Confrontations at the scene or shortly after
offcnsc or aJTest

000

The State bears the burden of convincing
the appellate court that improperly admitted
eyewitness identifications were harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.

Criminal Law
·,~;:.;, [n-Court Identification in General
Victim's show-up and in-court eyewitness
identifications of defendant were not sufficiently
reliable to be admissible in aggravated robbery
trial; show-up identification was made when
it was dark, defendant was handcuffed, and
all others present were police officers, in-court
identification was made when defendant was the
only defendant sitting at the defense table, victim

Criminal Law
<. Rulings as to evidence

Cases that cite this headnote

[I 0)

Criminal Law
>·· Evidence in general
Criminal Law
t;= Curing Error by Facts Established
Otherwise

State v. Lujan, 357 P.3d 20 (2015)

792 Utat1"Ac1v: Rep . . 46~·201·!5°UTApp.1gg"· ........... ----·--·· ·-- ·-for the appellate court to determine that
the trial court's error in admitting testimony
was hannless beyond a reasonable doubt, the
appellate court must consider the importance
of the witness's testimony in the prosecution's
case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the
presence or absence of evidence corroborating
or contradicting the testimony of the witness on
material points, the extent of cross-examination
otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall
strength of the prosecution's case.
Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms

*21 Nathalie S. Skibine and Lisa J. Remal, for Appellant.
Sean D. Reyes and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee.
Judge GREGORY K. ORME authored this Memorandum
Decision, in which Judge KATE A. TOOMEY concuITed.
Judge JOHN A. PEARCE dissented, with opinion.

Memorandum Decision
ORME, Judge:
~

1 Defendant Manuel Antonio Lujan appeals his conviction
ofaggravated robbery, a first degree felony under section 766-302 of the Utah Code. Because we determine that the trial
court erroneously admitted unreliable eyewitness testimony,
we reverse and remand for a new trial.

~

2 Early one November morning, a man could not sleep, so
he got out of bed and went outside. He decided to get his car
ready for an upcoming safety inspection. It was while the man
was seated inside his car in his driveway that he came face-tofacc with a robber. The man described the robber as "Spanish"
and as wearing a black leather jacket and beanie. The robber
had black and white "longish hair," which was straight and
poked out of the beanie to "mid- *22 ear length." The man
"definitely" remembered the robber's hair.

1 3 The robber opened the man's driver-side door,

squatted
next to the seat, and asked the man, "Why you following
me?" The robber stood, and the man saw him reach for what

appeared to be the handle of a gun or a knife. The man was
afraid he might be stabbed or shot. Wanting to return to the
safety of his house, the man stood, nearly touching the robber,
who was about his same height. He slowly worked his way
around the robber and around the car and ran to his house.
The robber drove off in the man 1s car, and the man told his
brother to call the police, which he did. Officers soon aITived.
~

4 The man's car had a fluid leak, and officers were able

to follow a trail of fluid and recover the abandoned car a
few blocks away, near an elementary school. A K9 unit was
called, and the dog appeared to "pick[ ] up on a track of
the person that they [were] looking for" at the walkway gate
of the school. The dog pulled the officers through the gate
and toward usome portable or relocatable classrooms." At
that point, some officers "kind of split" from the K9 unit,
and one of those officers had a ..gut feeling" to check an
air conditioning unit outside the school, even though the
dog was focused elsewhere. Officers found Defendant inside
the air conditioning unit, and he told them "something like
somebody is following me, somebody is out to get me."
,i 5 Defendant is Hispanic, and he had closely-shaven hair and
a goatee when the police found him. He was wearing a black
beanie. Officers also testified that he was wearing a black
jacket, but no jacket appeared in Defendant's booking photo,
was listed on the jail property list, or was produced at trial.

ii

6 Police contacted the man whose car had been stolen
and told him that they had a suspect. They brought the
man to the school and asked if he could identify Defendant,
who stood handcuffed in the dark, the only non-officer
present, illuminated by the headlights of police cars. The man
identified Defendant as the robber.

il 7 After being arrested and charged, Defendant requested a
lineup, which the trial court granted. At the lineup, the man
was unable to positively identify anyone as the robber. He did
indicate that Defendant and another man looked familiar, but
he was unsure whether either was the robber.

,r 8 At the preliminary hearing, the man was asked to identify
the robber, and he pointed to Defendant. As Defendant
observes, he "was the only defendant sitting at counsel table
and the only realistic choice."

,i 9 Defendant moved to exclude evidence of the show-up and
in-court identifications. The motion was denied, Defendant
was convicted as charged, and he now appeals. The sole
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issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred when
it denied Defendant's motion to suppress the identifications.
We conclude that it did.

I11 ,1 IO In State v. Ramirez. 8 I 7 P.2d 774 (Utah
1991 ), the Utah Supreme Court revised and clarified the
protocol for com1s to use in analyzing the admissibility of
eyewitness identifications. 1 See *23 id. at 779. 781-82.
The Utah Supreme Court indicated that such clarification was
necessary because "the scientific literature ... 'is replete with
empirical studies documenting the unreliability of eyewitness
identification.' "Id. at 779 (quoting State v. long, 721 P.2d
483, 488 (Utah 1986)). This led the Court "to comment that
'[p ]erhaps it is precisely because jurors do not appreciate
the fallibility of eyewitness testimony that they give such
testimony great weight.' " Id. at 780 (alteration in original)
(quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 490). Thus, Utah applies a more
stringent standard in making reliability determinations than
that employed in the federal system. Id. at 784. Compare
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375,
34 L.Ed.2d 401 ( I 972} (indicating that "the factors to be
considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification
include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at
the time of the crime, the witness'[s] degree of attention, the
accuracy of the witness'[s] prior description of the criminal,
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and
the confrontation"), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302,
87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967) (focusing on whether
an eyewitness confrontation was "so unnecessarily suggestive
and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that
[defendant] was denied due process of law"), with Ramirez,
817 P.2d at 781 (listing factors that are "generally comparable
to the Biggers factors" but "more precisely define the focus of
the relevant inquiry," and identifying the "ultimate question
to be detennined [as] whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the identification was reliable").
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distracting noises or activity during the observation. Id. at
782. The second factor considers the witness's degree of
attention to the actor. Id. at 781. 783. The third factor,
whether the witness had the capacity to observe the actor
during the event, includes considering whether the witness's
capacity to observe was impaired by stress or fright, personal
motivations, *24 biases, prejudices, unc01Tected visual
defects, fatigue, injury, drugs, or alcohol. Id. at 783. The
next factor, whether the witness's identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter or whether
it was a product of suggestion, includes considering the length
of time that passed between the witness's observation at the
time of the event and the identification of the defendant, the
witness's mental capacity and state of mind at the time of
the identification, the witness's exposure to information from
other sources, instances when the witness failed to identify the
defendant, instances when the witness gave descriptions that
were inconsistent with the defendant, and the circumstances
under which the defendant was presented to the witness for
identification. Id. And the final factor, the nature of the event
and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember,
and relate it con-ectly, includes considering whether the event
was an ordinary one in the mind of the witness and whether
the race of the actor was the same as the witness. Id. at 781.
~

12 The Ramirez court considered the first four factors

in detail and concluded that it was "an extremely close
case." Id. at 784. The Supreme Court was particularly
troubled by the "blatant suggestiveness of the showup,"
where Ramirez was identified in a very similar fashion to the
way Defendant was here-Ramirez "was the only person at
the showup who was not a police officer," he "stood with
his hands cuffed," and the "headlights of several police cars
were trained on him." Id. The Court was also concerned
with the "differences in racial characteristics between" the
eyewitness and Ramirez. Id. The Court detennined, however,
that "because the identification was based principally on the
eyes, physical size, and clothing, these racial factors may have

il 11 In Ramirez, the Court sBfen of relatively little importance." Id.

forth five factors that must be considered when analyzing
the reliability of an eyewitness identification: ( l) opportunity
to view, (2) degree of attention, (3) capacity to observe, (4)
spontaneity and consistency, and (5) nature of the event.
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781. The first factor, the opportunity
of the witness to view the actor during the event, includes
(but is not limited to) considering the length of time the
witness viewed the actor, the distance between the witness
and the actor, whether the witness could view the actor's
face, the lighting or lack of it, and whether there were

[71 ~ I 3 The same factors that led the Supreme Court
to conclude that Ramirez was "an extremely close case"
are present here. See id. The show-up was conducted in
almost identical fashion. Furthennore, the man who identified
Defendant is Native American and Defendant is Hispanic.
But unlike in Ramirez, the identification was not confined to
the eyes, physical size, and clothing of Defendant. Instead,
the State makes a point of the fact that the robber's entire,
unobscured "face was about ten inches from" the man's when
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the robber first crouched down next to the car. Thus "racial
factors" are more significant here than they were in Ramirez.
Cf id. at 776, 784 (noting that "racial factors may have been
ofrelatively little importance" when eyewitness identification
was based on the defendant's eyes, physical size, and clothing,
and the eyewitness did not have the opportunity to view the
defendant's entire face).

~

18 Evidence supporting the State's case includes the facts

that Defendant was wearing a beanie and a jacket when found
and that he is Hispanic, which jurors might conclude matched
the man's description of a "Spanish" robber. The State
recognizes that its strongest piece of evidence, aside from
the eyewitness identifications, albeit with their significant
descriptive discrepancies, was Defendant's comment to police

,i 14 This case also presents additional indications of

about someone following him-a comment similar to the

unreliability. For instance, the man failed to identify

question posed by the robber to the man, "Why you following

Defendant at the lineup, which is an important consideration

me?" But without the identifications, the jurors would likely

under the fourth Ramirez factor. See id. at 783. Moreover, the

have found very significant the man's initial description of

man's original description of the robber omitted any mention
of facial hair and included a definite recollection of long,

long black and white hair-and the evidence that a trained

the robber-a description that lacked a goatee and included

straight hair. In contrast, Defendant had a goatee and a shaved

police dog following the suspect's scent pulled officers toward

head, both of which are features that seem hard to miss at a

portable classrooms at the elementary school, while other

distance of ten inches, and the man did not miss the shaved

officers veered off from the K9 unit and later found Defendant

head because it was covered with a beanie-he "definitely"

curled up in an air conditioning unit.

remembered hair protruding well below the beanie.

il 19 When the eyewitness testimony is taken away, the State
18) ~ 15 If Ramirez was an extremely close call, we are
confident that here we can "say that [the man]'s testimony
is legally insufficient when considered in light of the other
circumstances to warrant a preliminary finding of reliability
and, therefore, admissibility." See id. at 784. But our inquiry
does not end there. We must also consider whether Defendant
suffered prejudice as a result of the trial court admitting the
identifications.
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1

16 We agree with Defendant that the State bears
the burden of convincing us that the improperly admitted
eyewitness identifications were harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Clwpnwn ,,. CaWornia, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87
S.ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ( 1967) ("[B]efore a federal
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be
able to declare a belief that it was ham,less *25 beyond a
reasonable doubt."). 2 The State has not met this burden.

1101 ii 17 For us to determine that the trial court's eirnr was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we must consider "the
importance of the witness'[s] testimony in the prosecution 1s
case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence

loses its strongest evidence against Defendant, and we cannot
say that the trial court's error in admitting the unreliable
eyewitness identifications was hannless beyond a reasonable
doubt. We accordingly vacate Defendant's conviction and
remand for a new trial.

PEARCE, Judge (dissenting):
,i 20 I dissent.

il 21

I agree with the majority that the time may have arrived

for the Utah Supreme Court to revisit its holding in State v.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). But so long as Ramirez
remains good law, we are duty-bound to apply it. I cannot
squint at Ramirez's holding in a way that permits me to
see how the identification testimony offered in this case is
less reliable than the testimony the Ramirez court deemed
admissible. Ramirez identified five factors a court must
consider in assessing the reliability of eyewitness testimony.
In almost all respects, the showup involving Defendant in this
case was substantially less troublesome than that the Ramirez
court approved.

or absence of evidence co[rro]borating or contradicting the
testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of
cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the

,i 22 The first Ramirez factor centers on the "opportunity of
the witness to view the actor during the event." Id. at 782. TI1is

1

overall strength of the prosecution s case." State v. Villarreal,

includes consideration of how long the witness saw the actor,

889 P.2d 419, 425-26 (Utah 1995) (citation and internal

the distance between them, the lighting, whether the witness

quotation marks omitted). When the man 1s identifications of

could view the actor's face, and whether there were distracting

Defendant arc removed, the State's case is severely weakened.

~-----......======-~
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circumstances that would affect the witness's ability to see the
actor. Id.

,r

23 In Ramirez, the witness (Wilson) testified at various
times that he had seen the actor for either a second, a few
seconds, or a minute or longer. Wilson also testified that
the actor was about ten feet away from him; other witnesses
described the distance as being as much as thirty feet away.
Wilson testified that the actor was crouched at the end of a
building and was wearing a mask over the lower part of his
face. Wilson conceded that he could not see the actor's eyes
clearly, but he "could see enough to know" they were "small."
Id. Testimony varied as *26 to whether the lighting was
good or whether shadows shrouded the actor. Id. at 782-83.

,r

24 Here, the trial court found that the witness viewed
Defendant for several seconds when they were face to face
in the car's open doorway. They were less than a foot apart,
and the area was lit by two street lamps, a porch light,
a neighbor's floodlight, and the car's headlights, as well
as the car's overhead dome light and lighted dashboard.
Defendant's face was uncovered. In all relevant ways, with
the possible exception of the duration of the observation, the
witness's opportunity to view Defendant was superior to the
observation Ramirez considered.

a pipe and was facing a gun pointed at him by a masked man
while the assailant continued to swing the pipe and threaten
him. The supreme court concluded that "it was reasonable
to assume that Wilson experienced a heightened degree
of stress." Id. Although the witness here was undoubtedly
startled by the presence of a stranger in his car at 3:30 a.m.,
there was no evidence before the trial court that this impaired
the witness's capacity to observe Defendant. Nor was there
any evidence that injury, drugs, or alcohol may have impaired
the witness.

1

27 The fourth Ramirez factor considers whether
the witness's identification was made spontaneously and
remained consistent. Id. It also examines whether the
identification was the "product of suggestion." Id. Ramirez
instructs that trial courts should consider a variety of factors,
including the amount of time between observation and
identification, the witness's mental capacity and state of mind
at the time of the identification, the witness's exposure to
infom1ation from other sources, instances when the witness
failed to identify the defendant, instances when the witness
gave inconsistencies in the description of the defendant, and
the circumstances under which the defendant was presented
to the witness for identification. See id.

"28 In Ramirez, the showup occmTed less than an hour after
,i 25 The second Ramirez factor examines the witness's
degree of attention to the actor. Id. at 783. In Ramirez,
Wilson was accosted by two men: Ramirez, who wie]ded
a firearm, and a second man carrying a pipe. Wilson was
struck with the pipe before he was even aware of Ramirez.
While Wilson became aware of Ramirez's presence, the "pipe
man" continued to threaten and swing the pipe at Wilson. In
contrast, here, the witness was alone with Defendant. After
observing Defendant for several seconds, the witness thought
that the way Defendant moved his hand was suggestive of
having a weapon. The witness began to get out of the car and
negotiate his way around Defendant to escape the situation.
Although concern over the potential possession of a weapon
by Defendant may have distracted the witness, it remains a
far cry from the distractions Wilson faced.

ii 26 The third Ramirez factor looks at the witness's capacity to
observe the event, including "whether the witness's capacity
to observe was impaired by stress or fright at the time of the
observation, by personal motivations, biases, or prejudices,
by uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, injury, drugs or
alcohol." State v. Ramirez, 817 P .2d 774, 783 (Utah I 991 ).
The Ramirez court considered that Wilson had been struck by

the event and the court concluded that nothing in the record
suggested that Wilson's mental capacity or state of mind
influenced the identification. Wilson was aware that one of
the other witnesses had not identified Ramirez as the gunman
but was otherwise not exposed to other identifications or
opinions. The supreme court noted that Wilson's descriptions
had varied in some details, such as whether Ramirez had worn
a hat or sported tattoos. Id. at 784.
29 In this matter, the showup took place thirty-five minutes
after the robbery. There is no indication in the record that
the witness had been influenced by additional infonnation.
However, as the majority ably describes, there exist a number
of concerns with the consistency of the witness's descriptions
of Defendant. Notably, at a subsequent lineup, the witness
identified both Defendant and another man as persons who
might have stolen his car. Moreover, the witness originally
omitted any mention of Defendant's facial hair and said that
the robber had long, straight hair. Defendant had a *27
goatee and was bald. The discrepancies in the witness's
identification present the only way in which this matter could
be considered a better candidate for reversal than Ramirez.
However, in light of the myriad other ways in which the

CU
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testimony in Ramirez appears more unreliable than that at
issue here, I cannot conclude that these discrepancies are
enough to pull this case from Ramirez's reach.
~ 30

Ramirez also examined whether Wilson's identification
of Ramirez was the product of suggestion by looking at
the procedures the showup employed. The identification
occurred at night. Id. Prior to the showup, police officers
remarked to Wilson that they had apprehended someone who
fit the description of one of the robbers. Ramirez, the only
person involved in the showup who was not a police officer,
was handcuffed to a chain-link fence illuminated by the
headlamps of police cars. Wilson identified Ramirez from the
back seat of a police vehicle. Here, Defendant was similarly
cuffed and lit by headlights. Defendant was also the only
person at the showup who was not a law enforcement officer.

showup is troublesome." 817 P.2d 774, 784 (Utah 1991).
However, even after acknowledging the troublesome nature
of the showup, as well as Wilson's inability to see Ramirez's
face (in part because Ramirez was wearing a mask), Wilson's
changing testimony about whether Ramirez wore a hat, and
the distraction caused by another assailant wielding a pipe, the
Ramirez court found that Wilson's identification testimony
was sufficiently reliable to be admissible. Id. at 782-84.
Although it is far from the most satisfying result, if the
testimony Wilson offered in Ramirez cleared the bar, so too
must the testimony the witness offered in this matter.

1 32 For these reasons, I dissent.
All Citations
357 P.3d 20, 792 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 2015 UT App 199

1 31

I concur with the majority when it echoes the Ramirez
court's conclusion that "[t]he blatant suggestiveness of the

Footnotes

1

We decide this case within the framework established by State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). We have
every reason to believe, however, that Ramirez must be revisited. See Anne E. Whitehead, Note, State v. Ramirez:
Strengthening Utah's Standard for Admitting Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 64 7, 689 (1992}
(generally approving of Ramirez but recognizing that it "is not without flaws" because "the court's conclusion seems
incongruous with the results of its application of the reliability analysis, leaving uncertain the future impact of the new Utah
analytical framework"). Aside from any flaws inherent in the Ramirez analysis, scientific and legal research regarding the
reliability of eyewitness identifications has progressed significantly in the last twenty-four years. See generally National
Research Council of the National Academies, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification 11-12 (2014 ).
Before Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court first took an in-depth look at the potential shortcomings of eyewitness
identifications in State v. Long, 721 P .2d 483 {Utah 1986). In Long, the Court accepted the invitation to "either abandon
any pretext of requiring a cautionary eyewitness instruction or make the requirement meaningful" by deciding "to
follow the latter course." Id. at 487. The Court did this by "abandon [ing its] discretionary approach to cautionary
jury instructions and direct [ing] that in cases tried from th[at] date forward, trial courts shall give such an instruction
whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and such an instruction is requested by the defense."
Id. at 492.
Then, after Ramirez, the Court considered another aspect of cases involving eyewitness identifications-expert
testimony. In State v. Buttetiield, 2001 UT 59, 27 P.3d 1133, the Court affirmed a trial court's exclusion of an expert
witness because the trial court had found that the proposed expert testimony "did not deal with the specific facts from
[that] case but rather would constitute a lecture to the jury about how it should judge the evidence." Id. 11 44 {internal
quotation marks omitted). The issue was revisited in State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 1114, 48 P.3d 953. In Hubbard,
while leaving Buttetiield untouched, the Court did invite trial courts "to specifically tailor instructions other than those
offered in Long that address the deficiencies inherent in eyewitness identification." Id. ,I 20.
But in State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 223 P.3d 1103, the Court recognized that its "previous holdings ha[d] created
a de facto presumption against the admission of eyewitness expert testimony, despite persuasive research that such
testimony is the most effective way to educate juries about the possibility of mistaken identification." Id. ,I 30. The Court
sought to change this by announcing "that the testimony of a qualified expert regarding factors that have been shown
to contribute to inaccurate eyewitness identifications should be admitted whenever it meets the requirements of rule
702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." Id. The Court "expect[ed] this application of rule 702 [to] result in the liberal and
routine admission of eyewitness expert testimony." Id.
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While Utah jurisprudence now better recognizes the problematic nature of eyewitness identification, Ramirez remains
the standard by which courts must evaluate the admissibility of this evidence. It is a standard that does not accurately
reflect the changed views about handling this problematic evidence. And the disconnect between the legal analysis in
Ramirez and its outcome makes it an unreliable tool for resolving particular cases, as shown by the two opinions in this
case. All of this, taken together, indicates that it is time for our Supreme Court to reconsider Ramirez, a proposition
with which the dissent agrees. See infra 1f 21.
We recognize that State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), was primarily concerned with an alleged due process
violation under the Utah Constitution. Id. at 781. See Utah Const. art. I, § 7. Utah's approach "is certainly as stringent
as, if not more stringent than, the federal analysis," but there is no reason to assume our constitution would impose a
different standard of review for those few circumstances where our constitution is violated but the federal constitution is
not. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
·-·-..-•--- ...- ............-..---------·-
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Addendum B

Addendum B

U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 12
West's Utah Code Annotated
Constitution of Utah
··ei Article I. Declaration of Rights
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons]

.·>,

l<ifl

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided
by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as
defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine
probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1994, S.J.R. 6, §

L adopted at election Nov. 8, 1994, eff. Jan. 1. 1995.
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Addendum D

PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Eyewitness Evidence
Improving Its Probative Value
, -::\

..,

l
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Gary L. Wells, Amina Memon,- and Steven D. Penrod

3

1

Iowa State University; 2 University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, Scotland; and 3John Jay College of Criminal Justice

criminal justice system relies heavily on
eyewitnesses to determine the facts surrowidin.g criminal
events. Eyewitnesses mciy identify culprits, recall conversc,.tions, or remember other details. An eyewitness who has
no motive to li.e is a powerful form. of evidence for jurors,
especially if the eyewitness appears to be highly confident
about his or her recollection. In the absence of definitive
proof to the contrary, the eyewitness s <Lecount is generally
accepted by police, prosecutors, judges, and juries.
However, the faith the lega,l system pl<Lces in eyewitnesses has been shaken recently by the advent offorensic
DNA testing. Given the right set of circumstances,forensic
DNA testing C<.m prove that a person who was convicted of
a crimr. is, in fact, innocent. Analyses of DNA exoneration
cases since 1992 reveal that mistalrnn erewitness identificutiun was involved in the vust mujority of these convictions, accounting for more convictions of innocent people
them all other factors combined. We review the latest figures on these DNA exonerations and explain why these
cases can only be a small fraction of the mistaken identi_fications that are occurring.
Decades before the advent of forensic DNA testing,
psychologists were questioning the validity of eyewitness
reports. Hugo Miinsterberg's writings in the early part of
the 20th centriry rnade a strong case for the involvement
of psychological science in helping the legal system
understand the vagaries of eyewitness testimony. But it
was not u.ntil the mid- to late 1970s that psychologists begem to conduct programmatic experiments aimed at
wulerstwrding the extent of error and the variables that
govern error when eyewitnesses give accounts of crimes
they have witnessed. Many of the experiments condu.cted i.n
the lute 1970s and throughout the 1980s resu.lte<Un cirticles
by psychologists that contained strong 1v<1r11ings to the legal system that eyewitness evidence was being overvllluecl
by the justice system in the sense that its impuct on triers
of fact (e.g., juries) exceeded its probative (legal-proof)
va.lue. Another message of the research was that the
SUMMARY-The

Direct correspondence to Gary L. Wells. Psychology Department,
Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011; e-mail: glwells@iastate.edu.
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validity of eyewitness reports depends a great deal on the
procedures that are used to obtain those reports and that
the legal system wa ... not using the best procedures.
Although defense attorneys seized on this nascent
research as a tool for the defense, it was largely ignored
or ridiculed by prosecutors, judges, and police until the
m.id 1990s, when forensic DNA testing began to uncover
cclses of convictions of innocent persons on the basis of
mistaken eyewitness accounts. Recently, a number of
jurisdictions in the United States have implemented
procedural reforms based on psychological research, but
psychological science has yet to have its fullest possible
influence on how the justice system collects and interprets
eyewitness evidence.
The psychological processes leading to eyewitness error
represent <t confluence of memory and socinl-influence
vciriables that interact i1~ complex ways. These processes
lend them.selves to study using experi,nental methods.
Psydwlogica.l science i.~ in a strong position to help the
criminal justice system understand eyewitness accounts of
criminal events and improve their accuracy. A su.bset of the
variables that affect eyewitness accuracy fall into what
researchers call system variables, which are variables
that the criminal justice system has control over, such as
how eyewitnesses are instructed before they view a
lineup and methods of interviewing eyewitnesses. We
re·view a numbr.r of system ·vuriable... <irul de.scribe how
psychologic(l,l scientists have translated them into procedures that can improve the probative value of eyewitness
accounts. Tf/e also review estimator variables, variables
that affect eyewitness accur(l,cy but over which the system
has no control, such as cross-race versus within-race
identifications.
We describe some concerns regarding external validity
arulgeneralization that naturally arise when movin.gfrom.
the la.boru.tory to the real world. These i11clu.de issues of
base rates, multicollinearity, selection effects, subject
populations, and psychological reali.i;m. For each of these
concerns, we briP.fly note ways in which both theory and
field data help make the case for generalization.
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Eyewitness Evitltmcc

INTRODUCTION
Kirk Rloorlsworth harl never been in trouble with the law, and yet
he was convicted in March 1985 for the 1984 sexual assault and
Rlaying of a 9-year-olrl girl in Marylanrl (State of Maryland v.
Kirk N. Bloodsworth, 1984). Five eyewitnesses identified
Bloodsworth at trial. Luter that month, a ju<lge sentenced him to
death. He spent 2 years on death row before he received a new
trial Lased on the prosecution's withhol<ling of information about
other suspects. This time he received a life sentence. Bloo<lsworth maintained a claim of innocence from the outset, but it was
not until 1993 that he was released from prison on the basis of
DNA testing that proverl he was not the source of semen founrl in
the little girl's undcnvear. Bloodsworth was lucky that the
unrlerwear had been preserved, because earlier (pre-DNA) tests
had indicated nothing of value on the underwear. But what kind
of luck is being convicted of a murder you did not commit'? His
mother died while he was in prison, before learning the truth that
he was innocent. And despite his release from prison, some
people, including one of the original prosecutors, continued to
helieve thal Bloodsworlh may have been the murderer. The
eyewitness evidence just seemed too strong. Maybe Bloo<lsworth
really was the murderer, they reasoned, and the tiny speck of
semen came from someone other than the murderer-perhaps
someone who hacl access to the little girl's clresscr drawer, for
instance. Bloodsworth went on with his life, confident in his own
inno<:ence but having to live with the occasional doubt raised by
those who somehow remained unpersuaded. Then, in September
20m, ONA testing got a hit on the actual murderer. Kimberly
Shay Ruffner. Nineteen years after Kirk Bloodsworth was sentenced to death, the proof was finally there: He had had nothing
lo <lo with the sexual assault and slaying of the young girl.
The case of Kirk Bloodsworth illustrates several problems
with eyewitness evidence. First, it illustrates the fallacy of assuming that inter-witness agreement is necessarily strong evidence of accuracy. Many factors can lea<l lo inter-witness
agreement, such as interaction among the witnesses in which
they share information. In general, factors that lead one eyewitness to make a particular error will lead others to make the
same error. Second, the Bloodsworth case illustrates the profounrl levd of proof requirer! for exonerating evirlence to trump
eyewitness identification evidence. Even when the semen was
proved not to match Bloodsworth's DNA, many people were
unwilling tu believe he was innocent. It was necessary to prove
that someone else had commilled the murder. Third, the
BlooJsworth case illustrates that mistaken identification is a
dual problem: Not only might an innocent person be convicted
but the guilty party remains free to reoffenJ.
The role of scientific psychology in the problem of eyewitness
evidence is a profound one. With few exceptions, the legal
system has not conclucte<l research on eyewitness eviclcncc, has
never conducted an experiment on memory, and has no scientific
theory regarding how memory works. The scientific study of
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eyewitnesses is purely the domain of psychology. When the U.S.
Department of Justice finally wrote guidelines on eyewitness
evidence in 1999, the only scientific studies cited were those
published by psychologists in psychology journals. Torlay, psychology is engaged in an active dialogue with judges, police, and
prosecutors on ways to improve the probative (evidentiary) value
of eyewitness reports. The credibility of scientific psychology
has risen immensely in the legal system recently, largely Lecause psychologists were already "blowing the whistle" on
eyewitness evidence well before forensic DNA tesling began
uncovering mistaken ic.lentifications in the 1990s. In effect,
psychologists were able lo use experiments lo identify eyewitness problems long Lefore the legal system was smacked in the
face with DNA exonerations.
A primary purpose of this article is to describe empirical
evidence supporting the proposition that some of the problems
with eyewitness evidence can be addressed by improving the
way the evidence is collected and preserved. We discuss how
eyewitnesses are interviewed, how lineups are conducted, and
why procedures can have a slrong impact on the resulting probative value of eyewitness testimony. These variables are called
system variables, because they are under the control of the
justice system (Wells, 1978). The importance of system variables that can reduce eyewitness error has become increasingly
apparent in light of the proven inadequacies of traditional
safeguards against eyewitness mistakes, such as the presence of
counsel at lineups and the opportunity to present motions to
suppress suggestive procedures (Stinson, Devenport, Cutler, &
Kravitz, 1996, 1997). But even if the system reaches a point at
which it makes perfect use of system variables, eyewitness
errors attributable to other factors will remain. Thus, it is
important to review these other (non-system-controlled) factors
as well.
This monograph is not intended as an exhaustive review of the
eyewitness literature. Insteac.l, we focus on practices, procedures, and research that address the most common threats lo
eyewitness reliability. Although the bulk of the scientific unc.l
legal literature we cite has a North American origin, the international research community has made extremely important
contributions. In fact, historically, it was Europeans who played
the much greater role in the study of eyewitness memory. 1
We begin with a brief history of psychology's attempt to help
the legal system on the eyewitness issue. Then we <lescriLe the
DNA exoneration cases that began to unfold in the l 990s and the
role these exonerations have played in giving scientific psychology a stronger voice in the legal system's policies and procedures involving eyewitness evidence. We then give an
overview of the standarrl methods used in eyewitness research,
followed by selected findings on estimator and system variables.
1
\vc arc forlunalc lo have Siegfried Sporer, a strong European conlribulor lo
the c•mpiric-:il likrature on cyewitnt'ss issues, write the editorial prececling thi~
monograph (sec p. i). Sporer phl('CS our report in a broader historical and in•
ternutional context.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY
In his hook /,a SuggeJtibilite: Alfred Binet (1900) argued for the
creation of a practical science of testimony based on his observations about the effects of suggestion. Binet was the first to
report that suggestive questioning influenced responses. But it
was German psychologists who were among the first to argue that
how eyewitnesses were questioned makes a great deal of differenee. Louis William Stern was publishing and ediLing studies
of eyewitness testimony as early as 1904 (Stern, 1904). In the
United States, Guy Montrose Whipple published a number of
articles in Psychological Bnlletin on eyewitness testimony
(Whipple, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912). But it was Hugo Munsterberg's (1908) book On the Witness Stand and his injection of
himself into the legal system that had a more lasting impact in
the United States.
Miinsterberg was recruited by William James in 1892 to come
to Harvard to run the university's psychological laboratory.
Milnsterberg was very much a public figure and he appeared
frequently in the popular press. He also was a somewhat controversial figure al Harvard, presumably because his colleagues
did not see a great deal of merit in applying psychology. His
lectures and writings were extremely perceptive and well reasoned. albeit rather short on data by modern standards. His
presr·ience is evirlent in such matters as his claim that eyewitness certainty has a tenuous relation to accuracy and that while
jurors might understanrl forgetting, they are not likely to
understand that a witness can remember the wrong thing.
Although Munst~rherg maintained a certain prominence in
psychology, his impact on the legal system was muted dramatically by the skilled eounterargumentalion of one of the grealesl
minds in American jurispru<lence, John Henry Wigmore. Particularly problematic; for Mtinslerberg was a law review article
by Wigmore (1909) that challenged Mtinsterberg's (1908)
overstatements about the ability of psychology to help the legal
system. Wigmore was especially effective in arguing that psychology did not yet have ready tools for handling the problem of
evaluating eyewitness accounts, as Mi.insterberg had claimed.
For the most part, Wigmore won the argument, at least from the
perspective of the legal system.
Eyewitness research foll to a trickle in the periorl of the 1920s
to 1960s. Some important work was done in the 19.30s by Burtt
(19:H) and Stern (19~9). Thi~ 1940s produced some important
studies by Snee and Lush (1941) on question effects an<l by
Allport and Postman (194 7) on person-lo-person information
transfer. And although Hastorf anJ Cantrill (1954) <lemonstrated
the effects of personal prejudice on perception in the 1950s,
there was little discussion of the relevance of this to the legal
8ystem and to f!yewitnesses in general. There are differing
accounts of why these decades were largely devoid of eyewitness
psychology. Sporer (1982) argues that it was the result of zealous
overgeneralizations by psychologists that failed to meet the
needs and standards of the courtroom.
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The Modern Era of Eyewitness Research
More than any other individual's work, it was Elizabeth Loftus's
elegant experiments on postevent information that gave rise to
the modern era of eyewitness research. Loftus managed to show
that realistic stimuli, such as pictures of stop signs and red barns
in their natural settings, could be used in rigorous scientific
experiments that revealed basic phenomena in memory and also
had practical utility for understanding eyewitness error. By
publishing her work in prestigious scientific psychology journals in the mid- and late l 970s-journals such as Cognitive
Psychology, Journcil of Verbal learning and Verbal Behavior, and

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human le<Lming and
Memory-Loftus legitimized the study of eyewitnesses in the
minds of psychological scientists. Her book Eyewitness Testimony (Loftus, 1979) remains one of the best known psychology
hooks almost three decades after it was released. Like
Mi.insterberg, Lofius was criticized for some of her claims (e.g.,
McCloskey & Egeth, 1983), but, unlike Mi.insterberg, she
helped spawn a new generation of researchers who have care[ully and strategically built an empirical literature Lhat the legal
system must contend with.
While Loftus was focusing on memory for evenls and the
malleability of memory, Robert Buckhout at Brooklyn College
was focusing on memory for people. Buckhout was more concerned with mistaken identification from lineups than with
memory for objects. Although Ruc:khout wrote a highly visible
article in Scient(fic American reviewing research on eyewitness
reliability (Rur:khout, 1974). he was not otherwise particularly
successful in getting his work published in scientific psychology
journals. He did. however, create his own "in house" outlet
called Social Action and the law. Buckhout often used dramatic
means to gel his point across. For example, he got a NP-w York
City television station to broadcast a staged mugging followed by
a six-person lineup. Of the 2,145 viewers who called in, nearly
2,000 mistakenly identified the mugger in the lineup (Buckhout,
l 980). Tt is possible that Buckhout could have published some of
his experiments in better journals but chose nol to spend the
time and effort required to go through the rigorous review process. Still, Buckhout influenced many younger researchers, who
took up the issue of mistaken identification. At about the same
time, eyewitness research activity was growing in the United
Kingdom, prompted by the investigation of the Devlin Committee (Devlin, 1976; see also Bull & Clifford, 1976; Cliffor<l &
Bull, 1978; Davies, Ellis. & Shepherd, 1978; Ellis. Davies, &
Shepherd, J977).
One of the organizing themes that emerged from the 1970s
was the <listinction between system variables and estimator
variables (Wells 1978). The argument was that some of the
variables that affect the accuracy of eyewitness reports were
unrler the control (or potentially under the control) of the justice
system (system variables) while others were not (estimator
variables). For example, how eyewitnesses are interviewed by
police and how eyewitnesses are instructed prior to viewing a
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lineup are system variahJes, becausf! they can be contro11ed hy
the system that is collecting the eyewitness evidence. Other
variables-such as cross-race versus within-race identifications
or stress experienced by the witness during tlte event-cannot
be controlled by the system. Both system and estimator variables
can he controlled and manipulatr.rl in experiments, hut only
system variables can be controlled in actual cases. Variables
thut cannot be controlleJ by the justice system (even though they
can be controlled in experiments) are called estimator variables
because the best that eyewitness psychology can do jg help estimate their impact in a given case.
The singling oul of system variables was important, because it
addressed the primary argument that Wigmore used in his
rlevastating criticism of Miinsterberg-namely, that psychology
had no practical recommendations for dealing with the eyewitness problem. Loftus's main findings fit nicely into the systemvariable framework. For instance. if certain types of questions
(leading questions) result in eyewitnesses incorporating information into their later reports regarding matters they did not
witness, then psychology coulJ devise practical ways lo avoid
this problem. Likewise, if certain instructions to eyewitnesses
prior to viewing a lineup reduce the chances of mistaken identific.:alion, then psychology could advise on the best ways lo instruct eyewitnesses.
Throughout the l 970s and 1980s, eyewitness research
was largely ignorecl by the criminal justice system. The hig
exception was criminal defense lawyers. Defense lawyers were
quick to rec.ognize the potential for psychology to help them
convince juries that eyewitness memory was not to be trusted,
ancl they saw expert testimony as the me.chanism lo do this. The
battle to permit expert testimony on eyewitness issues, however,
was and is a contentious one. Expert testimony has lteen hoth
pennitte<l and denied in nearly every slate in the United Stales,
depending on the discretion of the trial judge. Prosecutors
genernlly use four arguments against the admission of expert
testimony nn eyewitness issues. One argument is that the eyewitness literature is nol sufficiently mature or precise lo be
considered scientific. Today, this argument almost never prevails. However. the three other arguments continue lo prevent
expert testimony on eyewitness issues in many jurisrlict.ions.
One is that such testimony invades the province of the jury,
because it is the jury that must decide the credibility of wit. nesses. Another argument is that the findings are merely a matter
of common sense and that juries already know these things from
their every<lay experience. Yet another argument is that the
prejudicial value of expert testimony regarding eyewitnesses
outweighs its probative value. This argument m;sumes that
eyewitness experts can make juries more rlubious of the eyewitness than they ought lo be. It is not the purpose of the current
monograph to argue thf' mt"rits of expert testimony. W('. simply
note that expert testimony for the defense was, until recently,
virtually the only way the legal system acknowledged the
scientific study of eyewitnesses.
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Forensic DNA Testing: An Awakening of the Legal System
Muc:h has changed in the past few years. hut not because of any
change in how eyewitness scientists have approached their work.
Rather, the arlvent of forensic: DNA testing has changed the way
the legal system views eyewitness evidence. Previous studies of
the conviction of innocent people had shown that mistaken
eyewitness identification was implicated in the majority of
wrongful conviction cases (e.g., Borchard, 1932; Frank & Frank,
1957; Huff, Rattner, & Sagarin, 1986). But it was the development of forensic DNA testing jn the 1990s that permitted definitive cases of the conviction of innocent people in the United
Stales to be uncovered. Defense lawyers Barry Scheck and Peter
Neufeld, cofoun<lers of the Innocence Project in New York City,
took the lead and are still the central figures in facilitating the
use of forensic DNA to test claims of innocence by people who
were convicted by juries. Scheck and Neufeld were quick to see
the pattern: Eyewitness-identification error was at the heart of
the evidence used to convict the vast majority of these innocent
people. Press accounts of these exonerations caught the attention of U.S. Attorney General Janel Reno, and an early report
commissioned by Reno revealed that 26 of the first 28 exonerations were cases of mistaken eyewitness identification (Connors, Lundregan, Miller, & McEwan, 1996). follow-ups revealed
that :36 of the first 40 DNA exonerations were mistaken-identification cases (Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, &
Rrimacombe, 1998). Scheck, Neufeld, and Dwyer (2000) reported that 52 of the first 62 DNA exonerations were mistakenidentification cases. As of this writing, there have been more
than 180 definitive DNA exonerations; the proportion that involves mistaken eyewitness identification continues to run about
75% or more. The Innocence Project in New York maintains an
up-ln-<late \Veb site, www.innocenceprojecl.org, that catalogues
these DNA exonerations, and there are now innocence proj eels worldwide (hllp://forej uslice.org/wc/wrongful_con viction_
websites.htm).
Before the DNA exoneration cases, some people believed that
the results of eyewitness experiments in psychology were mere
aca<lemic exercises, games played with people's memories that
would not apply to real witnesses and real crimes. At the very
least, the DNA exonerations have proved that eyewitnesses can
be absolutely positive and yet absolutely mistaken, just as was
founrl in the experiments. But. do 180-plus cases of mistaken
identification prove anything? If these cases were the total, then
it might be argued that this is a rather small fraction of convictions. But consider the following observations. Virtually all of
these DNA exoneration cases involved sexual assault. Some also
involve<l murder, robbery, and other offenses, but sexual assault
is the common feature.
It is not that sexual assault witnesses are especially poor
e.yewit.nesse.s. In fact, they might be the very best at identifying
their altackers. because they lend lo get longer, closer views of
them than do victirus of most other crimes. The reason these DNA
exoneration cases are sexual assault cases is because they are the
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cases for which biologically rich DNA traces were left behind by
the perpetrator in the form of semen. (In 2004, nearly 95,000
sexual assaults were reported, with a 43% clearance rate. For
crime statistics, see www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/offenses_reporterV
violent_crime/index.html.) Stranger-rape cases, in which identification is most likely to be an issue, constitute less than a third
of all reported sexual assaults. More than 70% of rep011ed sexual
assaults involve an intimate partner, relative, or acquaintance, so
about 30,000 cases of stranger-rape come to the attention of the
police each year. In contrast lo sexual assault cases, only a small
fraction of murders (more than 16,000 reported in 2004) and
almost no robberies (more than 400,000 reported in 2004) or
aggravateJ assaults (more than 850,000 reported in 2004} result
in hiologically rich trace evi<lence being left behind. What can
the person who was convicted of a convenience store robbery or a
<lrive-hy shooting use to prove that the eyewitness identification
was mistaken? Thus, these 180-plus DNA exonerations represent a small proportion of the crimes for which eyewitness
identification evidence has been used to convict people. Furthermore, only a fraction of ol<l sexual assault eonvictions can
now Le tested, because the eviJence was never collecte<l, was
collected improperly, has deteriorated, has been lost, or has heen
destroyed. All in all, the 180 (and growing) DNA exonerations
can only be a small fraction of the total number of cases in which
people have been convicted because they were mistakenly
i<lentified by eyewitnesses.
\'\1c will not venture an estimate of the number of people in
prison who are i1111oce11t victims of mistaken eyewitness identification. Instead, our focus is on what the legal system might be
ahle to do to help prevent these mistakes from occurring in the
future. This is where we have seen some promising progress
recently. Janel Reno's appointment of a working group to develop guidelines for eyewitness evidence was a watershe<l event,
because the group included five eyewitness researchers. Reno
recognizeJ that scientific.: psychology was well ahead of the legal
system both in recognizing the eyewitness problem and in developing solutions for ii. An account of this process, which
yieldnl the first set of U.S. national guidelines on eyewitness
evidence, has been published elsewhere (Wells, Malpass,
Lindsay, Fisher, Turtle, & Fulero, 2000). Since the publication
of the guide, a number of jurisdictions have formally adopted the
recommendations and have gone well beyond the guide to include procedural changes recommended by eyewitness scientists. These jurisdictions include the states of New Jersey, North
Carolina, and Wisconsin, as well as the cities of Boston and
Minneapolis, among others (Wells, 2006).
Despite these encouraging reforms, it is estimated that
only about 10% of the U.S. population reside in reformed
jurisdictions (\Veils, 2006). Will these system-variable improvf'rnents continue hy increasin~ numbers of juris<lictions
in the years to come'? Only time will tell. In the following sections we review some of the evidence that has led to the changes,
and we note how the eyewitness-research area must continue to
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devel~p lo ensure that the evolving relationship between the
legal system and psychological science will be a fruitful and
lasting one.

COMMON METHODS USED IN EYEWITNESS
RESEARCH
The experimental method has dominated the eyewitness literature, an<l most of the experiments are lab based. Lab-based
experimental methods for studying eyewitness issues have
strengths and weaknesses. The primary strength of experimental
methods is that they are proficient at establishing cause-effect
relations. This is especially important for research on system
variables, because one needs to know in fact whether a particular system manipulation is expected to cause better or worse
pe1formance. In the real world, many variables can operate at
the same time and in interaction with one another. Multicollinearity can be quite a problem in archival/field research,
because it can be very difficult to sort out which (correlated)
variables are really responsible for observed effects. The control
of variables that is possible in experimental research can
bring clarity to causal relationships that are obscured in archival
research. For example, experiments on stress during witnessing
have shown, quite compellingly, that stress interferes with the
ability of eyewitnesses to identify a central person in a stressful
situation (Morgan et al., 2004; Deffenbacher, Bornstein. Penrod,
& McGorty, 2004). However, when Yuil1e and Cutshall (1986)
studied multiple witnesses to an actual shooting, they found that
those who reported higher stress had better memories for details
than did those who reported lower stress. Why the different results? In the experimental setting, stress was manipulated while
other factors were held constant; in the actual shooting, those
who were closer lo the incident reported higher levels of stress
(presumably because of their proximity) but also had a better
view. Thus, in the actual case, stress and view covaried.
The experimental methoJ is not well suited to post<liction with
estimator variables-that is, there may he limits to generalizing
from experiments to actual cases. One reason is that levels of
estimator variables in experiments are fixed and not necessarily
fully representative of the values observed in actual cases. In
addition, it is not possible to include all interesting and plausible internctions among variables in any single experiment
(or even in a modest number of experiments). Clearly, generalizations to actual cases are best undertaken on the basis of a
substantial hocly of experimental research conduelecl across a
wiJe variety of conditions and employing a wide variety of
variables. Nevertheless, the literature is largely based on experiments due to a clear preference by eyewitness researchers lo
learn about cause and effect. Fm1hermore, "ground truth" (the
actual facts of the witnessed event) is readily established in
experiments, because the witnessed events are creations of the
experimenters. That kind of ground truth is difficult, if not impossible, lo establish when analyzing actual cases.
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Experimental Methods
The ecological validity of witnessed events (when examined al
the surface level) varies considerably across experiments. Some
eyewitness experiments simply show slides to participant witnesses. while others stage live crimes. Some of the staged crimes
have been daborate ruses in which calls are made to "police"
(actually confederates of the experimenter) and participants are
shown lineups while still believing that what they witnessed was
real (e.g., Luus & Wells, 1994; Wells & Murray, 1983). Perhaps
the most common witnessed event used by researchers is the
video crime. The immense time and cost involved in staging live
crimes has undoubtedly made them less common in the literature in recent years, but the success of vi<leo crime experiments
in the peer-review process suggests that researchers believe this
method manages to capture the elements that are important for
studying eyewitness processes. Usually, the memory-acquisition
process is incidental in the sense that the participant witnesses
do not know when they watch the video that the study concerns
eyewitness memory. Instead, researchers commonly tell them
Lhal they are going lo have lo form impressions or make judgments about the people or scenes. Only later are they informed
Lhal the study concerns eyewitness memory.
In lineup experiments, the participant witnesses are usually
tested with photo lineups rather than with live lineups. Again,
the savings in cost and time are factors, but the use of photo
lineups in experiments parallels their use in actual cases. In the
United Kingdom, there has been a move toward the use of video
li11~11ps (Pike, Kemp, Towell, & Phillips, 1997; Valentine &
Heaton, 1999). Although some jurisdictions (such as New York)
stiJI use live lineups, most jurisdictions in the United Stales use
photo lineups. Even where live lineups are in common use, more
often than not they are preceded by a photo lineup, and the live
lineup is mere1y a confirmatory tool. Thus, the prevalence of
pholo lineups in experiments rellecls what is happening in actual criminal investigations.
IL is standard practice in experiments to use lineups in which
the actual perpelralor is present in the lineup for some parlicipant witnesses and not present for others. The not-present
lineups (target-absent or perpetrator-absent lineups) are critically impm1ant for eyewitness-identification studies that are
designed to examine accuracy. Target-absent lineups simulate
the real-world situation in which police have focused their
suspicion on an innocent suspect. The standard procedure in
lineup experiments is to create a target-absent lineup by replacing the target with another person who fits the target's description and leaving the fillers (the innocent distracters or foils
in the lineup) the same.
Participant witnesses in experiments typically take the perspecli ve of a byslan<ler rather than a victim. However, some
expPriments have examined possible differences between bystander eyewitnesses and victim eyewitnesses and have found
no significant differences (Hosch & Cooper, 1982; Hosch,
Leippe, Marchioni, & Cooper, 1984).
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Participant witnesses in experiments are typically college
students. Tlie reliance on this population has been criticized,
especially by prosecutors. However, many experiments have
included other populations, such as young chilchen, adults, and
the elderly. Importantly, when differences are found, the results
favor the college students. Specifically, co1lege students arc less
suggestible and more accurate as eyewitnesses overall than are
either children or the el<lerly (Cutler & Penrod, 1995; Searcy,
Bartlett, & Memon, 1999). Presumably this is due to the higher
education level, intelligence, memory ability, visual acuily,
alertness, and general health of college students relative to the
general population. Thus, if anything, heavy reliance on college
student subject populations for eyewitness re~earch may paint
an unrealistic:ally rosy picture of eyewitness abilities.
Within the basic eyewitness-experiment paradigm, manipulations are embedded and their effects are observed. For example, an experiment focusing on system variables might have
everyone view the same simulated crime and then randomly
assign some participant witnesses to receive a postevent suggestion or randomly assign some Lo receive a particular prelineup instruction. In an experiment focusing on estimator
variables, participants might be randomly assigned to view a
crime in which the perpetrator is of a different race or the same
race or to make an identification after a short delay or after a long
delay.
Archival Methods
Although the experimental method is preferred, archival studies
of eyewitnesses have become more common in recent years. A
major drawback to archival studies is the inability to establish
cause and effect and the questionable basis for assuming ground
truth. Studies of the DNA exoneration cases involve ground truth
for identity of Lhe perpetrator, hut these are only case studies, not
archival analyses. Archival analyses have proven to be particularly informative with regard to lineups. A lineup thal is
properly constructed inclu<les only one suspect (who might or
might not he the peq1etrator); the other people in the lineup are
innocent fillers who would not be charged with the crime if they
were identified by the eyewitness. Thus, when an eyewitness
selects a filler in an actual lineup, it is immediately classifiable
as an error. It is not the type of error that could send an innocent
person to jail (only identifications of an innocent suspect could do
that). but it is an identification error nevertheless.
Archival analyses of filler identifications have yielded very
interesting results. Wright and McDaid (1996) analyzed 1,561
lineup outcomes in London an<l found filler-identification rates
of 19.9%. These <lata are similar to the 21 % filler identification
rate reportc<l by Slater (1994) in a study of 84;~ lineups conducted by the Metropolitan Police in London. Behrman and
Davey (2001) reported that 24% of identifications from live
lin~ups in Sacramento, California, were identifications of fillers.
Valentine, Pickering, and Darling (2003) analyzed 119 lineups
in the greater London area and found that 21.6% of the
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eyewitnesses identified fillers. In these four studies of actual
eyewitnesses to serious crimes, filler iclentifications constitute<l
approximately one third of all positive identifications. These
archival results represent a ver)' important complement to the
experimental studies of eyewitnesses for several reasons. First.
they indicate filler-identification results that are quite consistent
with rates obtained in experiments (Ebbeson & Flowe, n.d.;
Stehluy, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001). Secon<l, these urchival results address a common criticism of experimentsnamely, that participant witnesses in experiments are not as
cautious as actual crime witnesses are, because the consequences of a mistaken identification in an experiment are nol
serious. But the witnesses in the archival studies were actual
witnesses to crimes anrl yet mistakenly i<lentified fillers in one
third of their positive identifications. Third. the filler-identificat ion rates in the archival studies permit us to make conservative estimates of the risk that an innocent suspect would face
in these lineups. For example, with five fillers in each lineup
(six-person lineup minus the suspect) and a 20% filler-identifieatiun rate, the risk to any given filler is 4%. If an innocent
suspeet has the same risk as a filler, the estimated risk to an
innoc·ent suspect is 4%.
These estimates of the risk to an innocent suspect are conservative for two reasons. First, lineups rarely yield equal distributions of error Lecause the innocent suspect will commonly
stand out for any number of reasons, including the selection of
fillers that bear a poor resemblance to the description of the
p,~rpetrator given hy the witness (Valentine & Heaton, 1999;
Brigham, Meissner, & Wasserman, 1999). Second, when the
actual perpetrator is not in the lineup (i.e., the suspect is innocent), the rates of filler identification increase (see Wells &
Olson, 2002). Assuming that the perpetmtor was present in a
large proµortion of the lineups in these arehival studies, the
filler-identification rates underestimate the expected error rate
fur any given lineup in which the perpetrator is absent.
Archival studies also permit analyses that examine results as
a Cunclion of <lifferenl levels or critieal variables. For example,
Wright and McDaid (l 996) found that the filler-identification
rate was 20.8% for violent crimes and l 7.6e,7o for nonviolent
crimes. Valentine et al. (2003) found that the filler-idcntificalion
rate was 15.9% when a weapon was present and 23.7%
when there was no weapon. The !alter result seems peculiar in
light of the experimental results indicating a deleterious effect
for the presence of a weapon (see meta-analysis by Steblay,
1992)-lmt in the weapons-effect section later in this monograph, we note that archival data are subject to "selection effects" that may offset or reinforce the effects of variables such as
weapon focus.
Another interesting archival finding does nol eoncern eyewitnf'sses per se hut has a powerful hearing on expe.cte<l rates of
mistaken identification in the courtroom: Archival studies indicate that those charged with a crime enter a guilty pica in 80 to
90% of cases (Cole, 1986). Let us assume that 80% plead guilty
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(the argument is stronger at 90%). We might assume that no
mistakenly identified (innocent) suspects plead guilty and
that all the guilty pleas are from guilty suspects. (In no sense do
we intend for this assumption to he interpreted as a denial
of the important work of Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004, and other
false-confession researchers, who have clearly made a compelling case that innocent people plead guilty.) Even if we
presume tlwt 10% of mistakenly identified suspects plead guilty,
90% of the innocent suspects and only 20% of the guilty suspeels will go lo trial. Assume further that a mere 4% of suspects
i<lentifie<l from a lineup are innocent and 96% are guilty. If we
assume that 80% of guilty suspects plead guilty and therefore do
not go to trial, only 20% of the 96% (19.2% of the guilty) will go
to trial, whereas 90% of the 4% (3.6% of the innocent suspects)
will go to trial. Thus, at the trial level, 16% of the defendants
(:t6% of the 22.8% going lo trial) will be cases of mistaken
identification. Charman and Wells (2006} called this the
"pleading effect"; it illustrates how the mistaken-identification
rate can be expected to be higher at the trial level than at the
lineup level (see Fig. 1).

ESTIMATOR VARIABLES
We first review estimator variaLles. Although these variables are
not unrler the control of the justice system, they are important to
our treatment for two main reasons. First, estimator variables are
central to our understanding of when and why eyewitnesses are
most likely to make errors. Informing police, prosecutors,
judges, and juries about the conditions that can affect the accuracy of an eyewitness account is important. Second, our
understanding of the impmtance of any given system variable is,
at least at the extreme, dependent on levels of the estimator
variables. Consider a case in which a victim eyewitness is abducted and hel<l for 48 hours by an unmasked perpetrator; the
witness has repeaterl viewings of the perpetrator, lighting is
good, and so on. We have every reason to believe that this witness has a deep and lasting memory of the perpetrator's face.
Then, within hours of being released, the eyewitness views a
lineup. Under these conditinus, we would not expect system
variables to have much impact. For instance, a lineup that is
biased against an innocent suspect is not likely to lead this
eyewitness to choose the innocent person, because her memory
is too strong to be influenced by lineup bias. On the other hand,
when an eyewitness's memory is weaker, system variables have a
stronger impact.
The effects on identification accuracy of a large number of
estimator variables-witnes:.:;, crime, and perpetrator characteristics-have been investigated by psychologists. Here we
recount findings concerning several variables that have received
significant research attention and achieved high levels of consensus among experts (based on ilerns represented in a survey hy
Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001) or have been the subject
of interesting recent research.
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Fig. 1. The ·'pleniling effer.t •· (Clwrrnan & W~lls, 2006). Assuming first that 96% of suspeets identified from
n lineup arc guilty and 4% a1·e innoc<'.nl, if 80'Yn of thr. guilty suspects ancl lO'Yn of the innocent suspects pl encl

guilty (the reby foregoing a trial), the rcsnlt is that 16% of the defendants who go to trial will be innocen t- that
is 1 cai--1:s of mistaken id1:11tification.

Cross-Race Id en tification
Meiss11er and Brigham (2001a) published Lhe mosl recent broad
review of research on the problems associated with what has
sometimes l,een called other-rnce or cross-race identification
impairment or own-race bins (O l{B). Meissner and Brigham
analyzed data from ,39 resea rch articles, with 91 independent
samples involving nearly 5,000 participant witnesses. They
examiner! measures of correct identification anrl false-alarm
rates, as well as aggregate measures of discrimination accuracy
and response criterion. They reported thal the chance of a mistaken identifica tion is 1.56 times greater in other-race than in
sanre-race conditions and that the witnesses were 1.4 times more
likely to correctly identify a previously viewed own-race face as
they were to identify an other-race face. Participants were more
than 2.2 Limes as likely to accu rately categorize own-race faces
as new versus previously viewed as they were lo accurately
categorize other-race faces. Meissner and Brigham explored the
qut-!sl ion of whet her cross-rnce co11tacl might reduce these effects
and found that such cunlact played only a snwll role in ORB,
accounting for just 2% of the variability across par1icipants (sec
also Wright, Boyd, & Tredoux, 2003). They also found th at the
amount of viewing time available to witnesses s ignificantly influenced ORB; specificall y, false alarms lo other-race faces incrcasf'd when study timc was limited.
l{ecent research by Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, and Moore
(2003) examined cross-nice impairment in kindergarten
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children, third graders, and young adulls who viewed black and
white target faces and a day later were tested with a six-person
lineup. These researchers observed the usual cross-race
effecl, which did not differ across age groups: In each age group,
cross-race identi fication was less accurate than own-race
iden ti fication.
Stress
Despite the importance of knowledge about the effects of stress
on witnesses, researchers cannot simulate vio lent crimes and
pose a threat to the well-being of experime ntal subjects. Researchers have therefore resorted to a vari ety of mani pulaLions to
induce stress, includ ing the use of violent versus nonviolent
videota ped c rimes. Increased violence in videotaped reenac tments of crimes has been shown to lead to decrements in
both identification accuracy and eyew itness recall (Cli.fford &
Hollin, 1981; Clifford & Scott, 1978), but this finding is not
universal (Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987a) .
Deffenbacher et. a l (2004) rec;ently published a meta-analysis
of stress effect studies. The meta-analysis was conducted on 27
tests of Lhe effects of heigh tenet! slress on identification accuracy and on 36 Lests of its effect on recal l of crime-related details.
They found that high levels of stress negatively affec ted both
lypes of memory. The effect of stress was notab ly larger for target-present th an for target-absent lineups-that is, s tress parti cularly reduced correct identification rates. The effect was also
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TABLE 1
f<ffcentages of A<:cu.rat,~ mul Mi.,;tuk,m Tcfoutiflcution.,; From
Struly of Eyewitness lde11tification Under Higli Versus Low Stress

High stress
Com~ct irfontifications [target-present)
Live lineup method
Photospread metho<l
Sequential photo method
Mi:-:1aken idm11ificatio11s [lar~et-ah!.enl)
Li\'e lineup method
Photosprea<l method
Sequential photo method

27
36
49
45
4U
0

Low stress

62
76
7f>

so
61
0

Note. Suurci-: Mur!!a,1 !'l 11I. (200•i).

considerably larger for eyewitness-identification studies that
simulated eyewitness conditions (e.g., staged crimes) than for
face-recognition studies.
These cffects are well illustrated in a study by Morgan et al.
(2004) that examine<l the eyewitness capabilities of more than
fiOO active-duty military personnel enrolled in a survival-school
program (see Table 1). After 12 hours of confinement in a mock
prisoner-of-war camp, participants experienced both a highslress inlerrogalion with real physical confrontation an<l a
low-str<>::;s interrogation without physical confrontation. Roth
interrogations were 40 minutes long; they were conducted by
different persons. A day after rf'lease from the camp, and having
recovered from food and sleep deprivation, the participants
viewed a 15-person live lineup, a 16-person photo spread, or a
sequential presentation of photos of up to 16 persons. Regardless of the testing method, as Table 1 shows, memory accuracy
for the high-stress interrogator was much lower overall than for
the low-stress interrogator.

Weapon Focms
Weaponfocus refers to the visual attention eyewitnesses give to a
perpetrator's weapon during the course of a crime. [t is expected
that the attention the eyewitness focuses on the weapon will
reduce his or her ability to later recall details about the perpetrator or to rncognize the perpetrator. Researchers have assessed eyewitness recall of various crime details in an attempt lo
establish the parameters of weapon-focus effects on perception
and memory; these efforts were reviewe<l in a meta-analysis by
Stel>lay (1992). The review included 19 studies with a total
sample of 2,082 participants. The weapon-focus effect on
irlentifications was .r:;tatistically significant but reflected a morlesl impairment; the effect on description accuracy was larger.
The analysis inrlicatecl that the weapon-focus effect was larger in
target-absent lineups and when memory was generally impaired.
R0.scarch by Mitchell, Livosky, ancl Mather (1998); Pickel
(1998, 1999); and Shaw and Skolnick (1999) indicates thal any
surprising object can draw attention away from the perpetrator
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and that novelty, rather than threat, may he the critical ingredient in the effect.
Researchers have tried to detect weapon-focus effects in field
studies, anrl the results are somewhat conflicting. Tollestrup,
Turtle, and Yuille (1994) examined the effect of weapon focus on
the rate of su::;pect identificatio11 and obtained data consistent
with laboratory findings. But Valentine et al. (2003) did not
find a weapon-focus effect in their study of 640 attempts by
eyewitnesses to identify the alleged target in 314 lineups.
Of course, as noted earlier, in nonexperimental studies it i:;
difficult to control for variables that might obscure a weuponfocus effect. For example, in lhe study by Valentine el al., lhe
primary outcome variable is suspect choices rather than perpetrator choices (i.e., witness identifications are intended to
determine whether suspects are perpetrators)--whereas in experimental research the identity of the perpetrator is known to
the researcher.
Field research can also suffer from selection effects that can
obscure the effects of variables of interest. For example, a true
weapon-focus effect could be obscured if witnesses to crimes
involving weapons believe that their memory is weak and are
therefore less incline<l lo allencl lineups. The result could be a
reduction in the number of weapon-focus-impaired witnesses
presented with lineups and thus a reduced number of cases of
weapon focus.
As mentioned earlier, a selection effect might aclually re<luce
our concern about the potential impact of weapon focus on
eyewitness performance. 011 the other hanrl, it is conceivable
that more intensive police investigations of weapon-present
cases produce a higher proportion of perpetrator-present lineups
for weapon-present witnesses, with the result that the apparent
performance of weapon-present witnesses is improved even
though their memories are impaired. lf investigations of all
crimes were similarly intense, a weapon-focus effect might
emerge. One might also imagine that the police are more motivated to "help" weapon-present witnesses identify perpetrators who use weapons and who thus pose a threat to society. Such
help might take the form of suggestive instructions to witnesses
and suggestive lineups.

Exposure Duration
Common sense tells us that the amount of time available for
viewing a perpetrator is positively ..issociate<l with the witness's
ability lo subsequently identify him or her. Amela-analysis by
Shapiro and Penrod (1986) showed that the linear trend for
exposure time was associated with improved performance. The
effects of exposure time were illustrate<l in a slu<ly by Memon,
Hope, and Rull (2003) in which mock witnesses viewed a realistic videotaped crime in which the target/perpetrator was
visible for 12 versus 45 seconds. Witnesses were tested with
target-present and target-absent arrays 4-0 minutes later. The
proportion of correct identifications in target-present anays and
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com~ct rejections in target-absent a11"ays increased suhstantia1ly when exposure time increased from 12 seconds 10 45
seconds (from 32% to 90% for correct identifications and from
15% to S9% for correct rejections), although mistaken identifications in target-absent arrays remained high even with longer
exposure (BS% al 12 seconds and 41 % at 45 seconds).

Disguise
It is common for people lo <lon disguises before engaging in
criminal acts. Full-face masks, stockings, hats, and hoo<ls can
be quite effective in diminishing the facial-feature cues necessary for recognition (Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987a,
1987b; Mc:Kelvie, 1988; Patterson & Baddeley, 1977). For example, Cutler et al. (19876) had participants view a videotaped
liquor store robbery and later attempt an iclentific:ation from a
videotaped lineup. In half of the robberies, the robber wore a
knit pullover cap that covered his hair and hairline. ln the other
half, he did not wear a hat. The robber was less accurately
i<lentified when he was disguised: 45% of the participants
identified the robber in the lineup test if he wore no hat during
the robbery; only 27% identified him if he wore a hat during the
roLbery.
Shapiro and Penrod, in their 1986 meta-analysis, coded experiments for whether or not faces were changed between the
initial viewing and recognition phases. Transformations included changes in facial hair and deliberate disguises, such as
masks or hats. Nontra11sfom1ccl faces were more accurately
recognized (effect size d = 1.05; 75% vs. 54%) and less
often falsely identified (d = .40; 22% vs. 30%) than transfonned
faces were.
Nol all disguises or changes in appearance work. Yarmey
(2004) found similar levels of identification accuracy for a young
woman viewed for lS seconds in naturalistic circumstances,
regardlei:;s of whether or not she wore a baseball cap and <lark
sunglasses. Thc:re was, however, an intPraction involving disguise: Witnesses who were given enhanced retrieval instructions
(involving mental rehearsal of the encounter) made significantly
more correct rejections in the no-disguise condition than in the
disguise conclition.

Retention Interval
Common sense tells us that memory declines over time. Can we
expect eyewitness-i<lentification accuracy to decline as the time
between the crime and the identification lest increases? Shapiro
an<l Penro<l (.l 986) included retention interval in their metaanalysis. When studies that manipulated retention interval were
grouped into long versus short lime <leluys (the exact nwnipulation depended on the study), longer delays led to fewer correct
identifications (d = .43; 51 % vs. 61 %) and more false identifications (d = .:13: 32% vs. 24%). Across all the studies examined in that meta-analysis (including those that did not directly
manipulate retention interval), retention interval also proved an

important determinant of correct identifications (r = -.11, p <
.05), although there was no significant relationship with false
identifications.
Witness Intoxir.ation
Rea<l, Yuille, an<l Tollestrup (1992, Experiment 1) tested
identification ac:curacy one week after a staged event using a sixperson lineup; they found that alcohol intoxication while witnessing the event was associated with a lower rate of correct
identifications when the level of arousal (manipulated by varying the participants' perceptions of the probability of getting
caught stealing an item from an office) was low during the event.
False identification rates were the same for intoxicated and
sober participants. Of course, after one week the participants
were no longer intoxicated, which raises the question of what the
effect of intoxication at viewing anJ identifi(:ation would be.
Dysart, Lindsay, MacDonald, and Wicke (2002) note that the
popular belief is that intoxicated witnesses are less accurate
than sober witnesses. However, one theory concerning "alcohol
myopia" (Steele & Josephs, 1990) predicts an interaction between blood-alcohol level and identification procedures in
which witnesses who were intoxicated at encoding will be less
accurate only in target-absent conditions. The theory suggests
that, compared with intoxicated witnesses, sober witnesses will
encode more information/cues about the perpetrator, which will
facilitate correct rejections in target-absent procedures. Intoxicated witnesses are likely to encode only salient cues, and
erroneous identifications will resu1t where more subtle cues
would have indicated that the suspect was not the target. On the
other hanJ, using salient cues will be effective for intoxicated
witnesses when the target is present.
Dysart cl al. (2002) examined the effect of aleohol consumption on identification accuracy using "showups," a procedure in which the witness is shown the suspect alone, without
any fillers. A showup is the identification procedure most likely
to be used by police with intoxicated witnesses. As predicted,
the researchers found that in the target-present showup condition, hlooJ-alcohol level was not significantly related to correct
identification: however. in the target-absent condition, higher
Llood-alcohol levels were associate<l with a higher likelihood
(52%) of a false identification than were lower blood-alcohol
levels (22%).

SYSTEM VARIABLES
System variables (variables that can be controlled in actual
cases) tend lo center on factors that come into play after the
witnessed event has passed. At that point, the legal system has
some eo11trol over a number of important variables, but not
necessarily all variables. For instance, first responders at a
crime scene can separatc eyewitnesses so they do not influence
each other, but some interactions could have already occurred
before the arrival of investigators. Similarly, although investi-
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gators haw~ total control over how a lineup is conducted. some
inentifications occur outside the control of the legal system-for
example. when an eyewitness spontaneously identifies someone
on the street as the perpetrator of an earlier crime.
System variables tend to be divided into two broad categories.
One category ii- interviewing eyewitnesses, a process that
generally involves recall memory. The other category is the
i<lentificatiun of suspec:ls, a process that generally involves
recognition memory. It is important to note that neither interviewing nor identification is considered by eyewitness scientists
to Le purely a memory process. Social influence can be a huge
factor in both.
The case of James Newsome, a man who served IS years for a
mur<ler he dirl not commit, is an extreme example of an eyewitness making a positive identification from a lineup, even
though his memory told him that the man he identified was not
the man who committed the murder. After Newsome was proved
innocent and the actual perpetrator was found through physical
evidence, eyewitness Anthony Rounds came forward and described how Chicago police had forced him to identify Newsome
from the lineup, even though he knew that Newsome was not the
man he saw commit the murder. According Lo Rounds, the lineup
administrators told Rounds whom to identify; when he resisted,
their intimidating insistence led him to identify Newsome and
give confident identification testimony at trial. A lawsuit in 2002
yielrlerl strong evirlen<:e to support Rounrls's claim, and a jury
awarded damages to Newsome; the finding was upheld by the
U.S. Se\'enth Circuit Court of Appeals (Newsome v. McCabe
et al.. 2002).
Although this is an extreme example, it illustrates how extraneous external variables can influence eyewitness testimony
withot1l operating through memory mechanisms. Under other
circumstances, social-influence variables are thought to actually influence memory. For instance, a misleading question such
as "What kiml of hat was the gunman wearing?" when the
gunman had no hat could lead an eyewitness to develop a
memory for a hat that did nol exist. For these reasons, eyewitness
scientists concern themselves with both social-influence variables and memory variables.

Interviewing Eyewitnesses
Research on interviewing eyewitnesses dates back lo the early
1900s. Alfred Binet (1900) was the first to study suggestibility in
children in France, and William Stern (1904) initiated eyewitness research on interrogation in Germany. Snee and Lush
(1941) wrote a short empirical article on the t1Sf' of interrogatory
versus narrative methods of interviewing eyewilnesses. MoJem
rcsf'arc-h on the issue undoubtedly owes much to the influence of
Elizabeth Loftus, who used the method of asking questions of
cyewitnes~es lo implant mislearling infonnation (e.g., Loftus &
Palmer, 1974). This line of research paved the way for experimental studies of the effects of explicit and subtle forms of
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misinfonnation imparted during questioning of adult and child
witnesses {for reviews see Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Loftus, 2005;
Wright & Loftus, 1998). This work led to important theoretical
advances in our understan<ling of the mechanisms underlying
eyewitness suggestibility in interviews. Examples include the
source-monitoring framework {Lindsay & Johnson, 1989;
Mitchell & Johnson, 2000; Poole & Lindsay, 2001); fuzzy-trace
theory (Brainer<l & Reyna, 1998; Memon, Hope, Bartlett, &
Bull, 2002); an activation-based memory model (Ayers & Reder,
1998); relrieval-induced forgelling (Macleod, 2002}; the role of
metacognition {Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000); and the
social-influence approach {Echterhoff, Hirst, & Hussy, 2005;
Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, in press; Zaragoza, Payment, Ackil,
Drivdahl, & Beck, 2001).
In this monograph, we do not discuss the mechanisms responsible for rlistmtions in information retrieved in eyewitness
interviews. Instead, we use one example of a procedure that
arose as a result of a direct request from the police to improve the
probative value of eyewitness evidence. This example shows
how researchers have attempted to wrap their knowledge about
memory and social influence into a set of procedures for interviewing eyewitnesses. It is also the most developed and extensively researched procedural package for gathering detailed
reports from cooperative eyewitnesses. (Readers who are interested in other approaches to interviewing eyewitnesses, including interviews designe<l to detect rleception, should refer to
reviews by Granhag & Stromwell, 2004; Memon & Bull, 1999:
Poole & Lamb, 1998; and Vrij, 2000.)

The Cognitive lnteroicw
The cognitive interview (Cl) was initially developed by the
psychologists ll. Edward Geiselman {University of California,
Los Angeles) and Ronald P. Fisher (Florida International University) in the early 1980s (Geiselman et al., 1984; Geiselman,
Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 1985) and has resulted in more
than two <leca<les of research. Two main forces <lrove the development of the CI. The first was a request from police officers
and legal professionals to improve the practices of police interviewers when gathering information from eyewitnesses.
Analysis of the techniques used by untrained police officers in
Florida (Fisher, Geiselman. & Raymond, 1987) suggested that
there existed some fundamental problems in the conduct of
interviews. leading to ineffective communication and poor
memory performance. The "stanJar<l police interview" was
eharacleriied by constant interruptions, excessive use of a
predetermined list of questions with an expectation that witnesses could provide answers, and questions that were limed
inappropriately. For example, if the witness was descriLing one
of the perpetrators, the officer might switch the line of questioning to the actions of another perpetrator. Interestingly, the
same problems were identified in studies of the typical police
interview in Britain (George, 1991) and Germany (Berresheim &
Weber, 2003).
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TABLE 2

Step 1. Build rapport
(a) Personalize the inlerview
Exchange names. Make sure the witness is comfortable an<l is willing to try to remember as much as possible. Ask the witness to give as many
dclails as po:,sihle hut not lo guess or fabricate.
(I,) Transfer c:ontrol to the witne$S
Tell the witness that you do not have knowledge of the event an<l it is the witness who hol<ls all the relevant information. Let the wilni::ss choose
the starling point fort he narrative and give the account al his or her own speed and in his or her own word!'.. Do not interrupt the witness. if at all
possihle. Lislrn actively lo what he or she has to say. Allow for pauses.
Stt:p 2. Hecn:ate the context of the original event an<l ask the witness to repo11 in detail.
To reinstate context, invite the witness to close his or her eyes and place himself or herself back at the scene.
Step :-3. Open-ended namition
(i) Request narrative description
Ask the witness lo ~ive a narrntivc ac:counl of the event in his or her own words. If clarification is required, use open-ended questions. Do nol
interrupt the narration to ask questions, although prompts such as ..tell more" may be used. Avoid judgmental comments and closed (yes/no)
riuestions.
(ii) Focused retrieval
This is nol a technique but a general guideline lo follow lo help the witness concentrate on what he or she is describing hy
• uging open-ended questions
~ allowing for long pauses
• not interrupting the witness when he or she is speaking
(iii) Extensive retrieval
Encourage the witness to search through his or her memmy more extensively hy asking him or her to report details from a number of different
perspectives and in different chmnological orders.
(iv) Wilm$s-c:0111pa1ible questioning
Time the questions appropriately so they are compatible with the witness's retrieval pattern rather than adhering to a protocol.
Stt:p 4-. Closure
Re sure to leave time lo brief the witness and let him or her know what might happen next. Exchange contact information and encourage the
witness lo gel in touch if he or she rememl>ers additional details.
~oh·. Adapll:d from Fi1<lu,r 1111d G1,i.~clrnnn (1992).

The CI in its present form represents the alliance of two fields
of f;tudy: communication anrl cognition. The social-psychological concerns of managing a face-to-face interaction and communicating effectively with a witness were integrated with what
psychologists knew about the way people remember things. The
social aspects are embodied in what is referred to as a structured
irzterview, which consists of a phase<l procedure (free report
followed by open-ended questions) and incorporates techniques
tu facilitate communication. These techniques indu<le rapport
huilcling, which is designed to increase the transfer of c:ontrol
from the interviewer to the witness, and the use of a questioning
strategy guide<l hy the witness's own free report rather than one
that is based on a predefined protocol. The stnwtured interview
resembles the recommended procedure for conducting investigative interviews with witnesses and victims in many countries
(see Poole & Lamb. 1998; Westcott, Davies, & Bull, 2002).
The original version of the Cl was presented as a set of four
specific cognitive techniques for imprnving eyewitness recall.
Following a series of laburntory simulations an<l field research,
the procedure was revised in 1.992 (Fisher & Geiselman, l 992).
The version of the CI that has subsequently evulve<l focuses
heavily on communication techniques and social dynamics and
is a proc(!dure in which the cognitive and eommunication
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components work in tandem. Here we will focus primarily on
research and practice relating Lo the revised Cl (also referred to
in the literature as the "enhanced" CI). For a summary of the
revised CI procedure, see Table 2.
The revised Cl comprises several phases during which the
interviewer engages with and establishes rapport with the wit•
ness, asks the witness to provide a narrative account of the
witnessed event, and then probes with questions relating lo
the <letails the witness has pruvi<le<l. Throughout the process, the
interviewer interrupts as little as possible, allows the witness to
dictate the subject mailer and sequence of questioning, and
listens actively to what the witness has to say. One of the primary
aims of the CI is lo facilitate the exchange of information helween the witness and interviewer through effective communication.
The first task of the interviewer is to build rapport with the
witness. This rapport serves two functions. First it puts the
witness at case, minimizing the discomfort and distress sometimes associated with sharing an intimate or fearful experience
with a stranger. Second, there is some evidence that building
rapport with open·ended questions can increase the accuracy uf
a child witness's report (Roberts, Lamb, & Sternberg, 2004). An
important component of rapport building in the revised CI is for
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the interviewer to explicitly "transfer eontrol" to the witness (see
Table 2 for rletails).
The "cognitive" pa1i of the CI relies on two theoretical princ:iples. First, a retrieval cue is effec:tive lo the exlent Lhat there is
an overlap between the encoded information and the retrieval
C'\H~. Reinstatement of the original encoding context increases
the accessibility of stored information (Tulving & Thomson's
encoding specificity hypothesis, 19n). Second, multiple trace
theory (Bower, 1967)-which proposes that memories are made
up of networks of associations rather than discrete and unconneete<l inci<lents-states that a memory can be cue<l by several
means and that information nol accessible with one technique
may Le accessible with another.
Having established rapport with the witness, the interviewer
instructs the witness to mentally reconstruct the physical and
personal contexts that existed at the time of the crime. Interviewers can help witnesses by asking them to form an image or
impression of the environmental aspects of the original scene
(e.g., the location of objects in a room); to comment on any
emotional reactions and feelings (e.g., surprise, anger) at the
time; aml to describe any sounds, smells, and physical conditions (e.g., hot, humid, smoky) that were present. Occasionally a
witness can Le taken back to the scene of the crime. Once the
witness has mentally reconstructed the context, the interview«~r
asks him or her to provide a detailed account of the event
(the free na1Tativc). To extencl retrieval, the witness is asked to
report all details. including partial or incomplete memories.
To minimize editing, Fisher and Geiselman (1992} adviser! interviewers to instruct witnesses to report everything that comes
to minr!. evf!n if it is trivial or out of chronological order. In
addition to facilitating the recall of additional information, this
technique may yield information that can he valuahle in piecing
together details from different witnesses to the same crime.
Roberts and Higham (2002) obtained ratings of the forensic
relevance of details elicited with the CI by asking police officers
anrl prosecutors lo rate the relevance of each detail to a criminal
investigation/court proceeding. Al best, only 50% of the
information the Cl elicited was deemed relevant by forensic
experts. Most of the correct, forensically relevant details appeared in the free-narrative account (cf. Mcmon, Wark, Bull, &
Kohnken, 1997).
Once the witness lrns provided an open-ended account, the CI
interviewer cnn probe for detnils using open-ended questions
and, when appropriate, can ask follow-up questions to clarify
what the witnes1; has said. It is imperative that interviewers
remind witnesses that if they are unsure of an answer to a
question, they should say so and not guess. Appropriate sequencing of the interviewer's questions (referred lo as interviewee-compatible questioning) is critical. Each eyewitness will
havc. a 1111iquf" mental rP.prf'Sf'ntation of the c>vent, rlepe.nrling on
the details or aspects of the event he or she attended to and the
orrlt>r in which <~vents unfolded for him or her (Fisher &
Schreiber, in press}. The interviewer should be guided by the
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interviewee's pattern of recall rather than adhering to a rigid
protocol or predetermined checklist. For example, if an interviewee is describing a suspect's face. this indicates that the
mental image of the perpetrator's face is currently active and
details about the face are accessible (Pecher, Zeelenberg, &
Barsalou, 2003). At this point, the interviewer should ask
questions relating lo the suspect's appearance and not switch to
another topic, such as the suspect\, car.
ln a Cl, the witness is encouraged lo focus or concentrate on
mental images of the various parts of the event, such as the
suspect's face (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). The interviewer
exhausts the content of each image by asking the witness lo form
an image and then describe it in as much detail as possible.
Bekerian and Dennett (1997) refer to this focus on specific
features as "molecular imaging," as compared to the general
"molar" approach, which emphasizes reinstating environmental
context. To effectively engage the interviewee in focused retrieval, the interviewer must speak slowly and clearly, pausing at
appropriate points to allow the interviewee time to create an
image and respond (Memon, 2006). Unfortunately, the use of
imagery can produce increases in errors and increased use of
inferences in eyewitnesses' spoken reports (Bekerian & Dennett, 1997; for a discussion, see Stevenage & Memon, 1997).
Alternative retrieval cues can he used to access an event. For
example, witnesses can be asked to recall an event in different
temporal order or from different perspectives. Some researchers
have found that witnesses can recall additional details if they
deviate from the e\'enl script and describe the event from the end
or the middle or if they describe its most memorable aspect
(Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Geiselman & Callot, 1990). However, in other studies, no additional details have surfaced when
the witness recalls Lhe event for a second Lime, in a different
order (Memon, Wark, Bull, et al., 1997}. One of the most controversial components of the original CI was that witnesses were
asked to "recall" an event from the perspective of another witness or from another location at the scene. The instruction to
change perspective typically does not yield additional details
and can inc:rease errors, particularly if witnesses do not understand what the interviewer wants them to do (Boon & Noon,
1994; Memon, Cronin, Eaves, & Bull, 1993). Fisher, Brennan,
and McCauley (2002) suggest that changing perspectives could
be potentially valuable for highly traumatized witnesses who
might find it loo stressful to describe the event from their own
perspective. However, forensic investigators are uncomfortable
with the instruction to change perspective, presumably because
it could invite witnesses to speculate (Kebbell, Milne, & Wagstaff, 2001).

Evaluation of the Cl
The CI has been examined in approximately 65 studies lo date.
A meta-analysis of 53 studies found a median increase of :~4%
111 the amount of correct information generated in the CI
as compared with a different interview model (Kohnken,
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Milne, Memon, & DuJl, 1999). Then~ was also an increase in
incorrect cfotails; we will return to this later. With the exception
of two field studies, alJ the studies have tested volunteer witnesses (typically c:ollege students) in the laboratory. Witnesses
observe either a live event or a videotape of a simulated crime.
After a short delay (typically hours or clays), the witnesses participate in a face-to-face interview. The witnesses receive either
the CJ or a control interview. The control is either u stanJurd
police interview or a structured interview that incorporates the
phased approach referred lo earlier. The interviews are tape
rec.:orc.led, transcribe<l, and then scored for the number of correct
and incorrect statements. The accuracy of the reported stateme11ts is high an<l comparable for both types of interview.
Giinter Kohnken and his colleagues in Germany (Kohnken,
Schimmossek, Aschermann, & Hofer, 1995; Kohnken, Thurer,
& Zorberbier, 1994) were the first lo demonstrate the superiority
of the CI over the structured interview. In their studies, the
structured-interview group received training in basic communication skills that was comparable in quality and length to the
CI group's training. The training included instruction on rapport
builJing and the use of various types of questioning. In the 1994
1-,tudy, both interviewees and interviewers were non-psychology
stu<lents with no prior experience in investigative interviewing.
The to-be-remembered event was a vi,IP-otape showing a blood
donation. Participants were tested a week after viewing the
Yi<leotape. Each interviewer concfocte<l one interview (n = ~O).
The CI significantly increased the amount of correctly recalled
information over Liu· structured interview without increasing the
number of errors and confabulated (made-up) details. In a
subsequent stucly with adult participants, a small increase in
confabulated details was also noted (Kohnken et al., 1995).
Memon and colleagues (Memon, Wark, Holley, Bull, &
Kohnken, 1997) directly examined whether the Cl advantage
was due lo the use of the communication components of the
revised CI (rapport building, transfer of control, and elements of
the structured interview) or of the cognitive components (con I ext
reinstatement, imagery, reverse order, and reporting in detail).
As in the Kohnken research, cognitive and structured interviewers received similar training, and each group was Jed to
helieve it was w,ing the superior interview technique. A third
group of interviewers sen1 ecl as the control and was not trained.
Both trained groups elicited more correct information than the
untrnined group did. However, this was offset by the fact that
they also produced a significantly higher number of errors and
confabulations than the untrained group. These findings are
important in themselves hut also raise the question of what is an
appropriate control group. The cognitive interviews produce
more correct details than <lo interviews conducted by an untrnine<l group of interviewers. However, a structured interview
with some of the communication components of the Cl built in
can also yield increases in correct recall. The increase in errors
that occasinnaUy occurs could he somewhat problematic (for a
discussion, see Memon & Stevenage, 1996; .Memon, 2006).

Some have argued that the production of incorrect as well as
cort'ec:t information suggests that the CI may he affecting report
criteria (Mcmon & Higham, 1999; Roberts & Higham. 2002).
Others argue that there is no suggestion that. witnesses should
lower their output criteria to produce unsure responses and inlerviewe:rs should instruct witnesses not to guess or fabricate
details (Fisher el al., 2002). It is important to note that accuracy
rates typically do not <liffer Letween the CI and comparison
groups.
The efficacy of the CI with nonstandard populations-notably,
young children, the elderly, and people who are intellectually
impaired-has also been examined. Given that the primary aim
of the CI is to increase the amount of information retrieved, it
may be the most effective procedure to use with young chilrlren,
because children tend not to provide as much information as
adults do. The results are somewhat mixed. The Cl has been
found to increase the amount of correct information recalled by
children aged 7 to 11 years when the comparison group was a
standard (untrained) group (Saywitz, Geiselman, & Bornstein,
1992). When the comparison is a structured interview, the CI
increases correct information but can also increase errors in 8to 9-year-olds (Memon, Wark, Bull, el al., 1997; Milne, Bull,
Memon, & Kohnken, 1995).
More recently, Akehurst, Milne, and Kc>lmken (200:3) examine<l whether the revised CI would aid the recall of chil<lren aged
8 to 9 years an<l ] 1 to 12 years after a 6-day delay. Children
viewed a video of a shoplifting and were interviewed 4 hours or 6
clays later. The Cl led to an increase in correct recall as compared with a structured interview, with no increase in errors.
There were no interactions involving age group or delay. As to
the suitability of the Cl for younger children, Holliday (2003a)
reported that a modified version of the revised CI could increase
the amount of correct information recallec.l in the narrative (freerecall) phase of the interview in 4- to 5-year-olds as compared
with a structured interview. In a later study with 4- and 8-yearolds, Holliday (2003h) found that a CI given after postcvcnt
misinformation reduced children's reporting of misinformation
in the interview (for a similar finding with 8- to 9-year-olrls, see
Memon, Wark, Bull, et al., 1997).
There is some evidence lo suggest the CI can aid the
recall of adults (Milne, Clare, & Bull, 1999) and children
(Milne & Bull, 2006) with mild learning disabilities, although
further research is required with this population, using larger
sample sizes and people with a broader range of learning
difficulties.
To date, there have only been two published studies of the
efficacy of the CI when the witnesses are older adults. Mello anc.l
Fisher (1996) found the Cl led to similar incrf!aSF-S in correct
recall when the participants were older adults (mean age = 72
years) hut Searcy, Bartlett, Swanson, aml Memon (200!) found
no differences in correct identification (recognition) of a target
when witnesses aged 62-79 years were interviewed using a
procedure resembling the CJ.
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The failure to find an effect of CI on recognition (in this case,
identification of a target) is consistent with earlier studies. In
four separate studies. Fisher, Quigley. Brock, Chin, and Cutler
(1990) found no advantage of the Cl in recognition, but it di<l
elicit better descriptions of the target as compared with a noinstruetion control. Gwyer and Clifford (1997) comparen the
revised version of the CI with a structured interview and again
found no reliable effectg on reeognitio11 performance in targetpresent conditions but a reduction in false identifications in
target-absent conditions in their short (4-8-hour) delay group
(ef. Yanney, 2004). This finding did not generalize to the long
(96-hour) cfelay group.
These fin<lings come as no surprise. The literature in<licates
that environmental manipulations of context are not effective in
a recognition test when alternative cues are available. According to Smith and Vela (2001), this is because the influence of
contextual cues will be reduced or will be outshone when there
are strong retrieval cues present at the time of the memory test.
This is referred to as the outshining hypothesis. For instance, in
a recognition tesl in which a copy of the item lo be remembered
is provideJ, this item serves as a retrieval cue, an<l contextual
cues are n~nderecl ineffective. When the task is lo recall an item
uf information in the ubsence of a specific retrieval cue, the
reinstatement of c:onlext should guide memory (Smith, 1994).
However, as pointe<l out by Fisher an<l Schreiber (in press), the
outshining hypothesis leads to the pre<lic:tion that experimental
manipulations should have smaller effects in target-present than
in target-ahsenl conditions.
Future studies should examine whether witnesses interviewed
with the revis<>ei CI are morn likely to make correct rejections
und whether the effect of a Cl in an identification situation will
vary as a function of retention interval (Gwyer & Clifford, 1997)
unJ other relevant system an<l estimator variables.

Ap/>lic<1.tion/Tmi11.ing
Police officers complain that eyewitnesses sel<lom provide sufficient information (Kebhell & Milne, 1998). The Cl has proved
to be a prime system variable in that a full and accurate eyewitness statement may determine whetheror not a case is solved.
The question is, what impact has the CI had on interviewing
practice?
Despite the extensive scientific research on the Cl, knowledge
and application of it is not widespread among investigators in the
United Stales, and it does not appear to have hau a substantial
impact on the methods police officers use lo interview witnesses
(Fisher & Schreiber, in press). Nevertheless, personnel from
police and nonpolice organizations have received training in the
leehnique. These organizations include the FBI; the National
Transportation Safety Board: the Department of Ho1rn~land Security: the Federal Department of Law Enforcement: and the
l1ureau of Alcohol, Tobacco. and Firearms.NASA personnel will
receive such training in the near future. The training has varied
across states am! differs between federal and state training
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academies. Fisher and Schreiber (in press) note that federal
investigators receive 18 hours of training in interviewing, including techniques for interrogating suspects and nonpsychological topics such as the legal aspects of interviewing.
In England and Wales, the CI was introduced in a booklet to
every police officer as part of the national investigative interviewing package in 1992. However, while Britain has some good
examples of police training in the CI, with input to the trainers
from researchers. the training is typically limited to the detective ranks or is on]y provided in a minimal, introductory form
to junior officers (see Milne & Bull, 2006). A survey of police
officers (Kehbell, Milne, & Wagstaff, 1999) suggesled that
relatively few officers used the full CI in practice. Training
programs have also been developed in other European countries. as well as in Australia, New Zealand, and Israel (Fisher,
2005). The efficacy of the Cl has also recently been demonstrated in Brazil (Stein & Memon, in press). with the aim of introducing it to the Brazilian police and judiciary in the near
future.
Given the extensive research on the CI and the light it has
shed on faulty interviewing practices, have police interviews
improved in the 20 years since the CI was first introduced? In a
recent analysis of police interview techniques, Fisher and
Schreiber (in press) asked 2;3 Miami detectives experienced in
investigations of robbery, sexual assault, homicide, and internal
affairs to tape record their witness interviews. Analysis of these
interviews revealed techniques and behaviors similar to those
identified 20 years earlier. This was particularly disappointing
in view of the scientific progress made in the field and the efforts
by Fisher and Geiselman to disseminate their findings to practitioners and to implement training programs.
The pictun~ is just as bleak across the Atlantic. Clarke and
Milne (2001) conJucted a national evaluation of investigative
interviewing training (the Planning, Engage, Account, Closure,
Evaluation-or PEACE-model) in England and Wales to see
if it ha<l improved workplace practice. The PEACE model provides two ways of obtaining an interviewee's account: the CI an<l
conversation management. The latter involves asking witnesses
to give their own account of events: the interviewer then selects
specific topics from the account uncl questions the witnesses in a
Jogical sequence. Clarke and Milne (2001) found little evidence
of any cognitive interviewing taking place. Most officers seem
preoccupied with getting a statement from the witness and
asking closed questions. One reason for the lack of development
in witness-interviewing skills is that resources have targeted the
use of inlem>galive techniques or suspect interviews at the expense of gathering information from cooperative witnesses
(Milne & Rull, 2006).
Resources need lo be directed toward training in witnessinterviewing practices. Milne and Bull (2006) argue that this
will involve procedural changes in collecting evidence in the
United Kingdom, such as electronic !"<"cording of a11 witness
interviews to maintain an accurate record of the original ac-
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count, assessment of training and supervision of witness, and
victim interviews to ensure that appropriate techniques are
used. With respect to the United Stales, R.P. Fisher (personal
c:ommunication, March 28, 2006) has noted that nonpolice
groups. such as engineers, have displayed a willingness to use
CI in investigations, suggesting that perhaps those with an
academic background or a motivation to use investigative
techniques to arrive at solutions find it easier lo un<lerstan<l the
theory behind the CJ. Following this line of reasoning, perhaps
police officers with specialist skills {homicide, child protection)
might Lenefit more from training in the CL However, those who
are specialists may already have an established protocol for
interviewing and thus be less willing to adopt new techniques
(Memon, Milne, Holley, Bull, & Kohnken, 1994).
We advocate a two-tiered approach to training. First, there
is a need for more extensive training programs on witnessinterviewing techniques for new police officers. Training and
examples of how faulty witness testimony can contribute to
miscan-iages of justice might also prove fruitful (see Savage &
Milne, in press). The moniloring and assessment of witness interviews (e.g .• recording) is essential. A second approach is to
present trainees with a simpler, more accessible version of the
cognitive interview (e.g., Davis, McMahon, & Greenwood, 2004)
lo encourage wider use.
Identifying Criminal Suspects
The identification of a criminal suspect can be the most important eyewitness evidence that is presented al a trial. This is
especially true when the eyewitness claims to have seen the
suspect commit the criminal act. In that case, the eyewitnessidentification testimony is direct evidence of guilt in the sense
that the accuracy of the inentification has a one-to-one relationship to the ultimate issue of whether the suspect committed
the crime. Tn other situations, eyewitness identification evidence may be circumstantial-for instance, if the eyewitness
only saw the person in the vicinity of the crime or saw the person
leaving a building at a certain time. In these cases, other types of
evidence are needeJ to complete the inference that the person
who wus seen is the same person as the one who committed the
crime. Regardless of whether the idenlifi<·ation is direct or circumstantial. those who observe identification testimony (for
example. j1frors) are likely to aecept it as accuralf! if the eyewitness is confident and consistent (e.g., Berman & Cutler,
1996; firndficld & Wells, 2000; Brigham & 11othwell, 198:~;
Cutler, Penrod, & Stuve, 1988; Lindsay, Lim, Mirando, & Cully,
1986; Lindsay, Wells, & O'Connor, 1989; Lindsay, Wells, &
Rumpel, 1981; Maas, Brigham, & West, 1985; Wells & Leippe,
1981; Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979).

Lineups
A primary methorl for obtaining identifications of criminal
suspects is the use of the lineup. Lineups can be either live, as
commonly seen on TV shows, or photographic. In the experience
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of the first and third authors, most lineups in the United States
are conducted using photographs. At its simplest level, a lineup
involves placing a suspect among distracters (called fillers) and
asking the eyewitness if he or she can identify the target. The
lineup is more complex than it at first appears. Understanding
how mistaken identifications can occur with lineups and what
kinds of system improvements can be made to prevent mistakes
requires an understanding of the structural properties oflineups
and their possible outcome distributions.

lineup Structure. Regardless of whether there is more than one
culprit, or target, a lineup should contain only one suspect, with
the remaining members being known-innocent fillers (Wells &
Turtle, 1986). It is critical to keep in mind that the suspect might
or might not be the target {i.e., might or might not be the actual
culprit). Hence, we will refer to two possible states of truth: (a)
the suspect is the target, an<l (b) the suspect is not the target.
Recause there is on]y one suspect per lineup, these two states of
truth are equivalent lo target-present and target-absent lineups.
Tn a target-present lineup, two kinds of e1Tors can be made: (a) an
incorrect rejection (making no identification), and (b) the
identification of a filler. Note that one cannot mistakenly identify
an innocent suspect in a target-present lineup. The only time an
eyewitness can mistakenly identify an innocent suspect is in a
target-absent lineup. 'forget-absent lineups can also result in
filler-identification errors, but these errors would not result in
charges being brought against an innocent person. We reserve
the term ·'mistaken identification" to refer to the identification of
an innocent suspect; the identification of anyone other than the
suspect is called filler irlentification. Thus, the structural
properties of a lineup produce the set of possible outcomes
shown in Table 3. In an exp~riment, participant witnesses are
shown either a target-present or target-absent lineup to simulate
the real-world fact of an unknown probability that the police are
focusing on an innocent suspect. The proportion of targetpresent and target-absent lineups (the target-present base rate)
is commonly 50/50 for experiments, but Bayesian statistics
permit quantitative analyses of what happens across all possible
base rntes for any given experiment {see Wells & Lindsay, 1980;
Wells & Olson, 2002; Wells & Turtle, 1986).

Typical Outcome Distributions. As would be expected from
heller-than-chance performance, experiments typically show
that accurate identifications are more likely tlwn inaccurate
identifications and that lrne rejections are more likely than are
false rejections (Clark, 2003; Wells & Lindsay, 1980; Wells &
Olson, 2002). Notice, however, that there are two types of filler
identifications. Filler identification Type 2 is a "miss" in the
sense that the target was present and could have been chosen but
the eyewitness picked someone else. Filler identification Type l
is an accurate rejection in the sense that the suspect is innocent
and the eyewitness did not pick him or her. In genera], experiments show that Type 2 filler identifications are more likely than
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TABLE 3
Pm;.~ibfo Out,:m11w; From u

Lilllm]J

Response of Eycwitnci-s
S1n1e of truth

Identification of suspecl

Identification of filler

Suspt:ct not target
Suspect is target

Accurate identification
Mistaken idenlilicalion

Filler identilic:ation type l
Filler identification type 2

No identification
False rejection
True rejection

Nole. Filll!l' i<lentif1c11ti1111 type l c1111 l,e construed us 111111ccurnte rejection in the sense thut the target wus 1101 present un<l the
1:ycwi1ncss did not pick him or her. Filler iclcntificalion type 2 is a "miss" in the S<'nsr. thal lhc lnrgct wa~ prcsr.nl hut was not
piclu\1I. Source: Chunnnn & W,ills {20116).

are Type l tiller identifications (Wells & Olson, 2002). This
makes sense an<l fits well with the concept of relative judgments
(Wells, 1984), in which it is presumed that eyewitnesses tenrl to
select the person who looks most like the targel. When the target
is ahsent, the chances increase that one of the fillers will be
perceived as looking like Lhe largel. Usually, eyewilnessirlentification performance is calculated hy the extent lo which
accurate identifications exceed mistaken identifications and
true rejections exceed false rejections. However, the rate of
mistaken iuentifications can be decrease<l without increasing
correct rejections by shifting identifications to fillers in the
target-absent lineup. This is a key to understanding how careful
selection of fillers for lineups can reduce mistaken identifications even if it does not reduce the propensity of eyewitnesses to
at.tempt identifications from target-ahsent lineups.

Target Removal Witholll Replacement. The relative-judgment
c·onceptualization (Wells, 1984) has permeated the literature
on lineups. It simply states that eyewitnesses have a tendency
lo identify a person from the lineup who looks most like their
memory of the target relative lo the other lineup members. As
lung as the actual target is in the lineup, the rdativejudgment procel:is shoul<l work well. However, if the actual target
is not in the lineup, problems ensue, because there will always
be sorneo11e who looks more like the target than the other lineup
members. Various results have been interpreted as supporting
the relative-judgment conceptualization. but the removalwithout-replacement (RWR) effect is the best evidence in support of the relative-judgment conceptualization.
In the original demonstration of the RWR effect (Wells, 199:~).
eyewitnesses viewed either a six-person lineup that contained
the target or a five-person lineup in which the target was re111oved aml not reµlace<l with anyone. In both con<litions, the
eyewitnesses were instructed that the target might not be present
{see following section on pre-lineup instructions). When the
target was present, S4,% pickt"d the target, 21 % selected no one,
anJ 2!1o/c selecle<l fillers. Wells reasoned that if the 54% represented true re<:ognition rather than a relative judgment, removal of the target should result in the 54% joining the 21 % in
picking no one. When the target was removed, however, only
32% selected no one, and 68% selected fillers. Thus, among the
54% selecting the target when the target was present. it is es-

Vul11111<' 7-N11111lwr 2

Li mated that 79.6% of them (43%/54%) would have selected one
of the fillers in the absence of the target. Recent data show the
RWR effect to be robust across a variety of conditions, anr) the
magnitude of the effect appears lo be greater when memory is
weaker (Clark & Davey, 2005; Mac Lin, Wells, & Phe1an, 2004).
There remains some debate about the psychological processes
underlying the RWR effect. Ebbessen and Flowe (n.d.), for instance, suggest that it could simply represent a downward criterion shift that occurs when the target is removed. Regardless of
the interpretation, the RWR effect illustrates the substantial risk
that accrues lo an innocent suspect when the actual target is not
present.
The effect also further illuminates the problem of filler
selections that we noted earlier in the discussion of archival
studies using police files, in which one third of positive
identifications by witnesses were identifications of innocent
fillers. In the American archival study, Behrman anrl Davey
(2001) found that nearly a quarter of witnesses selected a filler
(and 50% selected the suspect). Thus, the average filler was
selected by 5% of witnesses-what might be termer! "had
guesses'' (at least in the sense that witnesses' memories were not
good enough lo avoid en-ors; Penrod, 2003). Of course, in a
perfectly fair array, one would have to assume that at least
another 5% of witnesses wuulc.l "guess" the suspect. These
selections might be characterized in various ways: Steblay et al.
(2001) called them "calculated guesses" and Penrod called
them "lucky guesses."
As we discuss later, there ure reasons lo believe Lhal many
lineups are not fair and that calculated/lucky guesses produce
many suspect idenlifications that look like "hits" but are really
the product of biased arrays and witness guessing. Steblay et al.
(2001) reported, for instance, that in studies of target-absent
simultaneous arrays in which a filler similar to the suspect was
designated the "innocent suspect," that person was picked by
27% of witnesses (across all studies. one of the six fillers-including the suspect-was picke<l Ly 51 % of witnesses). One
might expect that in a fair lineup the innocent filler would he
selected by 8.5% (Sl %/6) of witnesses instead of 27%. The
much higher rule of suspect identification suggests that the
witnesses had some memory for the appearance of the missing
target hut not enough of a memory to avoid mistakenly identifying an innocent person.
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Pre-Linenp Instructions. One of the first and most fundamental
lineup system variables to be tested empirically was the instruction (or warning) to eyewitnesses that the target might or
might not be in the lineup. Malpass and Devine (1981) used both
target-absent lineups and target-present lineups; they either
gave the pre-lineup instruction that the target might or might not
be present or gave no instruction. When participants viewed a
target-present lineup, the instruction had little effect on the
distribution of responses. When they viewed a target-absent
lineup, however, the instruction reduced choosing rates (Jramatically. This general pattern, in which the i1istruction reduces
the chances of lmth mistaken identifications and filler identifications, has been replicated extensively (see meta-analysis by
Steblay, 1997). A more recent meta-analysis indicates that accurate identification rates in target-present lineups might be
~lightly harme<l by the instruction, but the decline in accurate
identifications when the target is present is much smaller than
the decline in mistaken identifications when the target is absent
(Clark, 2005).

been to use the eyewitness's description of the target anrl to take
any additional measures needed to make sure that the suspect
does not stand out in the lineup (Wells et al., 1998).
Along with these strategies for selecting fil1ers, various
techniques to assess lineup fairness by using "mock witnesses"
have been developed. The task of a mock witness is to examine
the lineup and try to discern which person is the suspect. From
this mock-witness paradigm, various metrics have been <leveloped to assess the extent to which the suspect stands out unfairly
(Ma]pass & Lindsay, 1999). In lab studies, the mock-witness
parn<ligm appears to be sensitive lo lineup bias an<l is relatively
robust across variations in lineup procedure (e.g., simultaneous
vs. sequential proce<lures; see McQuiston & Malpass, 2002).
Studies of photo arrays and lineups from actual cases using the
mock-witness method reveal that arrays are frequently biased
against suspects, who are picked more than twice as often
(relative to the fillers) as one would expect by chance alone
(Brigham et al., 1999; Valentine & Heaton, 1999; Wells &
Bradfield, 1999b).

Selection of Fillers. The characteristics of the fillers used

Lineup Size. A common practice in the Unite<l Stales is to use
five or six persons (a suspect plus four or five fillers) in a live
lineup and six or eight photos in a photo lineup. For purposes of
this discussion of lineup size, we will assume that each lineup
member is viable in the sense that the fillers are selected to fit
the description and in other ways do not make the suspect stand
out. Given a set of properly selected lineup fillers, there is no
reason to believe that an innocent suspect has a greater chance
than any of the fillers to be identified by an eyewitness. Hence,
eyewitness researchers have adopted the assumption that the
chances of a mistaken identification are (l/N) x p(I). where N
is the number of lineup members and p(l) is the probability
that art eyewitness will make an identification (see Doob &
Kirshenbaum, 1973; Wells, Leippe, & Ostrom, 1979). Note that
increasing lineup size reduces the chances of a mistaken
i<lcntification in a negatively decelerating fashion (i.e., each
additional lineup member reduces the chances of a mistaken
identification less than the previous addition did). Because of
this negative deceleration, the addition of persons to the lineup
brings diminishing returns. Thus, adding six additional members to a six-person lineup reduces the chances of mistaken
identification from 16.7% to 8.3% (i.e., among those making an
identification). But, adding six members to a 12-pcrson
lineup reduces the chances of mistaken identification from
8.:3% lo 5.S%.
If reducing the chances of a mistaken identification were the
only consideration, increasing the size of the lineup to a very
high number is a good i<lea, even with <liminishing returns. But
the formula speaks only to mistaken identifications from targetabsent lineups and not to the chances of accurate identifications
from target-present lineups. The idea of a system variable improvement for lineups is lo reduce the chances of a mistaken
identification without harming the chances of an accurate

in a lineup have a strong influence on the chances that
an innocent suspect will be identified in a target-absent lineup.
In general, if the innocent suspect fits the description
of the target and the fillers do not, the innocent suspect
is likely to be mistakenly identified. The first empirical demons! rat ion hy Lindsay and Wells (1980) was followed by a debate
aliout the optimal criteria for selecting fillers. Two primary
strategies for selecting fillers have been advocated. One is to
select fillers who resemble the suspect. Luus and Wells (1991)
argued against this strategy because it has no "stopping point"
an<l also because it risks creating a lineup of clones, which
woultl reduce accurate identification rates for target-present
lineups. Wells, Ry<lell, an<l Seelau (1993) found that selecting
fillers on the basis of the description given by the eyewitnesses
managed to protect the innocent suspect in target-absent
lineups without harming accurate identification rates in targetpresent lineups. On the other hand, selecting fillers on the basis
of their resemblance to the suspect harmed hit rates with no
additional protection for the innocent suspect in target-absent
li1wups.
Wogalter, Marwitz, and Leonard (1992) presented another
argument against selecting fillers on the basis of their
resemblance to the suspect: The "backfire effect" refers to the
idea that, somewhat ironically, the suspect might stand out if he
or she wus the basis for selecting the fillers in the lineup, because the suspect represents the central tendency or origin of the
lineup. Chu-k an<l Tunnicliff (2001) reported evi<lence for the
backfire effect. However, eyewitnesses' descriptions of the target are often sparse and sometimes do not even match the
characteristics of the suspect (Lindsay, Martin, & Webber, ·1994-;
1\1eissner, Sporer, & Schooler. in press; Sporer, 1996, in press).
The general recommendation for selecting fillers for lineups has
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identification. Thus. the critical question is what happens to
accurate identifications as a function of increasing lineup size?
The eyewitness-identification literature has not derived a precise function relating lineup size to accurate-identific:ation
rates. Levi (2002) reported no drop in accurate-identification
rates when lineup sizes were increased from l O lo 40 persons.
In fact, the literature includes reports of eyewitnesses being able
to view up to about :{OU photos with little reduction in the
chances of an accurate identification (Ellis, Shepherd, Flin,
Shepherd, & Davies, 1989; Lindsay, Nosworthy, Marlin &
Martynuck, 1994}. These results are consistent with the general
observation that identifications of the target from target-present
lineups are not as sensitive to lineup variations as mistaken
irlentifications from target-absent lineups are (Charman &
Wells. 2006). For example, the "might or might not be present"
instruc.tions have little effect on accurate identifications from
target-present lineups but appreciably reduce identifications
from target-absent lineups (Stehlay, 1997). Similarly, the use of a
filler-biased lineup has little effect on accurate identifications
from target-present lineups but increases mistaken identifications from target-absent lineups (Wells, Rydell, & Seelau,
199~). Also, suggestive influences from lineup administrators
appear to have little effect when eyewitnesses view a targetpresent lineup but have a strong effect when the eyewitnesses
view a target-absent lineup (Haw & Fisher, 2004). More systematic research is needed heforc it will be possible to conclude
that lineup sizes can easily be raised to 20 or more persons
without harming accurate idf'ntification rates, hut there appears
to be great promise in the simple idea of increasing the nominal
size of lineups.

Double-Blind lineups. Police conducting a lineup hus been
likened lo psychologists conducting an experiment (Wells &
Lum;, 1990). One element of this rich ..malogy is the ic.lea of the
double-blind lineup (Wells, 1988). Normally, a lineup is conductec.l by the case detective. who also asscmbleJ the lineup and
knows which person is the suspect and which people are merely
fillers. The psychological literature on experimenter-expectancy
effects reveals the <langcrs of permitting a person who knows the
correct, desired, or expected answer to administer a face-to-face
test (Harris & Rosenthal. l 98S). and yet this is standarrl practice
for lineups. Experiments have shown that when the lineup administrator is led to believe that a particular lineup member
(rnnc.lomly selected) is the suspect, the chances that the eyewitness will identify that person are increased (Haw & Fisher,
2004; Phillips, McA uliff, Kovera, & Cutler, 1999). Furthermore,
when the eyewitness selecls the person whom the lineup administrator was led lo believe is the target, the eyewitness expres~P.s higher levels of conGdenee in the identification
(Garrioch & Brimacombe. 2001).
The idea of the double-blind lineup is straightforward: The
person who administers the lineup should not be aware of which
lineup member is the suspect and which members are fillers
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(Wells et al., 1998). This recommendation does not presume any
intention or awareness on the part of the lineup administrator
to influence the eyewitness. Some police jurisdictions might be
concerned about manpower issues involved in using an in<lependent lineup administrator. Because most lineups in the
United States are actually photo spreads of some sort rather than
live lineups, an alternative to using a double-blind administrator
is to have a laptop computer administer the lineup, thereby effectively eliminating any possible influence from the lineup
administrator (for a description of suc:h a program, see Mac Lin,
Zimmerman, & Malpass, 2005).

Sequential Lineups. An alternative to the traditional police
lineup. the sequential lineup, was introduced in the mid-1980s
(Lindsay & Wells, 1985}. Unlike the traditional police lineup, in
which all members are presented to the eyewitness at once
(simultaneous lineup), the sequential lineup presents the lineup
members to the eyewitness one at a time. The eyewitness is told
that he or she will view a number of people-the number is not
specified. The witness makes a decision on each lineup member
(yes, no, or not sure} before the next lineup member appears. The
theory behind the sequential lineup is that it prevents eyewitnesses from relying on relative judgments, in which one lineup
member is compared with another an<l the one most similar to
the target is picked. Although the eyewitness can compare the
lineup member ctmently being viewed with those already seen,
there is a chance that a lineup member yet to come might look
even more similar to the target. The initial results indicated
support for a sequential-superiority effect in which identifications from target-absent lineups diminished while identifications of the target from target-present lineups remained largely
the same.
Years of additional experiments culminated in a metaanalysis that aggregated data across 4,145 participant witnesses
(Stelilay et al., 2001). The meta-analysis supported the original
observation of lower mistaken ic.lentification rates for the sequential than for the simultaneous lineup; however, there was
also a reduction in accurate identifications of the target from the
target-present li11eups. In general, the sequential procedure
appears to result in fewer identification attempts overall compared with the simultaneous procedure. Although the seffuential
procedure reduced mistaken identifications at a greater rate
than it did accurate identifications, this shift in performance is
consistent with a criterion shift in which eyewitnesses set a
higher criterion for identification with the sequential than with
the simultaneous proce<lure (Meissner, Tredoux, Parker, &
Mac Lin, 2005). However, these results are also consistent with a
shift away from relative judgments.
Recall that the RWR effec:t indicates that some propo1tion of
accurate identifications appears to result from relative judgments rather than true recognition. Thus, a shift away from
relative judgments is likely to result in fewer accurate identifications as well as fewer mistaken identifications. An argument
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can be ma<le that a more conservative lineup test (whether owing
to a higher criterion for making a positive i<lentification or lo a
reduced reliance on relative judgments) is desirable, as mistaken iclentification is the primary cause of convictions of the
innocent. The trade~off of accurate and mistaken identifications
ultimately is a clccision for po]icymakers, not scientists. However, Steblay et al. (2001) and Penrod (2003) argue that any
losses of accurate i<lentifications that result from reduce<l reliance on relative judgments are merely reductions in lucky or
calculated guesses.
A recent field experiment involving actual lineups con<lucte<l
in Illinois (Illinois Pilot Program, 2006) has been touted as a
comparison of the sequential lineup and the traditional simultaneous lineup. The authors' report on the experiment interprets
its results as indicating that the traditional simultaneous lineups
yielded fewer filler identifications and more suspect identifications than did the sequential lineups. In fact, however, this twocondition experiment actually confounded several variables.
Perhaps the most important confound was that the simultaneous
lineups were never conducte<l using <louLle-blin<l procedures
but were always conducted by the case Jetectives. The sequential li1wups, in contrast, were always conducted using the
double-blin<l methoc.J. Tlrns, the low filler rate obtained in the
simultaneous lineups could havP. heen the result of not using
double-blind procedure:--. Consistent with this concern, it should
he notecl that the douhle-hlincl sequential-lineup clata in the
Illinois Pilot Program conformed quite well with data obtained
using the double-blind sequential procedure in the Hennepin
County (Minnesota) pilot project (about 8% filler identification
rates; see Klobuchar. Steblay, & Caligiuri, in press). In contrast,
the very low filler rate reported in the lllinois Pilot Program
using the nonLlind simultaneous procedure (about ~~%) is an
extreme outlier from the approximately 20% rate found in other
jurisdictions with simultaneous lineups (see Behrman & Davey,
2001; Slater, 1994; Valentine et al., 2003; Wright & McDaid,
1996). The profoundly low filler-identification rate for simultaneous lineups reportetl in the Illinois Pilol Program suggesls a
suppression of filler identifications and/or a reluetance to report
filler identifications by the nonblind lineup administrators.
Thus. we are reluctant at this time to consider the Illinois Pilot
Program to be an interpretable test of the simultaneous versus
sequential procedure.
Composites
When there is no dear suspect, investigators sometimes resort to
the use of sketch artists or composite faces. Little systematic
research on sketch at1ists exists, i11 part because variance across
artists (e.g., in their abilities} is presumed lo be significant and u
fairly large sample would be required to reach generalizable
conclusions. Considerable research exists, however, on composite production systems, which are increasingly being used by
crime investigators in place of sketch artists. Composite production systems create faces by selecting features (e.g., nose,

eyes, chin, head shape. hair, mouth, brows, ears) and combining
them into a face. One of the original systems, Identi-Kit, use<l
line drawings of facial features on transparencies. An accompanying booklet displayed all the possible features, and the
eyewitness selected features that were then overlaid on each
other to form a complete face. A later system, Photo-Fit, used the
same system, except that the features were black-and•white
photos of actual facial features instea<l of line drawings.
In recent years, computer software programs have replaced
transparency-based composite systems. Examples of such soft•
ware are E-Fit, Evo-FI'l~ CD-Fit, and Mac a Mug (Frowd et al.,
2005). The FACES program is currently popular among U.S. law
enforcement agencies (Cote, 1998). FACES indudes 361 hair
selections, 63 head shapes, 42 forehearl lines, 410 sets of eyebrows. 514 sets of eyes, 593 noses, 561 sets of lips, 416 jaw
shapes, 145 moustaches, 152 beards, 33 goatees, 127 sets of
eyeglasses, 70 eye lines, 147 smile lines. 50 mouth lines, and 40
chin lines. In each feature category, a selection button permits
the user to view subsets of the feature that meet a particular
description. For instance, eyes are diviJed into the subsets
narrow, deep set, overhanging lids, heavy lids, average blue or
green, almond-shaped blue or green, average brown, almondshapeJ brown, and bulging. Noses are tlivicle<l into the subsets of
narrow, average with round base, average with broad hase,
average pointed, hooketl nostrils not showing, hooked nostrils
showing, slightly flared nostrils, very Aarerl nostrils, round
(bulbous), average large, wide base with nostrils showing, and
wide base with nostrils not showing. Jn addition, controls permit
the feat mes to be moved up or down and closer or farther apart,
and lo be made larger or smaller. The features are displayed on
one side of the computer screen, and the face is built on the other
side. When a feature is clicked, it appears on the face. To make
changes-for example, in the eyes-one simply clicks a different set of eyes, and those on the face are replaced with the new
ones.
All composite systems use a pmt-to-whole method to build the
face: The eyewitness constructs a face by selecting features and
assembling them. Numerous face-recognition researchers have
noted that this method may conflict with the natural way faces
are encoded in memory-namely, in a holistic manner (e.g.,
Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997; Wells & l·lryciw, 1984). Research experiments generally indicate that composite faces tend lo be rather poor likenesses of the original faces
(e.g., Bruce, Ness, Hancock, Newman, & Rarity, 2002; Ellis,
Davies, & Shephar<l, 1978; Kovern, Penrod, Pappas, & Thill,
1997). The research by Kovera et al. illustrates the difficulty of
generatiug a composite that resembles the intended target. The
researchers used a set of 50 composite images of the faces of
high-school classmates and faculty created by former students.
Other graduates of the same schools judged the composites'
quality. The judges were told that some of the composites were of
former high-school clussmates: they were asked to identify them,
rating the faces' familiarity and their own confidence in that
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assessment anci, where possible, giving names. Ratings of familiarity and confirlenc:e rlirl not rliffercntiate significantly between the known and unknown faces, and only 3 of the 167
names offererl for the composites prover! to he co1,-ec:L! Ratings
by the composite constructors of their familiarity with the targets
and thPir assessments of the quality of their composites were
unrelated to identification accuracy on any measure. The researchers conclu<led that "the findings ... raise <loubts about the
likelihood that composites prepared under field conditions will
yield a pinpointed identification of a perpetrator by individuals
who know the perpetrator" (Kovera et al., 1997, p. 245).
Although early research using the ldenli-Kit and Photo-Fit
suggeste<l that the poor likenesses might Le due to the composite
systems themselves (e.g., Loo few choices of features; Ellis et al.,
1978). there is an emerging consensus that people simply do not
have good memories for isolaterl facial features and that any
system that requires parts-to-whole-face recall will be severely
limited. Furthermore, research suggests that having eyewitnesses build a composite face can damage memory for the original faee am.I make the witnesses less able lo 1:ecngnize the
original target face in a later lineup (Wells, Charman, & Olson,
200S). Similar effects have been observed for giving verbal
descriptions of faces, a phenomenon called the verbal overslwdowing effect (originally clemonstrated by Schooler &
Engstler-Sdwoler, 1990; and see meta-analysis by Meissner &
Brigham, 2001 h).
Recent research has produced some encouraging results for
cases in which multiple eyewitnesses independently produce
composites. In such cases, morphing the individual composites
produces a new face that is a better likeness of the person than is
any individual composite (Bruce et al., 2002; Hase} & Wells, in
press). But even the morph of four individual composites does
not pro<luce a Jramatic likeness of the original face. Hase] and
Wells rt>ported that the ability lo pick the original target from
sets of four alternative faces was 35% for imliviJ11al composites
and 48% for four-composite morphs (chance = 25%).

POSTDICTION VARIABLES
Posldictio11 variables are neither system nor estimator variahl<"s
in the traditional sens1~, because they are not presumed to
causally affect the accuracy of eyewitnesses. These variables are
measurable products that correlate with the accuracy of eyewitnesses in a noncausal manner. The most researched of these
is the confidence (certainty) of the eyewitness. Another postdiction variable is response latency-specifically, how long the
eyewitness takes to make ,m identification. The third post<liction
variable that we review here is self-reported decision process.

Confidence
The confidence an eyewitness expresses in his or her identification is one of the most researched questions in the study of
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eyewitnesses. First, there is a strong intuitive appeal to the irlea
that confidence am! accuracy should be closely related. Second,
courts have explicitly endorsed the idea that the reliability of an
eyewitness should be gauged at least in part by the person's
confidence, a tenet advocated by the U.S. Supreme Court
(Manson v. Braithwaite, 1977). Third, even in the absence of
instructions to pay attention to eyewitness confidence, participant jurors rely heavily on the confi<lenc:e of the eyewilness in
deciding whether he or she made an accurate identification (e.g.,
Bradfield & Wells, 2000; Fox & Walters, 1986; Lindsay el al.,
1986; Lindsay et al., 1989; Limlsay et al., 1981; Wells, Ferguson, & Lindsay, 1981; Wells et al., 1979).
Initially, eyewitness researchers focused on the relationship
between eyewitness-identification confidence and eyewitnessidentification accuracy {Wells & Murray, 1984). This was a
useful starting point, but it is now clear that the relationship
between confidence and accuracy varies greatly as a function of
many other factors. For instance, it depends, in part, on how
similar the mistakenly identified person is to the actual target
(Lindsay, 1986). The confidence-accuracy relalionship is generally higher when memory strength is stronger rather than
weaker {Deffenliacher, 1980); when ii is calculated only among
those who make an identification rather than among both those
who make an identification and those who do not (Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995); and when it is calculated across
witnesses under different viewing conditions rather than among
witnesses who had the same viewing conditions (Read, Vokey, &
Hammersley, 1990).
In their meta-analysis of 30 studies involving a total of 4,036
participant witnesses, Sporer et al. (1995) estimated that the
confidence-accuracy correlation among choosers could be as
high as + .4 l. Wells, Olson, & Charman (2002) nole that a .41
point-biserial correlation (a correlation between a two-level
variable and a continuous variable) between confidence an<l
accuracy in eyewitness identification is less than the pointbiserial correlation between height and gender in humans.
Nevertheless, under conditions of uncertainty, a post<liction
variable that has a .41 correlation to a criterion variable is not
something that should be ignored. In fact, the American Psychology-Law Society's white paper on lineups endorses the idea
of making a clear record of the confidence of an eyewitness that
triers-of-fact might later use (Wells ct al., 1998).
Accuracj' of Higl,ly Conficlenl Witnesses
Though conficlence-aecuracy correlations are sometimes relatively high, most research yields relatively low correlations.
Attempts have hecn marle to increase the correlation through
accountability, context reinslulemenl, and other thought manipulations, but none has been successful, and such measures
commonly have the reverse effect of harming the confidenceaccuracy relationship (Robinson & Johnson, l 998). Some have
argued that despite the generally weak confidence-accuracy
correlation. accuracy may be very high among the most confi-
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dent witnesses. One analytic method that addresses this queslion uses calibration methorls that measure peoples' confirlence
on a percentage scale (zero. 10%, 20%, 30%, and so on) and
then elump~ people together at rlifferent levels of confidence to
assess their accuracy (see Brewer, Keast, & Rishworth, 2002;
Rrewcr, Weber, & Semmler, 2005; Brewer & We1ls, 2006; Cutler
& Penrod, 1989; Juslin, Olsson, & Winman, 1996; Weber &
Brewer, 20o:3, 2004).
Cutler and Penrod found witness overconfidence of 10 to 20%
(that is, witnesses were making 10%-20% more errors than their
confidence levels indicated). Juslin et al. (1996) found that
confidenc:e scores were roughly comparable lo accuracy scores;
in particular, in a 95% confidence group, judgments were 85 to
90% accurate (the exact numbers are not reporterl-numbers
are estimated from figures). Although these numbers look
promising, even in the 95% confidence group there appear to be
10 to 15% errors; en-ors are much higher-with greater overconfidence-at lower confidence levels.
Other researchers have found less promising results. Though
the publisheJ numbers are slightly ambiguous, it appears that
the top 21 % most confident witnesses in Brigham, Maus, Sny<ler,
and Spaulding (1982) were 85% correct. Brewer el al. (2002)
founJ that eyewitnesses who were very confident in the accuracy
of their identifications (95% certain) were about 70 to 75%
correct-that is, high error rates and substantial overconfidence. In a 1987 sturly by Fleet, Brigham, and Bothwell, 75% of
subjects who rated themselves as extremely confident were accurate. Brigham (1990) found a 74% accuracy rate for the top
27% most confident witnesses. Bornstein and Zickafoose (1999)
reported that they found overconfidence in both general-knowledge domains and eyewitness-memory domains and that the two
were correlated. The latter finding suggests that confidence has
an individual-difference component that can be independent of
the task. Research by Perfect and Hollins (1996) suggests that
poor confidence-accuracy relationships are at least partly attributable to people's lac!k of insight regarding their general
abilities in the eyewitness domain.
The general point is that these results are consistent with
other measures of the confidence-accuracy relationship.
Even lhP calibration approach rlocs not uniformly support the
notion that confidence is a highly reliable indicator of accuracy.
Error rates can be high among even the most confident
witnesses. Furthermore, these numbers presume that the criminal justice system would skim off only the most confident witnesses and thut none of those witnesses would have had their
confidence artificially boosted.

The Problem. Grows Worse
Imagine that prosecutors are skimming only the most confident
witnesses; there is no artificial confidence-boosting among the
witnesses; and we have reliable measures of confidence, not the
vague verbal reports currently obtained by police. Among these
highly confident witnesses, the results above indicate that 20 to
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30% could he in error. But even if the error rate is only 10% for
these highly selected and most confident witnesses, they will all
appear highly confident to jurors-so confidence cannot help
the jurors figure out which witnesses have made errors. ln<leed,
the simple correlation between confidence and accuracy for
these witnesses wi1l be much worse than among all witnesses,
because there is very little variability in confidence and maybe
no useful variance. Though it is tempting to conclude that jurors
might be entitled to assume a fairly high base rate of accuracy
among these highly confident witnesses (even if confidence
cannot aid them in differentiating accurate and inaccurate
witnesses), the pleading effect discussed earlier suggests that it
would not Le safe to conclude that the accuracy rate is fairly
high; inrlee<l, the accuracy rate could be fairly low, because the
guilty defendants facing confident witnesses have already
pleaded guilty. ln short, the research results and logic call into
question the notion that witness confidence can be of significant
assistance to jurors.
Even if the research showed that eyewitness-identification
confidence an<l accuracy are related al a level that could have
practical utility, this conclusion would come with another huge
caveat. Wells and Bradfield (1998) showed that giving confirming feedback to eyewitnesses who had made mistaken
identifications (e.g., "Good, you identified the suspect") produces profound distortions in their retrospective judgments,
including their recol1ections of how confident they were when
they made their identification, how good a view they had when
they witnessed the event, and how much attention they devoted
to the target's face during the event.
The idea that eyewitness confidence can be driven by variables that are independent of accuracy has theoretical roots in
Leippe's (1980) early analysis of the prohlem, hut the fact that
other testimony-relevant variables (such as self-reports of al·
tention and view) are also malleable is a startling revelation.
There are numerous replications of this phenomenon, known as
the post-identificationfeedback effect. (Bradfield, Wells, & Olson,
2002; Dixon & Memon, 2005; Hafstad, Memon, & Logie, 2004,;
Neuschatz et al., 2005; Semmler, Brewer, & Wells, 2004; Wells
& Bradfield, 1998, 1999a; Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2003; also
see a meta-analysis by Douglass and Stcblay, in press). The postidentification feedback effect occurs even if the feedback is
delayed for 48 hours (Wells et al., 2003). The effect occurs for
both positive identifications and "not there" decisions (Semmler
ct al.. 2004), and the effect occurs for both the elderly (Neuschatz et al., 2005) an<l young children (Hafste<l et al., 2004).
Importantly, the confidence-inflating effect of confirming feedback is greater for eyewitnesses who have made a mistaken
irlentification than for those who have made an accurate identification; as a result, confirmatory post-identification feedback
harms thf! accuracy-confidence relationship (Bradfielrl ct al.,
2002). Furthermore, a recent experiment showed that the postidentification feedback effect occurs for actual eyewitnesses to
real crimes (Wright & Skagerberg, in press).
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The post-identification foerlback effect is of considerable
practical imporl, because it is a common practice for lineup
administrators to give eyewitnesses feedback about their identifieations. When an eyewitness has received some form of
feedback before being asked about his or her confidence in the
identification, the confidence statement is contaminated. Eyewitnesses tend to believe that the feedback did not affect them;
however, those who report that the fee<lbuck <lid not affect their
response to the retrospective confidence question are nevertheless affected just as much as are the smaller portion of witnesses who report that it might have affected them {Wells &
Bradfield, 1998). Fortunately, if the eyewitness is asked to indicate his or her confidence level Lefore receiving feedback, this
tends to inoculate the eyewitness against post-identification
feedback effects (Wells & Bradfield, 1999a). The need for immerliate measures of confidence is further inrlicaterl hy the fact
that repeated questioning, expenditure of effort over time, and
publir. displays of confidence (as might happen at a trial) all tend
to inflate eyewitness confidence even when accuracy is held
constant (Shaw & McClure, 1996; Shaw & Zerr, 20W~; Shaw,
Zerr, & Woythaler, 2001). Clearly, the must pristine measure of
witness eonfidence is one collected from the witness al the lime
uf identification an<l before the contaminating influence of these
later events.
An intriguing phenomenon that appears to be related to the
post-identification feedback effect is visual hindsight bias.
1farley. Carlsen, and Loftus (2004) presented participants with
pl10tographs of familiar faces that were severely rlegraderl
(blurred) but gradually resolved to full clarity. After the identity
of the face became apparent, participants predicted the level of
blur that would permit a na'ive observer to identify the face.
Participants who had already learned the identity of the face
consistently prec.licted that a nai've participant woulc.l be able to
idenlify the face al levels of blur that were in fact loo severe for
identification. Thus, once the "correct" answer is known, people
think that objeclively poor viewing conditions are nevertheless
sufficient for accurate identification. This "saw it all along" eff~ct could he an important component of the propensity for
eyewitnesses to have retrospective overconfidence in their
iclentifications.
Response L,1tcncy
Another interesting postdictor of eyewitness accuracy is the
n:spunse latellt")'" of tlie eyewitness in making a lineup identification. \Ve use "response latency" rather than "decision time,"
because the former term incorporntcs buth decisional and motor
{'0lllponenls (Weber, Brewer, Wells. Semmler, & Keast, 2004).
The effect was first Jocumented by Sporer ( 1992); considerable
data have accumulated showing that witnesses who make accurate identifications from lineups do so faster than do those who
make inaccumte iclcntifieations (Ounning & Perretta, 2002;
Dunning & Stern, 1994; Smith, Lindsay, & Pryke, 2000; Smith,
Lindsay, Pryke, & Dysart, 2001; Sporer. 1993, 1994; Weber

Voluuw 7-Numlu·r 2

et al., 2004). Sporer (1992) suggested that this occurs because
comparisons made to the target involve a large number of
common features between memory and the stimulus face,
thereby permitting a very fast decision in recognizing the target.
Comparisons to an innocent lineup member, on the other hand,
involve fewer common features between memory anrl the stimulus, thereby resulting in a slower decision. The potential
practical value of the negative relation between response latency and identification accuracy is considerable because, unlike confidence, response latency is a performance variable
rather than a self-report. And, unlike confidence, response latency can be measured without the eyewitness's awareness.
Furthermore, response latency and confidence are not fully redundant postrlietors of accuracy {Smith et al., 2001; Weber et al.,
2004).
For response latency to be useful at the level of evaluating an
individual eyewitness, however, some criteria have to be set for
"fast" anrl "slow." How are police, prosecutors, judges, and
juries to know whether a given result (e.g., response latency of
20 secon<ls) was fast or slow and thus should Le considered
accurate or inaccurate? Dunning and Perretta (2002) approached this problem by repeatedly selecting different response latencies, examining the percentages correct above and
below eaeh response latency, and calculating the obtained chisquare values for each response latency. The response latency
that prorlucerl the greatest value was then considered to be the
best rule for deciding on the decision criterion. Using this approach, Dunning and Perretta found that a response latency of
10 to 12 seconds worked best across four different data sets.
Furthermore, the 10-12-second response latency was highly
discriminating-those who responded before the 10-12-second
latency had a probability of accuracy of nearly 90%, while those
who took longer than 10-12 secomls had a probabi]ity of accuracy of approximately 50%. Dunning and Perrella called this
the "10-12 second rule." The consistency of the 1O-12-second
response latency data sets fits nicely with Dunning and Stern's
(1994) notion of automatic versus deliberative processing in
eyewitness identification. They arguerl that automatic decision
processes (which are fast) are likely to be characteristic of accurate eyewitnesses, while deliberative processes (which are
slower) ought to be more characteristic of inaccurate eyewitnesses. Furthermore. because automatic processes tend Lo be
uninHuenced by decision context, the speed of accurate identifications ought to be relatively stable across situationshence, the 1O-12-second mle was µruposed to be stable across
various circumstances and conditions.
!\fore recent research, however, has shown that the l O-12second rule is not stable across variations in witnessing and
lineup conditions. Weber el al. (2004) found that the maximally
discriminating time ranged from S seconds to 29 seconds across
variations in conditions. Fu.rthermore, eyewitnesses who responded faster than the optimal time boundaries did not show
particularly high probabilities of being accurate; they were often
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in the SO to 60%· range rather than the 90% range found hy
Dunning anrl Perretta (2002). Although the 10-12-second rule
does not appear to be stable. the fact that accurate identifications are made faster than inaccurate identifications is itself a
very reliable finding.

Self-Reported Decision Processes
Another potential postdictor of eyewitness-identification accuracy is eyewitnesses' reports of the processes they use to make
their identification decisions. Wells (1984) argued that mistaken
identifications tend to arise from making relative judgments in
which the eyewitness compares one lineup member to another to
decide who looks most like the target; Wells argued that an
absolute judgment (comparing the lineup member lo memory)
would be more likely to be accurate. Consistent with this assumption, Stern anJ Dunning (1994) found that eyewitnesses
who agreed with the statement "l <:omparecl the photos fin the
lineup] lo each other lo narrow the choices" were more likely lo
have marle a mistaken identification than were those who entlor~ed the statement "I just reeognized him, I cannot explain
why" or those who said the photo "popped out:• Similar results
have been reported by Smith et al. (2000), Smith et al. (2001),
Dunning and Stern (1994). and Lindsay and Bellinger (1999).
One of the problems with self-reporteu uecision processes is
that, like eyewitness confidence, they are subject to distortion.
For instance, confirmatory post-identification feedLack leads
eyewitnesses Lo be more likely to recall that the lineup photo
"popped out" and less likely lo report having made a relative
judgment (Wells & Braclfielcl, 1998). Furthermore, if eyewitnesses thought these kinds of self-reports would be used lo assess the Ji ke1y accuracy of their identifications, they might shape
their answers acc:orrlingly.
Overall, it appears that postdiction has not been highly successful for eyewitness identification. Indicators of confidence
measured at the time of the identification may have some diagnostic value with regard to accuracy, but feedback, prosecutorial skimming, and plea bargaining can operate lo obliterate
the diagnostic value of confidence. This underscores the primary
message of the system-variable approach-namely, that it would
lie heller lo use procedures that liclp prevent mislakcn idcnlifications from occurring i11 the first place than lo try to detect
errors after tlw fact.

PHOGRESS AND PROSPECTS
F:yewitncss science has made consi<lerahle progress in recenl
years in gelling a number of jurisdictions in the United Stales lo
improve their identification procedures and undertake training
in the cognitive interview. The state of New Jersey, for instance,
has adopted an entire package of reforms for how it conducts
lineups. These reforms are based explicitly on the eyewitness
literature and include the adoption of recommendations for
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selecting lineup fillers, instructing eyewitnesses before the
lineup, using double-blind lineup administrators, using the
sequential procedure, and obtaining a confidence statement
from the eyewilness before extemal factors ean influence the
person's confidence. Other jurisdictions-including the states
of Wisconsin and North Carolina and the cities of Boston and
Minneapolis-have also adopted these reforms. In each of these
jurisdictions, eyewitness scientists played a central role in explaining the literature and helping translate the findings into
practical reforms of eyewitness-identification procedures.
In many jurisdictions, eyewitness researchers have become
involved in training police investigators in eyewitness-identification procedures or training the trainers. Increasingly, eyewitness researchers are targeting some of their writings toward
law enforcement journals to more directly make the research
findings accessible lo law enforcement (e.g., Turtle, Lindsay, &
Wells, 2003). Jury simulations have shown that mock jurors
respond more favorably to eyewitness-identification testimony
when it was obtained using these packages of reformed procedures than when procedures deviate from these reforms
(Lampinen, Ju<lges, OJegunl, & Hamilton, 2005). This is an
unusual impact for a laboralory-hased psychological science. In
the years ahead, it is expected that these reforms will become
even more widespread and the role of scientific psychology more
deeply ingrained in the legal system.
Despite this progress, we believe that research has only
scratched the surface of ways to help the legal system improve
the accuracy of eyewitness accounts. Thus far, almost all improvements to lineup procedure have been designed to reduce
the chances that an innocent suspect will be identified without
reducing identifications of the target. It has been more difficult
lo discover ways lo increase the chances that the eyewitness will
iJentify the target in target-present lineups. Both research experiments and archival analyses of actual lineups suggest that
eyewitnesses fail to identify the target about 50% of the time.
This does not 11ecessari1y mean that the target walks away; in
some cases, other evidence is sufficient lo charge or convict the
person. Nevertheless, there is room to improve these hit rates. 1t
seems likely that some failures to identify the target from targetpresent lineups are due at least in part to changes in the target's
appearance. Specifical1y, the appearance of the target when the
eyewitness viewed the crime represents a moment in time. The
photo seen in a photographic lineup may be olJer or more recent.
Attempts to use pre-lineup instructions that warn the eyewitness
that the target's appearance might have changed have not proveJ
successful in increasing accuracy; in fact, they seem to increase
errors (Clrnrman & Wells, in press).
It could be argued that research has been profoundly conservative in its approach to the eyewitness-identification problem. Specifically, researchers have tended to operate within the
confines of the traditional lineup, in which a suspect is placed
among fillers and the eyewitness makes a verbal identification.
But what if the lineup had never existed and the legal system
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turni>ci to psychology to cletermine how information could

hf! extracted from eyewitnesses' memories? Specific methods for
obtaining detailed reports from witnesses-such as the cognitive inter\'iew-rlo not appear to aid identification, hut the
quality of witness descriptions could be improved though
innovative questioning procedures. This is an area in which
research is sparse, despite the potential to study the effectiveucss of various types of retrieval cues in eliciting descriptions
(Sporer, in press). The focus on target identification has also
resulted in research that has selectively focused on the impact of
a specific system or estimator variable on lineup performance,
insteatl of exploring relevant interactions. For example,
is the weapon-focus effect more pronounced when a witness has
a shorter exposure to the target, when the retention interval
is longer, and when the witness is making a cross-race
identification? Operating from scratch, it seems likely that
modern psychology would have developed radically different
ideas. For instance, brain-activity measures, eye movements,
rapid displays of faces, reaction times, and other methods for
studying memnry might have Leen cJevelope<l insteacJ of the
traditional lineup. Once we step outside the confines of the
lrnditional lineup, it is possible lo imagine a future science of
eyewitness evidence that is radically different from the methods
used today.
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■ Abstract The criminal justice system relies heavily on eyewitness identification
for investigating and prosecuting crimes. Psychology has built the only scientific literature on eyewitness identification and has warned the justice system of problems with
eyewitness identification evidence. Recent DNA exoneration cases have corroborated
the warnings of eyewitness identification researchers by showing that mistaken eyewitness identification was the largest single factor contributing to the conviction of these
innocent people. We review major developments in the experimental literature concerning the way that various factors relate to the accuracy of eyewitness identification.
These factors include characteristics of the witness, characteristics of the witnessed
event, characteristics of testimony, lineup content, lineup instructions, and methods of
testing. Problems with the literature are noted with respect to both the relative paucity
of theory and the scarcity of base-rate information from actual cases.
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Eyewitnesses are critical in solving crimes, and sometimes eyewitness testimony
is the only evidence available for detennining the identity of the culprit. Psychological researchers who began programs in the 1970s, however, have consistently
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articulated concerns about the accuracy of eyewitness identification. Using various methodologies, such as filmed events and live staged crimes, eyewitness
researchers have noted that mistaken identification rates can be surprisingly high
and that eyewitnesses often express certainty when they mistakenly select someone
from a lineup. Although their findings were quite compeBing to the researchers
themselves, it was not until the late 1990s that criminal justice personnel began
taking the research seriously. This change in attitude about the psychological literature on eyewitness identification arose primarily from the development of forensic
DNA tests in the 1990s. More than 100 people who were convicted prior to the
advent of forensic DNA have now been exonerated by DNA tests, and more than
75% of these people were victims of mistaken eyewitness identification (Wells
et al. 1998, Scheck et al. 2000). The apparent prescience of the psychological
literature regarding problems with eyewitness identification has created a rising
prominence of eyewitness identification research in the criminal justice system
(Wells et al. 2000).
Because most crimes do not include DNA-rich biological traces, reliance on
eyewitness identification for solving crimes has not been significantly diminished
by the development of forensic DNA tests. Interestingly, research on eyewitness
reliability has been done only by psychologists-primarily cognitive and social
psychologists-and the psychological literature represents the only source of empirical data on eyewitness identification. The vast criminal justice system itself has
never conducted an experiment on eyewitness identification.

COVERAGE OF THIS REVIEW
No review of the eyewitness identification literature has previously appeared in the
Annual Review of Psychology. Therefore, we include here references to articles

from the 1970s and 1980s that we think especially critical to the development of the
literature, but we primarily emphasize more recent developments. Also, because
the eyewitness identification literature has become so vast, we are necessarily selective in our citations and coverage. Readers should note that this review focuses
on eyewitness identification rather than on eyewitness testimony in general. Eyewitnesses commonly testify about many things, such as which hand a gunman
used, the color of a car, or recollections of a conversation, but these event memories are outside the scope of this review. The large literature on child eyewitnesses,
suggestibility, and recovery of repressed memories is not reviewed here.

BASIC CONCEPTS
The eyewitness identification literature has developed a number of definitions and
concepts that require explanation. A lineup is a procedure in which a criminal
suspect (or a picture of the suspect) is placed among other people (or pictures of
other people) and shown to an eyewitness to see if the witness will identify the
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suspect as the culprit in question. The term suspect should not be confused with
the tenn culprit. A suspect might or might not be the culprit (a suspect is suspected
of being the culprit). Fillers are people in the lineup who are not suspects. Fillers,
sometimes cal1edfoils or distractors, are known-innocent members of the lineup.
Therefore, the identification of a fi11er would not result in charges being brought
against the filler. A culprit-absent lineup is one in which an innocent suspect is
embedded among fi11ers and a culprit-present lineup is one in which a guilty suspect
(culprit) is embedded among fillers. The primary literature sometimes calls these
target-present and target-absent lineups.
A simultaneous lineup is one in which all lineup members are presented to
the eyewitness at once and is the most common lineup procedure in use by law
enforcement. A sequential lineup, on the other hand, is one in which the witness
is shown only one person at a time but with the expectation that there are several
lineup members to be shown.
A lineup'sfunctional size is the number of lineup members who are "viable"
choices for the eyewitness. For example, if the eyewitness described the culprit as
being a tall male with dark hair and the suspect is the only lineup member who
is tall with dark hair, then the lineup's functional size would be 1.0 even if there
were 10 fillers. Functional size was introduced as a specific measure (Wells et al.
1979), and competing measures have been proposed, such as Malpass's (1981)
"effective size." Today functional size is used generical1y to mean the number of
lineup members who fit the eyewitness's description of the culprit.
Mock witnesses are people who did not actually witness the crime but are asked
to pick a person from the lineup based on the eyewitness's verbal description of
the culprit. Mock witnesses are used to test the functional size of the lineup.
The diagnosticity of suspect identification is the ratio of accurate identification
rate with a culprit-present lineup to the inaccurate identification rate with a culpritabsent lineup. The diagnosticity of "not there" is the ratio of "not there" response
rates with culprit-absent lineups to "not there" response rates with culprit-present
lineups. The d;agnosticity offiller identifications is the ratio offiller identification
rates with culprit-absent Jineups to fl lier identification rates with culprit-present
lineups.
Among variables that affect eyewitness identification accuracy, a system variable is one that is (or could be) under control of the criminal justice system, while
an estimator variable is one that is not. System variables include instructions given
to eyewitnesses prior to viewing a lineup and the functional size of a lineup. Estimator variables include lighting conditions at the time of witnessing and whether
the witness and culprit are of the same or of different races.
The distinction between estimator and system variables has assumed great significance in the eyewitness identification literature since it was introduced in the
late l 970s (Wells 1978). In large pait, the prominence of this distinction attests to
the applied nature of the eyewitness identification literature. Whereas the development of a literature on estimator variables pennits some degree of postdiction
that might be useful for assessing the chances of mistaken identification after the
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fact, the development of a system variable literature permits specification of how
eyewitness identification errors might be prevented in the first place.

ESTIMATOR VARIABLES
Estimator variables can be sorted into four broad categories: characteristics of the
witness, characteristics of the event, characteristics of the testimony, and abilities of
the testimony evaluators to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate witness
testimony.

Characteristics of the Witness
Are members of certain groups better eyewitnesses than those of others? The
empirical evidence is not overwhelming. For example, there is no clear evidence
that males and females differ significantly overall in ability to identify people from
lineups. A meta-analysis by Shapiro & Penrod ( l 986) indicated that females might
bes Iightly more likely to make accurate identifications but also slightly more likely
to make mistaken identifications than are males (due to females being more likely
to attemp an identification), thereby yielding an overall equivalent diagnosticity for
males and females. Although males and females might take an interest in different
aspects of a scene and thereby remember somewhat different details (e.g., Powers
et al. 1979), overall abilities of males and females in eyewitness identification
appear to be largely indistinguishable (but see Brigham & Barkowitz 1978, Shaw
& Skolnick 1999).
The age of the eyewitness, on the other hand, has been consistently linked to
eyewitness identification performance, with very young children and the elderly
performing significantly worse than younger adults. The eyewitness identification
errors of young children and the elderly are highly patterned: When the lineup
contains the actual culprit, young children and the elderly perform nearly as well
as young adults in identifying the culprit, but when the lineup does not contain
the culprit the young children and the elderly commit mistaken identifications at a
higher rate than do young adults (see the meta-analysis on children versus adults
by Pozzulo & Lindsay 1998).
There is little evidence that intelligence is related to eyewitness identification
performance. Although an early study by Howe11s (1938) indicated a significant
relation between face recognition accuracy and intelligence, later studies have
shown no relation (e.g., Brown et al. 1977). A word of caution is in order here,
however, because Howells's sample of witnesses included a much greater range
of intelligence at the low end than have later studies. At the low extremes of
intelligence, a pattern similar to that found with children seems likely, namely a
high rate of mistaken identifications in response to culprit-absent lineups.
The race of the eyewitness has been examined extensively. Although no consistent overall differences attributable to race have emerged, the evidence is now
quite clear that people are better able to recognize faces of their own race or
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ethnic group than faces of another race or ethnic group. A recent meta-ana]ysis
by Meissner & Brigham (2001) shows that this effect is robust across more than
25 years of research.
. Little published research relates personality characteristics to eyewitness identification accuracy. Hosch et al. (1984) found that high self-monitors (individuals
· who adapt their behavior to cues regarding what is socially appropriate) are more
susceptible to biased lineup procedures than are low self-monitors, and Hosch &
Platz ( 1984) found a relation between self-monitoring and correct identifications.
Also, a meta-analysis by Shapiro & Penrod (1986) indicated that individuals high
in chronic trait anxiety (a general attitude of apprehension) made fewer mistaken
identifications than individuals low in chronic trait anxiety. Their meta-analysis
also indicated that field independents (those with a perceptual tendency to differentiate parts of a visual field from the whole) made fewer accurate identifications (but equal mistaken identifications) than did field dependents. However,
little research has been directed at the role of personality in eyewitness identification, and no strong theory relating personality to eyewitness identification has
emerged.

Characteristics of the Event
A variety of factors affect the abi1ity of an eyewitness to identify the culprit at
a later time, including the amount of time the culprit is in view, the lighting
conditions, whether the culprit wears a disguise, the distinctiveness of the culprit's
appearance, the presence or absence of a weapon, and the timing of knowledge
that one is witnessing a crime.
Distinctive faces are much more likely to be accurately recognized than nondistinctive faces (e.g., Light et al. 1979). Faces that are highly attractive or highly
unattractive are easier to recognize than are faces that are average in attractiveness (e.g., Fleishman et al. 1976), but what makes a face distinctive is not entirely
clear. Because the arithmetic mean (averaged at the pixel level) of several faces
(a prototype) is judged to be more attractive than the individual faces that were
averaged (see Lango is & Roggman 1990), the distinctiveness-recognition relation
is probably not due to a simple deviation from the arithmetic mean of individual
facial features.
Simple disguises, even those as minor as covering the hair, result in significant
impairment of eyewitness identification (Cutler et al. 1987). Sunglasses a}so impair
identification, although the degree of impairment can be reduced by having the
targets wear sunglasses at the time of the recognition test (Hockley et al. 1999).
Photos of criminal suspects used in police lineups are sometimes several years old.
Changes in appearance that occur naturally over time and changes that are made
intentionally by suspects can have quite strong effects on recognition. Read et al.
( 1990) found that photos of the same people taken two years apart were less likely
to be recognized as the same people when their appearance had naturally changed
(via aging, facial hair) than when their appearance had remained largely the same.
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Clearly, at the extreme of low light levels there is a point at which a face cannot
be perceived well enough to be recognized later. Surprisingly, however, we know
ofno experiments that have measured the light levels required for the encoding of
faces. We encourage researchers to address this question.
As would be expected, the amount of time a culprit's face is in view affects
the chances that the eyewitness can identify the person later (E1lis et al. 1977).
However, this relationship depends less critically on the eyewitness's opportunity
to view per se and more on the amount and type of attention that the witness directs
at the culprit. Given equal exposure time to a face, people are more likely to be
able to recognize that face later if they make abstract inferences about it (e.g., is
this person honest?) than if they make physical judgments (e.g., does this person
have a large or small nose?). Presumably, this effect occurs because the abstract
inferences require holistic processing of the face whereas the physical judgments
require feature processing (Wells & Hryciw 1984).
In general, the amount of time a culprit's face is in view is not as critical for
eyewitness identification accuracy as the type or amount of attention given by
the witness. For example, Leippe et al. ( 1978) exposed unsuspecting people to a
staged theft of a package. Some were led to believe that the package contained a
valuable item and some were led to believe that the package contained a trivial
item. In addition, some learned of the value of the item in the package before the
theft and some only learned the value after the thief had fled. Although all had the
same opportunity to view the thief, the witnesses who knew the value of the item
beforehand were significantly more accurate at identification than the other three
groups. Observers often do not realize that they have witnessed a crime until after
the culprit has fled. Although they might have had significant opportunity to view
the culprit, they might have had little reason to attend closely.
One factor that can signal to eyewitnesses that a crime is occurring is the presence of a weapon. Unfortunately, learning that one is an eyewitness to a crime
via the culprit's display of a weapon might not make the person a better eyewitness. A number of studies have been directed at the question of the so-called
weapon-focus effect. A meta-analysis of these studies indicates that the presence
of a weapon reduces the chances that the eyewitness can identify the holder of
the weapon (Steb lay 1992). Loftus et al. ( 1987) monitored eyewitnesses 's eye
movements and found that weapons draw visual attention away from other things
such as the culprit's face. Complicating the issue somewhat is the fact that the
presence of weapons or other types of threatening stimuli can cause arousal, fear,
and emotional stress. The effects of such stress on memory are still being debated.
Some research shows that increased levels of violence in filmed events reduces
eyewitness identification accuracy (e.g., Clifford & Hollin 1981) whereas other
research has failed to find this effect (e.g., Cutler et al. 1987). Deffenbacher ( 1983)
suggested that the effect is likely to follow the Yerkes-Dodson Law where only
very high and very low levels ofarousal will impair memory. Christianson 's ( 1992)
review of the evidence relating emotional stress to memory suggests that emotional
events receive preferential processing; emotional response causes a narrowing of
attention (as suggested by Easterbrook 1959) with loss of peripheral details.
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Characteristics of Testimony
Considerable interest and research have been directed at the question of whether
there are characteristics of an eyewitness's testimony that could be used to postdict
whether the witness made an accurate or false identification. The bulk of this research has focused on the certainty (confidence) of the eyewitness. Although early
research suggested that the certainty an eyewitness expresses in an identification
is largely unrelated to the accuracy of the identification, current analyses suggest
a more hopeful but also more complex view of the cerlainty-accuracy relation.
Although any given experiment might show a statistical1y nonsignificant relation
between certainty and accuracy, meta-analyses of the literature show a reliable
correlation. Several moderators of the strength of the relation have been identified. One important moderator is the overall accuracy of the eyewitnesses. When
accuracy is low (e.g., from poor witnessing conditions), the certainty-accuracy
relationship suffers (Bothwell et al. 1987). Later meta-analyses indicate that the
certainty-accuracy relation is stronger if the analysis is restricted to those making an identification (choosers only) than if it also includes witnesses who make
correct and false rejections (Sporer et al. 1995). In fact, using a weighted average
of effect sizes for choosers only, Sporer et al. reported a 0.37 certainty-accuracy
correlation across 30 studies. More recent work indicates that directing eyewitnesses to reflect on their encoding and test conditions or asking them to entertain
hypotheses regarding why their identification might have been mistaken can improve the relation between accuracy and certainty, especially when this relation
is calculated using calibration methods rather than the point-biserial correlation
(Brewer et al. 2002).
Although the 0.37 correlation estimate for the certainty-accuracy relation is
more optimistic than the early estimates, recent studies suggest the literature might
be overestimating the utility of eyewitness certainty in actual cases. In a series of
experiments, eyewitness certainty was shown to be highly malleable among eyewitnesses who had made mistaken identifications (Wells & Bradfield 1998, 1999).
After making mistaken identifications, some eyewitnesses were given confirming
feedback by the lineup administrator ("Good, you identified the suspect") whereas
others were given no feedback about their identification. This feedback served to
distort the eyewitnesses' recollections of the certainty they had in their identifications. Those given confiiming feedback recalled having been very ce11ain in their
identification compared to those given no confinning feedback. This certaintyinflation effect is greater for eyewitnesses who make mistaken identifications than
it is for those who make accurate identifications, resulting in a significant loss in
the ce11ainty-accuracy relation (Bradfield et al. 2002). In actual cases, it is common for lineup administrators (usually the detective in the case) to give confirming
feedback to eyewitnesses, thereby inflating the certainty of the eyewitness and confounding the certainty-accuracy relation. Even if the lineup administrator refrains
from giving the witness confirming feedback, the witness is likely to make confirming inferences from later events (e.g., an indictment of the identified person).
Another real-world factor that can muddle the meaning of eyewitness certainty is
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repeated testing. Shaw and his colleagues (Shaw 1996, Shaw & McClure 1996)
have shown that repeated questioning of eyewitnesses on a matter about which they
were inaccurate serves to inflate their certainty that they were accurate. Hence, it is
unclear whether the .37 correlation between certainty and accuracy revealed in the
Sporer et a1. meta-analysis of experiments can be directly applied to actual cases
in which there are other influences that inflate the certainty of eyewitnesses.
An even more promising indicator of eyewitness accuracy is the speed with
which the eyewitness makes an identification from a lineup. Several studies have
now found that witnesses who make accurate identifications from a lineup reach
their decision faster than do witnesses who make mistaken identifications
(Dunning & Perretta 2002; Dunning & Stem 1994; Robinson et al. 1997; Smith
et al. 2000; Sporer 1992, 1993, 1994). In an impressive set ofresults, Dunning &
Perretta found that those who made their decision in less than 10-12 seconds were
nearly 90% accurate in their identifications from a lineup whereas those taking
longer were approximately 50% correct. The 10-12-second rule was developed
post hoc to produce the best separation of accurate and inaccurate witnesses, so
some caution is called for with regard to how well the 10-12-second rule works
in other situations; but the general relation between accuracy and speed of identification has received support in several studies. In addition, the idea that faster
identifications are more likely to be accurate than are slower identifications makes
good theoretical sense. It has long been theorized that mistaken identifications result from a deliberated judgment in which witnesses compare one lineup member
to another and use inferences and elimination strategies to decide which person
must be the culprit whereas accurate identifications result from a more automatic
recognition process that does not require comparisons of one lineup member to
another (Wells 1984a).

Lay Observers' Judgments of Accuracy

i'7\
~

Observers (e.g., jurors) have little ability to make correct discriminations between
accurate and inaccurate eyewitness identification testimony. Several methods have
been used to assess the adequacy of people's judgments about eyewitness identification accuracy. Surveys, for example, show poor agreement (often less than
50%) between the answers that lay people give about variables affecting eyewitness identification accuracy and the answers researchers score conect based on the
empirical literature (e.g., Deffenbacher & Loftus 1982, Mcconkey & Roche 1989,
Noon & Hollin 1987). Another approach has been to use "prediction" studies in
which eyewitness identification experiments are described and people are asked
to predict the results. The results of these studies show a tendency to overestimate
eyewitness identification accuracy and a failure to correctly predict interactions
between variables (e.g., Brigham & Bothwell 1983, Wells 1984b).
A third approach is to cross-examine eyewitnesses to staged crimes and to
ask subject-jurors to determine whether witnesses made accurate or mistaken
identifications. In a series of experiments using this methodology, subject-jurors
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have shown little or no ability to make such discriminations (Lindsay et al. 1989,
Lindsay et al. 1981, Wells et al. 1981, Wells & Leippe 1981, Wells et al. 1979).
Because observers' belief rates exceeded eyewitnesses' accuracy rates, these
studies are commonly cited as evidence that people are overbelieving of eyewitnesses. However, this pattern of overbelief is restricted primarily to poorer
witnessing conditions; when witnessing conditions were good, belief rates and
eyewitness identification accuracy rates were more similar. In addition, mock
jurors sometimes underbelieved the eyewitnesses who had quite low levels of
certainty.

SYSTEM VARIABLES
System variables are those that affect the accuracy of eyewitness identifications
and over which the criminal justice system has (or can have) control. In general,
these tend to be lineup test factors, such as how witnesses are instructed prior to
viewing a lineup or how the lineup is structured. The distinction between system
variables and estimator variables is consequential in several respects. Whereas estimator variables can at best increase the probabi1ity that the criminal justice system
can s01t accurate from inaccurate eyewitness identifications, system variables can
help prevent inaccurate identifications from occurring in the first place. Consider,
for instance, the idea thatjurors tend to overbelieve eyewitness identification tes~
timony. Although expert testimony about eyewitness identification might manage
to reduce jurors' tendencies to overestimate eyewitnesses' accuracy, the system
variable approach might enable eyewitness identification accuracy to match the
level of jurors' beliefs (Seelau & Wells 1995).
The procedure used by crime investigators conducting a lineup has been likened
to that of researchers conducting an experiment (Wells & Luus 1990). Crime
investigators begin with a hypothesis (that the suspect is the culprit), create a design
for testing the hypothesis (embed the suspect among fillers), carry out a procedure
(e.g., provide pre-lineup instructions and present the group to an eyewitness),
observe and record the eyewitness's behavior (witness decision), and then interpret
and revise their hypothesis (whether the suspect is the culprit). All the types of
things that can go wrong with an experiment to cause misleading results can also
go wrong with a lineup. For instance, the instructions might bias the witness, the
hypothesis might be prematurely leaked, the design might be flawed, the behavior
might be misinterpreted, confinnation biases might be operating, and so on. Indeed,
a great deal of the research literature on system variable eyewitness identification
could be construed as the extension of sound experimental methodology to the
design and procedure of police lineups.
Most system variable research in eyewitness identification can be placed into
four categories: instructions, content, presentation method, and behavioral influence. Before reviewing these system variables, however, it is important to understand the role played by the presence versus absence of the culprit in the lineup
and the concept of a relative-judgment decision process.
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Culprit-present Versus Culprit-absent Lineups
A lineup might or might not include the actual culprit. If police investigators have
unknowingly focused on an innocent person as their suspect and place that suspect
in the lineup, then the eyewitness(es) will end up viewing a lineup for which the only
correct answer is "not there." Research repeatedly shows that culprit-absent lineups
present great problems for eyewitnesses. The same eyewitnesses who identified
an innocent person from a culprit-absent lineup might otherwise have been able to
identify the actual culprit from a culpiit-present lineup (Wells 1984a). In one study,
for example, 54% of eyewitnesses were able to identify the actual culprit from a
6-person culprit-present lineup and 21 % made no identification. When the culprit
was removed without replacement (making it a 5-person culprit-absent lineup),
however, the rate of no identification rose only to 32%, with the other 68% of
the eyewitnesses who saw this lineup mistakenly identifying someone from the 5
remaining members of the lineup (Wells 1993).
A theoretical view that has been used heavily in the eyewitness identification
literature is that eyewitnesses tend to use a relative-judgment decision process in
making identifications from a lineup (We1ls 1984a). The relative-judgment conceptualization states that an eyewitness tends to select a person from a lineup who
most resembles the eyewitness's memory of the culprit relative to the other lineup
members. Although the relative-judgment decision process permits eyewitnesses
to do a reasonable job ofidentifying the culprit from a culprit-present lineup, when
eyewitnesses view a culprit-absent lineup there will likely be one lineup member
who looks more like the culprit than the others.
An alternative explanation of the errors witnesses make with culprit-absent
lineups is that eyewitnesses tend to have lax criteria of resemblance; under culpritabsent circumstances, innocent lineup members easily meet these undemanding
criteria (Ebbesen & Flowe 2002). Experimental data have not yet favored one
of these interpretations over the other. Recent mathematical modeling of lineup
data by Clark may help to refine our understanding of the ro1es of both re1ative
judgments and criterion setting (Clark 2002).

Instructions
A variable shown repeatedly to have considerable impact on eyewitness identifications from lineups is the pre-lineup instruction given to eyewitnesses. Malpass
& Devine ( l 981) were the first to demonstrate that the ratio of accurate to inaccurate identifications is strongly affected by whether or not eyewitnesses have been
instructed (warned) prior to viewing the lineup that the culprit might or might
not be in the lineup. A meta-analysis of the eyewitness identification literature on
pre-lineup instructions reveals that the loss of accurate identifications from such
instructions is minima] whereas the reduction of mistaken identifications is considerable (Steblay 1997). Steblay's meta-analysis showed that the presence of the
"might or might not be present" instruction (compared to no instruction) reduced
mistaken identification rates in culprit-absent lineups by 41.6% whereas accurate
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identification rates in culprit-present lineups were reduced by only 1.9%. Based
on this compelling research, the U.S. Department of Justice included this type of
instruction in its first set of national guidelines for law enforcement on the collection of eyewitness evidence (Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence
1999).

Lineup Content
When police have a suspect and decide to conduct a lineup, nonsuspect (filler)
members of the lineup must be chosen. The imp01tance of the selection of fillers
as a system variable was demonstrated early, and it remains one of the primary
active issues in the eyewitness identification literature. Ideally, lineup fillers would
be chosen so that an innocent suspect is not mistakenly identified merely from
"standing out," and so that a culprit does not escape identification merely from
blending in. The first experimental demonstration of the importance offiller selection showed what can happen when this idea is not achieved. When fillers did not
at all resemble the culprit, eyewitnesses tended to mistakenly identify an innocent
suspect who resembled the culprit; when the suspect was the culprit, however,
the manipulation of fillers had little effect on the rate of accurate identifications
(Lindsay & Wells 1980).
Although the issue of lineup fillers seems simple at first glance, it is in fact
complex. In the early demonstrations, researchers used their knowledge of the
culprit's identity to select fillers. In actual cases, of course, the identity of the
culprit is not known. Using the suspect as a proxy for the culprit will have different
effects on rates of accurate and mistaken identification depending on whether the
suspect is the culprit or an innocent person. Accordingly, selecting fillers who
are highly similar to the suspect can help protect the innocent suspect in a culpritabsent lineup, but can also reduce accurate identifications in a culprit-present lineup
(Luus & Wells 1991 ). Another line of research has shown that using the suspect
as the reference point to select fillers can create a "backfire effect" in which an
innocent suspect, being the origin or central tendency of the lineup, actually has
an increased chance of being identified as the culprit (Clark & Tunnicliff 200 I,
Navan 1992, Wogalter et al. 1992).
An alternative to the strategy of selecting fillers based on their resemblance to
the suspect is to select fillers based on their fit to the verbal description the eyewitness had given of the culprit. This fit-to-description strategy has several practical
advantages (see Wells et al. 1994) and has worked well in some experiments (Juslin
et al. I 996, Wells et al. I 993). However, biases against the innocent suspect can
remain with the fit-to-description method when the description is especially sparse
or when the innocent suspect happens to show a high resemblance to the culprit
(Clark & Tunnicliff 2001, Lindsay et al. 1994). In actual cases, high resemblance
between the innocent suspect and the culprit can occur by chance or it can occur
whenever the innocent person became a suspect because she or he resembled a
composite or a security video image of the culprit.
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Lineup Presentation Method
Many alternatives to the traditional 1ineup have been proposed and tested, and
future research will likely focus on solving the lineup system variable problems.
The first proposed alternative to the traditional lineup was the blank lineup control
method (Wells 1984a). A blank lineup is one that contains only fillers (no suspect).
The eyewitness is first shown the blank lineup under the belief that this is the only
lineup to be shown. The identification of someone from a blank lineup is known to
be an error (because the Iineup mem hers are all fl llers ), and witnesses who make an
identification from a blank lineup can thereby be discarded. Witnesses who do not
make an identification from the blank lineup can then be shown the actual lineup
(which contains a suspect). Data indicate that eyewitnesses who do not make an
identification from the blank lineup are much more reliable on the second (actual)
lineup than are those who were not screened with the blank lineup method. In
effect, the blank lineup method is analogous to the use of a control condition in
a within-subjects design and could be used in actual cases. In general, however,
crime investigators have not liked the idea of the blank lineup control method on
grounds that it "tricks" the eyewitness and could sever the eyewitness's trust in
investigators.
Another proposed alternative to the traditional lineup procedure, and the best
known of these alternatives, is the sequential lineup (Lindsay & Wells 1985). Unlike the traditional lineup in which the lineup members are shown to the eyewitness
simultaneously, the sequential lineup shows the eyewitness only one lineup member at a time and requires the eyewitness to make a decision ("Is this person the
culprit or not?") prior to viewing the next lineup member. The most powerful version of the sequential procedure is one in which the eyewitness does not know how
many lineup members are to be viewed. ln theory, the sequential lineup procedure
prevents eyewitnesses from selecting the person who looks most like the culprit
relative to the other lineup members, a process called relative-judgment decision
(see above) (Wells 1984a). To the extent that relative judgments are operating,
eyewitnesses will have difficulty with culprit-absent lineups because by definition
someone in the lineup resembles the culprit more closely than the other lineup
members do. Unlike the simultaneous lineup, the sequential lineup prevents eyewitnesses from making a relative-judgment decision because at any point in the
sequence a lineup member who has not yet been viewed may turn out to resemble
the culprit more than any person viewed thus far. Eyewitnesses must compare each
member of the sequential lineup to their memory of the culprit and thus make a
more "absolute judgment" about identity. A recent meta-analysis of 25 studies
comparing simultaneous and sequential lineups showed that the sequential lineup
reduced the chances of mistaken identifications in culprit-absent lineups by nearly
one half (Steblay et al. 200 l ). Unfortunately, the sequential technique was also associated with a reduction in accurate identification rates in culprit-present lineups.
Although this reduction was not as great as that in mistaken identifications, it was
nevertheless statistically reliable. The pattern of these results has led Ebbesen &
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Flowe (2002) to speculate that the sequential lineup raises the criteria for making
a positive identification rather than changing the process from relative to absolute
judgments.
Another alternative to the traditional lineup is the elimination lineup, a procedure in which the witness's task is to eliminate al] but one lineup member and then
make a separate decision as to whether that person is the culprit or not (Pozzulo
& Lindsay 1999). Although the elimination lineup does not seem to work well
with adults, it seems to eliminate some of the problems young children have with
lineups.

G
Behavioral Influence: The Need for Double-Blind Testing
One of the ways that the justice system itself can influence eyewitness identification evidence is through the behaviors of the person who administers the lineup
(Wells 1993). Commonly, the person who administers a lineup is the case detective who, of course, knows which member of the lineup is the suspect and
which members are fillers. The need for double-blind testing is well established
in the behavioral sciences (Rosenthal 1976) but is largely unknown or unheeded
in criminal investigation procedures and forensic science (Risinger et al. 2002).
Lineup administrators could inadvertently communicate their knowledge about
which lineup member is the suspect and which members are merely fillers to the
eyewitness through various verbal and nonverbal means. Phillips et al. (1999) manipulated lineup administrators' assumptions about the identity of the culprit and
found that this manipulation affected the choices that eyewitnesses made from the
lineup, especially when a sequential lineup procedure was used. In addition to
influencing eyewitnesses' choice of particular lineup members, the person administering the lineup can cause other problems. Wells & Bradfield ( 1998, 1999) found
that post-identification suggestions to eyewitnesses from lineup administrators led
mistaken eyewitnesses to develop high levels of false certainty that they had made
an accurate identification. The problem of influence from the lineup administrator
is easily fixed by having lineups administered by someone who does not know
which lineup member is the suspect and which ones are fillers (We1ls et al. 1998).

Base Rates as System Variables
Base rates can be considered system variables in some cases. The important base
rate in eyewitness identification is the base rate for the culprit being present versus
absent in a lineup. Most mistaken identifications occur when the culprit is not in
the lineup. Although the relation between the culprit-absent versus culprit-present
base rate and the chances of mistaken identification has been established and
modeled mathematically (Wells & Lindsay 1980, Wells & Turtle 1986), the case
was only recently made for treating this base rate as a system variable (Wells
& Olson 2002). Previously, this base rate was treated as a fixed (albeit largely
unknown) variable in actual cases. In fact, however, no laws or rules determine
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when a suspect is placed in a lineup and, therefore, this base rate varies as a
function of the decisions crime investigators make when conducting a lineup.
Consider, for instance, two police departments, a lax-criterion department and
a strict-criterion department. In the lax-criterion department, investigators will
place a suspect in a lineup for the slightest ofreasons (e.g., a mere hunch) whereas
the strict-criterion department requires certain evidence against a person (e.g.,
possession of stolen goods) before placing that person in a lineup. These two
departments will, over the long run, have different base rates for culprit-present
and culprit-absent lineups. Suppose, for example, that over a run of 1000 lineups
the lax-criterion department shows 500 culprit-absent lineups and 500 culpritpresent lineups whereas the strict-criterion department shows only 100 culpritabsent lineups and 900 culprit-present lineups. Given equivalent eyewitnesses in
both of these departments, mistaken identifications of suspects will be nine times
as likely in the Jax-criterion department than in the strict-criterion department.
(These surprising differences in the chances that an identification will be mistaken
are simple derivations from Bayes' theorem.) Although the justice system has not
yet done so, it could control the culprit-present versus culprit-absent base rate by
requiring "probable cause" before placing someone in a lineup (Wells & Olson
2002). The base rate for culprit-present and culprit-absent lineups might be the
most powerful system variable affecting the chances of mistaken identification.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
In spite of the successful application of the eyewitness identification literature,
significant work has yet to be done. The eyewitness identification literature has
been driven much less by theoretical frameworks than by practical perspectives.
Two problems are related to this state of affairs. One is that the premium on application and forensic relevance reduces the interplay and sharing of ideas between
eyewitness identification researchers and their counterparts in basic areas of psychology, especially cognitive and social psychology. In addition, the experimental
eyewitness identification literature is likely never to be complete enough to cover
every possible situation that arises in actual cases; hence, better theory is needed
to generalize this body of literature and to fill in gaps regarding what is likely to
happen under various conditions.
A second concern is that while laboratory data on eyewitness identification
are extensive, some key forms of real-world data are lacking. Certain estimable
rates of eyewitness identification behavior and lineup conditions from actual cases
could assist the design and interpretation of laboratory work. For instance, there
have been no empirical estimates of the base rate for culprit-present versus culpritabsent lineups in actual cases. Although it is difficult to establish the ground truth
(actual guilt or innocence) needed for precise estimates of this base rate in actual
cases, methods exist for estimating upper limits (see Wells & Olson 2002). In
addition, although the identification of a suspect from a lineup usually cannot be
definitively classified as an accurate or mistaken identification in an actual case, the
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identification of a filler is a known error in actual cases and the rate at which these
known errors occur can be informative. Two estimates of the fil1er identification
rates in actual cases have been published. Wright & McDaid ( I 996) reported a rate
of about 20% and Behnnan & Davey (2001) reported a rate of24%. One problem
in collecting fi11er identification data from real cases is that police records often
do not distinguish between eyewitnesses who make identifications of a filler and
those who make no identification, which can result in a serious underestimation
of the rate offiller identifications (Tollestrup et al. 1994). Another problem is that
filler identification records from actual cases often lack an indication of the level of
eyewitness certainty. These problems can be avoided by scripting data coHection
with police departments.
Actual case data of these types (e.g., base rates, filler identification rates, eyewitness certainty on known errors) can supplement the laboratory literature on
eyewitness identification in two important ways. First, actual case data can be
compared to laboratory data to see if the general rates of certain behaviors (e.g.,
nonidentification responses) are similar. Second, the rates for certain conditions
in actual cases (e.g., rates of culprit-present versus culprit-absent lineups) are critical for Bayesian estimations of posterior probabilities that cannot themselves be
derived from experiments.
Eyewitness identification research is likely to continue to focus on system variables for the foreseeable future because of the way system variables can be mapped
onto the problem of improving eyewitness identification accuracy in actual cases.
At the same time, estimator variables might be re-emerging with new promise for
postdiction for three reasons. First, conditions are being found in which eyewitness
certainty might be more closely related to eyewitness identification accuracy than
once thought, especially when external influences on eyewitness certainty are minimized. Second, new postdiction variables, such as decision time, are emerging.
Third, Bayesian analyses are being used to show that some eyewitness responses
to lineups, such as filler identifications, have postdiction value in exonerations.
Each of these represent potentially superior estimator variables because they can
be more precisely measured in actual cases than can some of the more traditional
estimator variables (such as stress or arousal). In any case, there is little evidence
that eyewitness identification research is veering away from its applied orientation,
especially in the face of recent successes in _affecting legal policies and practices
(Wells 200 I, Wells et al. 2000).
The Annual Review of Psychology is on line at http://psych.annualrevicws.org
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